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Arms Control & Disarmament

A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS



VOLUME 7, NUMBER 4

FALL 1971

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1971

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A QUARTERLY BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABSTRACTS AND ANNOTATIONS

Prepared by the
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION
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PREFACE

Arms Control & Disarmament attempts to bring under bibliographic control a large and growing body of literature in an important subject area. It is prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section of the Library of Congress, through the support of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, and German languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, locations are shown by call numbers for cataloged items and by symbols for uncataloged items and materials held by custodial units of the Library. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,200 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

Library of Congress Location Symbols

(Uncataloged and Unclassified Materials)

Chi Kor	Chinese and Korean Section
DLC	Books in process
Hebr	Hebraic Section
Japan	Japanese Section
LL	Law Library
Nr East	Near East Section
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
N&CPR	Newspaper and Current Periodical Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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I. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS

1459
American Society for Cybernetics. CYBERNETICS, SIMULATION, AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION; PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM. Edited by Douglas E. Knight, Huntington W. Curtis and Lawrence J. Fogel. New York, Spartan Books [c1971] 249 p.
HM136.A58

A series of lectures on the problem of campus confrontation, international conflict analysis and simulation, and the role and applications of cybernetics in the coming decade and beyond.

1460
Ansprenger, Franz. [AFRICA: AREAS OF INFLUENCE, INTERVENTION, PROPAGANDA] Afrika: Einflussräume, Interventionen, Propaganda. Moderne Welt, v. 11, no. 3, 1970: 262-275.
D839.M58, v. 11

The Sino-Soviet conflict affects Africa only indirectly, and its influence on that continent is seldom visible to the foreign observer. The most important questions are how Moscow and Peking select their African partners and how the Africans react to the ideological split between these two Communist powers. Although there were earlier attempts at intervention, the Soviet and Chinese policies toward Africa appear to be converging. In selecting partners, both powers place their main emphasis on the established governments of the independent states, exhibiting only moderate preference for "noncapitalist" regimes. All African leaders favor peaceful coexistence and therefore tend to favor Moscow's position. In regard to the use of force in the transformation of society, opinion in Africa varies, although those currently in power understandably disavow its use. Africa will play a role in the Sino-Soviet conflict to the extent that its leaders feel they can exploit these foreign influences to their own advantage.

1461
Apel, Hans. [MYTH OF THE YELLOW POWER] Mythos der gelben Macht. Frankfurter Hefte, v. 26, May 1971: 368-373. AP30.F555, v. 26

The ever-current myth that China will rival or overtake the economic and military potential of the Soviet Union or the United States in the foreseeable future is based on the projection of faulty assumptions and exaggerated growth factors and has led to political speculation on the likelihood of war or permanent estrangement between China and the Soviet Union. The truth is that when more realistic assumptions are made and a more plausible growth rate of 4 percent is used, China is still a long way from becoming a superpower. In fact by the year 2000 China will have reached only one-fifth of the U.S. potential. Contrary to general opinion, China and the Soviet Union will soon find political and ideological accord for economic reasons. Mao's leadership has been based on the economic realities of early industrialization, which require the constant reinvestment of surplus, resulting in his endeavors to create "the new-type man," one who will accept a self-sacrificing role for the greater good. As China's productive capacity increases, however, this ideology of asceticism will give way to the philosophy of consumer consumption and material reward, just as it has in the Soviet Union.

1462
Art, Robert J., and Kenneth N. Waltz, comps. THE USE OF FORCE; INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY. Boston, Little, Brown and Company [1971] 547 p. DLC

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Capabilities and doctrines: theories on the use of force.--pt. 2. Case studies on the use of force: Chemical warfare; a study in restraints, by Frederic J. Brown. Controlling the risks in Cuba, by Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter.--pt. 3. Innovation and obsolescence in the use of force: adjusting strategy to capability.--pt. 4. Constraints on the use of force: reciprocal interactions in armament races: The objectives of arms control, by Hedley Bull. Arms races: prerequisites and results, by Samuel P. Huntington. On stability in deterrent races, by Malcolm W. Hoag.--pt. 5. Successes and failures in the control of force: Weapons, doctrine, and arms control: a case from the good old days, by Warner R. Schilling.--Suggestions for further reading.

Articles on the role of military power in international politics, with special attention to the impact of modern technology. The selections deal both with theoretical problems or principles and with particular cases of the application of force. They are meant to throw light on the role force has actually played in international politics, how military power has evolved in the 20th century, and how changes in the use of force have influenced the practices of statesmen.

1463
Banks, Michael. [ON THE THEORY OF CONFLICT: A CONTRIBUTION TO THE TASK OF MEDIATION] Zur Theorie des Konfliktes: ein Beitrag für die Aufgabe der Vermittlung. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, Jan./Feb. 1971: 12-17.
U3.034, v. 9

Written for the seminar of the International Peace Academy Committee held in Vienna, Aug. 22-Sept. 10, 1970.
Includes bibliographic references.

Discusses the nature and processes of conflict, its complexity and consequences, and its control and termination. Banks urges that governments accept the active counsel of conflict theorists (mediators) as part of the decisionmaking process in much the same fashion that business corporations solicit the services of management consultants when problems arise that cannot be satisfactorily solved from within.

1464
Böhm, Anton. [EAST-WEST; CONFRONTATION OR COEXISTENCE?] Ost-West; Konfrontation oder Koexistenz? Osnabrück, A. Fromm [1970] 55 p. (Texte + [und] Thesen, 6) DK274.3 1970.B64

The West should maintain a strong defense posture and reassert its dedication to personal freedom, for the West's position vis-a-vis the Communist bloc is one of confrontation, not coexistence. The West must be strong to thwart Soviet expansionism, for the Communists move only into areas where the risk is negligible. The West must practice its concept of personal freedom because disuse or abuse erodes it and deprives the West of its most priceless weapon in the continuing East-West confrontation. The idea of convergence, that the two systems are moving toward each other, is not valid. Militating against it is the fact that the Communists themselves contend it is an attempt at psychological infiltration except in the developing countries, where they sometimes find it useful in overcoming local hostility to communism. Within the educated class in the Soviet Union a small but growing opposition has developed, nurtured by literature from the West, itself a product of Western freedoms. For this opposition the convergence theory would be anathema. The alleged advantages of the Communists' closed society in their struggle with the Western democracies are short term and will become liabilities as the liberalizing opposition grows. "The same conspiratory talent that enabled the Bolsheviks under the Tsar to survive and disseminate their ideas is now helping that opposition to exist, to produce, and grow."

1465
Brockriede, Wayne, and Robert L. Scott. MOMENTS IN THE RHETORIC OF THE COLD WAR. [New York, Random House, c1970] 130 p. (Issues and spokesmen series, SSP14) E183.8.R9B68
A Random House study in speech.
Includes bibliographies.

Analyzes the verbal interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union, with particular reference to the Truman Doctrine of 1947, Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959, and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The authors study the interrelationships among rhetoric, ideology, and policy, demonstrating in each of the three specific events how these factors combined to escalate or deescalate the cold war.

1466
Brown, Neville. UNDERDEVELOPMENT AS A THREAT TO WORLD PEACE. International affairs (London) v. 47, Apr. 1971: 327-339. JX1.I53, v. 47

Posits a correlation between social and economic underdevelopment and violence. Brown recites recent examples of conflict situations in developing countries that have been caused by rapid population growth, including the Honduras-El Salvador "football war" and the Ibo migration from the Eastern region of Nigeria. The author castigates military strategists for separating military planning and defense from considerations of the consequences of economic and social underdevelopment. He describes the prospects for economic development in the Third World, noting that despite the "green revolution" food output has been falling. Even where agricultural progress exists political stability cannot be guaranteed without a sophisticated economic and social structure. Brown calls for a greater effort to predict the future of human society, but he cautions that predictions can have a greater impact on those shaping government policies if they are made on a short-term basis (10-15 years).

1467
THE CHANGING FACE OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Peter A. Toma. Tucson, University of Arizona Press [1970] 413 p. illus. DR48.5.C44
Papers from a summer institute at the University of Arizona, 1969.
Bibliography: p. 389-400.

Contents.--Introduction, by Peter A. Toma.--The Socialist Republic of Rumania, by Stephen Fischer-Galati.--Poland: continuity and change, by Joseph R. Fiszman.--Bulgaria under Zhivkov, by Martin V. Pundeff.--Walter Ulbricht's German Democratic Republic, by Donald D. Dalgleish.--Czechoslovakia: a case study of social and political development, by Jan. F. Triska.--Decompression in Hungary: phase two, by Bennett Kovrig.--Yugoslavia: the process of democratization, by George Klein.--Albania in the sixties, by Nicholas C. Pano.--East European relations with the USSR, by Vernon V. Aspaturian.--East European relations with the West, by Wolfgang Klaiber.--Conclusions, by Peter A. Toma.

Analyzes changes in Communist countries of East Europe, emphasizing the individuality of each nation and the inaccuracy of treating them as a uniform collection of Soviet satellites. "National sovereignty, no matter how defined, is stronger today in Eastern Europe than international Communism." The collection also seeks to explain how the appearance of nuclear weapons forced the Marxists to change their belief that, under imperialism, wars are unavoidable.

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1468
Cherkin, Arthur, and Richard O. Meinecke. SUPPRESSION OF FIGHTING BEHAVIOUR IN RABBITS BY PAIRED EMERGENCE FROM ANAESTHESIA. Nature (London) v. 231, May 21, 1971: 195-196.
Q1.N2, v. 231

Offers experimental evidence that the usual violent attack behavior of male-rabbit pairs is suppressed when the two animals are allowed to recover simultaneously and in the same cage from pentobarbital anaesthesia. The explanation may be that the "stimulus novelty" of "one rabbit to another is dulled during slow emergence from anaesthesia and is abated by the gradual familiarization occurring during emergence." Similar results have been observed in chickens, dogs, and cats.

1469
Cobb, Roger W., and Charles Elder. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY; A REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STUDY. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [c1970] 160 p. (Cases in international politics)
JX1950.C62
Bibliography: p. 143-152.

Examines the sources of integration theory, focusing on the literature of research findings and on the major approaches to the study of community development at the international level. The authors provide a general model to "give the reader an overall perspective for interrelating existing studies on community development"; they study integration on more than one level of nation-state alinement by gathering "data on a variety of integrative indicators from mass attitudes toward other countries to a variety of transaction measures including trade, mail, telephone calls, tourism, and student exchange." Eighteen propositions related to integration theory are developed.

1470
Corning, Peter A. THE BIOLOGICAL BASES OF BEHAVIOR AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE. World politics, v. 23, Apr. 1971: 321-370.
D839.W57, v. 23
"Revised and greatly abridged version of a paper presented at the Sixty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1969 (reproduced by University Microfilms), and . . . the nucleus of a larger work, Politics and Survival, scheduled for publication in 1971."

Condemns the failure of social scientists to take into consideration the role of biological factors in shaping human behavior from the specific viewpoint of evolution. Corning outlines the relevant aspects of the modern "synthetic" theory of evolution, describes current research in behavior, and discusses possible implications for political theory and political research. After establishing that human societies can be fitted within a biological and evolutionary framework, he goes on to examine which human needs and wants are genetically based. The lines of development suggested by the exploitation of this "evolutionary paradigm" in politics include use of the basic parameters of an adaptive society to evaluate particular societies and their systems, three-dimensional functional comparisons of specific behaviors (across species, cultures, and epochs), and an evolutionary approach to the study of such major political phenomena as war and revolution.

1471
Couve de Murville, Maurice. [IMPRESSIONS OF A TRIP TO CHINA] Eindrücke von einer Reise nach China. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Apr. 25, 1971: 273-282.
D839.E86, v. 26
Translated from Politique Étrangère, no. 3, 1971. JX3.P6

The author's impressions of China's world posture, based on his trip to Peking and his talks with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. The French statesman sees the outlook of the Chinese as strongly colored by their intense national pride, by their century-long exploitation by outside powers, and by their current strong central government, which was brought to power by their own Communist arms without outside intervention. The Chinese regard the two superpowers as intent on dividing the world between themselves. They are therefore extremely assertive in their determination not to fall under the influence of what they call the "double hegemony" of the United States and the Soviet Union. The author holds that Chinese enmity toward Russia is traditional and geographic, whereas the opposition to America rests primarily on the Taiwan question. Although he doubts any aggressive intentions on the part of the Peking government, he does see the Pacific as China's primary area of concern and, consequently, as a major focal point in international affairs for years to come. What Washington does following the settlement of the Taiwan question, whether it sides with Moscow or Peking or maintains a neutral posture, will be an important factor in Pacific affairs. Any combination of events may occur, and thus it behooves France to be diplomatically present at a capital where others are absent.

1472
Crozier, Brian, ed. "WE WILL BURY YOU"; STUDIES IN LEFT-WING SUBVERSION TODAY. [London] Tom Stacey Ltd. [c1970] 182 p.
HX518.S8C76

Contents.--Introduction, by Brian Crozier.--Marxism and freedom, by Maurice Cranston.--"Left" and "right": the false dichotomy, by Tibor Szamuely.--Communism, capitalism and economic progress, by Alfred Sherman.--Soviet imperialism, by C. H. Ellis.--Battling for the Third World, by Geoffrey Wheeler.--Competitive subversion (1), by Brian Crozier.--Front organisations, by David Williams.--Competitive subversion (2), by Harry Welton.--Subversion in industry, by David Williams.--Western defence: a vulnerable Britain, by George Taylor.--The East-West balance, by W. F. K. Thompson.--Communism, Christianity and the international scene, by Michael Bourdeaux.--Appendix.

Essays on the approaches, varieties, effects, and dangers of leftist subversion of the world and of British institutions. An appendix lists left-wing front organizations and their publications in Great Britain.

1473
Dalma, Alfons. [POINTS OF CRISIS AND DISRUPTION OF STABILITY: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ON THE WORLD SITUATION AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN 1970] Die Krisenherde und die Entstabilisierung: politisch-strategische Überlegungen zur Weltlage und zur Entwicklung des Jahres 1970. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, Jan./Feb. 1971: 6-12. U3.034, v. 9

While the balance of terror maintained by the United States, a maritime superpower, and the Soviet Union, a continental superpower, continues to be the basis of the world's prevailing political and strategic system, certain destabilizing factors threaten the bipolarity of that equilibrium. Among these factors are technological developments in strategic armaments, the emergence of a domestically strengthened China as a nuclear power, the industrial and economic might of Japan and its waxing influence in East Asia, the broadened West European economic communality, the heightened or intensified crises in the Third World, and the East-West détente in Europe. Implicitly disruptive of the present balance are the Soviet Union's efforts to challenge American maritime superiority and to dislodge American influence from the peripheral areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the necessity for the United States to maintain control of these waters for reasons of trade and security. As for the crisis areas, in Indochina the Americans have dealt the North Vietnamese severe setbacks, but the Soviets have resigned themselves to the impossibility of increasing their influence in Southeast Asia and recognized Chinese predominance in that area. The stalemate in the Middle East is fragile, but the longer the situation there remains unresolved the greater are the opportunities for political and expansionist maneuvers by the Soviet Union to solidify its new position in the Mediterranean. Only nonalined Yugoslavia blocks Soviet expansion into the area. Elsewhere in Europe, the Soviet Union is expanding its influence in a climate of détente, with the goal of arranging a European security system over which it would exercise hegemony. Then the Soviets will have succeeded in making a U.S. military presence in Europe superfluous. In view of the potential for the disruption of the balance currently sustaining the world situation, 1971 may well see increased tensions and crises.

1474
Davis, Guy G. PEACE, AND THE USES OF WAR. Worldview, v. 14, Apr. 1971: 9-12.
D839.W66, v. 14

Seeks to dispel some clichés about war and peace, such as "wars never settle anything," "old men get us into war and young men have to fight them," "nobody profits from war except the munitions-makers," etc. Davis rejects simplistic thinking by slogans and urges more penetrating examination. He suggests the unusual notion that war is not utterly useless and that its persistence through history may indicate that some ends are achieved by war. War and peace are more complex problems than activists and scholars usually acknowledge.

1475
Deutsch, Morton. TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT. International journal of group tensions, v. 1, Jan./Mar. 1971: 42-54.
N&CPR

"Based on a chapter in the author's forthcoming book, The Resolution of Conflict."

Outlines a social-psychological approach to the understanding of human conflict. Deutsch identifies the chief variables affecting the course of conflict and defines the key terms of conflict analysis from a social-psychological perspective. He stresses the common features of interpersonal, intergroup, and international conflict, and he argues that while it would be undesirable to eliminate all conflict from social life, it can and ought to be made less destructive and more creative.

1476
Deutscher, Isaac. RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE WEST; A CONTEMPORARY CHRONICLE, 1953-1966, edited by Fred Halliday. London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 360 p.
DK274.D43 1970

Contents.--Introduction.--The fall of Beria.--The development of Soviet foreign policy in 1954.--The fall of Malenkov.--The foreign policy of Malenkov's successors.--The Twentieth Congress.--Crisis in the Soviet bloc.--Mao and the hundred flowers campaign.--Khrushchev gains the ascendancy.--Khrushchev on the defensive.--From the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Congress.--Khrushchev's diplomatic initiatives.--The deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations.--The Twenty-second Congress and the end of the first decade after Stalin.--Khrushchev's troubles increase.--The fall of Khrushchev.--The policies of Brezhnev and Kosygin.--The great cultural revolution.--Chronology of events.--Index.

An "edited selection of Isaac Deutscher's writings on current affairs from 1953 to 1966," with introductory essays by the editor. The articles focus on the postwar evolution of Soviet and Chinese domestic and foreign policies and on the relations of Russia and China with each other and with the United States.

1477
Eid, Mohammad Salah-uddin. [THE NONALINED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS] Die blockfreien Staaten in den Vereinten Nationen. München-Pullach, Berlin, Verlag Dokumentation, 1970. 267 p.
JX5363.E58 1970

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Originally presented as the author's thesis, Heidelberg.
Bibliography: p. 261-266.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Neutrality and nonalinement as concepts. Neutrality and international law. Positive neutrality and nonalinement. The nonalined states.--pt. 2. The nonalined states in the General Assembly. Outlines of the proposals. The votes. Positions. Recommendations and measures.--Final considerations.--Appendix.--Bibliography.

Defines and distinguishes the concepts of nonalinement and neutrality and traces the history of the adoption of the former by some non-bloc states. The behavior of the nonalined states in the United Nations is examined on the basis of three issues: the Hungarian rebellion, the Suez war, and the Cuban missile crisis. These issues were chosen to represent developments in the attitudes of the nonalined bloc over time. The debate over the admission of Communist China to the United Nations is commented on to illustrate current attitudes.

1478
Epstein, Samuil. [THE MANIPULATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS] Die Manipulation des Bewusstseins. Sowjetunion heute, v. 16, June 16, 1971: 28-30.
DK266.A25784, v. 16

Pillories the "imperialist" information media in their massive endeavors to cover up weaknesses in the capitalist system and to foster anti-Communist and anti-Soviet attitudes. Epstein discusses the goals and methods of bourgeois propaganda, the refined art of lying, and the use of psychological warfare. He indicts the U.S. Information Agency as the general staff planning organ of the cold war. As a "boomerang effect" sets in and the exploited classes lose confidence in the media, the manipulators are turning to science to find ways--medical, genetic, and electronic--to influence and alter opinions. Socialist propaganda, on the other hand, Epstein claims, is directed against these manipulators and seeks to enlighten the masses on the true purposes of the psychological war being waged against them.

1479
Fraczek, Adam, and Jacqueline R. Macaulay. SOME PERSONALITY FACTORS IN REACTION TO AGGRESSIVE STIMULI. Journal of personality, v. 39, June 1971: 163-177. BF1.J66, v. 39

A word association test which included aggressive stimuli (weapon names) was given to college students. Those whose responses were relatively high or low in emotionality were asked to participate in a "study of stress reactions to electric shock." When the subject arrived at the laboratory, he and a partner were given tasks to perform. The partner, a confederate of the experimenter, gave the subject an unfairly high number of shocks in judging the subject's performance. The subject then judged the partner's work, using shock. Half the subjects were in the apparently accidental presence of guns when given the chance to retaliate. Among low-emotionality subjects, the presence of guns increased the number of shocks given the partner, as Berkowitz and LePage found. High-emotionality subjects tended to give the partner longer shocks than low subjects, whether guns were present or not. In contrast to the low subjects, when guns were present, highs tended to give shocks of shorter duration and to report lowered anger, as if the aggressive stimuli had dampened the intensity of their reaction. The results as a whole indicate that the perceptual set for aggressive stimuli and the presence of such stimuli have an interactive effect on aggressive tendencies. (Abstract supplied)

1480
Gasteyger, Curt. [THE FRAGILE BALANCE: CRITICAL QUESTIONS ON THE EUROPEAN OSTPOLITIK] Das zerbrechliche Gleichgewicht: kritische Fragen zur europäischen Ostpolitik. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Feb. 25, 1971: 131-138.
D839.E86, v. 26

At a time when negotiations with the East are being hailed as promising signs for a coming era of cooperation, détente, and mutual trust, it may be appropriate, if not welcome, to take a more sober view of the changed power relations and today's fragile balance of power. The United States is reducing its obligations abroad. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is continuing to develop and extend its position as a world power. Yet sympathetic understanding is given in many circles to the Soviet Union's feverish arms program to achieve parity with the United States. This tacit approval may be misplaced. Parity need not bring with it concessions on the Berlin question or cooperation in the Middle East. An arms balance, an ambiguous term at best, could just as easily lead the Soviet Union into the recklessness of overconfidence as into responsible international behavior. It must be remembered, too, that détente means more or less permanent Soviet control over Eastern Europe; for without that control the Eastern bloc countries would gravitate into economic dependence on the West. Roughly speaking, there are two ways to meet the new situation: to continue the program of European integration through economic cooperation, in order to provide a counterweight to Soviet power while maintaining a defense alliance with the United States; or to pursue a policy of cautious, step-by-step accommodation to the changed power relationships on the continent. Which alternative the Soviet Union would like to entice Western Europe into choosing is clear. For 20 years the stability of Europe has rested on the relatively balanced distribution of power. The erosion of this balance, as even Tito has said, would jeopardize not only the nonalined states but all of Europe.

1481
George, Alexander L., David K. Hall, and William E. Simons. THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY; LAOS, CUBA, VIETNAM. Boston, Little, Brown [1971] xviii, 268 p. JX1417.G45
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Introduction.--The development of doctrine and strategy, by Alexander L. George.--The Laos crisis, 1960-61, by David K. Hall.--The Cuban missile crisis, 1962, by Alexander L. George.--The Vietnam intervention, 1964-65, by William E. Simons.--Comparisons and lessons, by Alexander L. George.--Appendix: note on theory and methodology.

The product of a research program at Stanford University on "Theory and Practice in International Relations." The program is designed to study basic problems in international relations, thereby contributing to the practice of foreign-policy making and to the theory of international relations.

1482
Goffman, Erving. STRATEGIC INTERACTION. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press [c1969] 145 p. (University of Pennsylvania series in conduct and communication monograph 1)
HM291.G625
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Expression games: an analysis of doubts at play.--Strategic interaction.

Two essays on some features of "the calculative, gamelike aspects of mutual dealings." The first examines "the individual's capacity to acquire, reveal, and conceal information," adopting for this purpose the perspective of "an organizationally committed observer who needs information from another person" and relying for illustrative material on "popular literature on intelligence and espionage." The second "attempts to isolate the analytical framework implied in the game perspective, and shows its relationship to other perspectives in analyzing interpersonal dealings."

1483
Grewe, Wilhelm G. [PLAY OF FORCES IN WORLD POLITICS. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Spiel der Kräfte in der Weltpolitik. Theorie und Praxis der internationalen Beziehungen. Düsseldorf, Wien, Econ-Verlag [1970] 688 p.
D843.G76
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--pt. 1. The game's pieces: The state system in the 20th century: integration and splintering. Equality and inequality of states. The allied and nonalined: alliances in the nuclear age. Splendor and misery in the United Nations: deeds and failures of the world organization.--pt. 2. The actors: Diplomacy as a profession.--pt. 3. The motivating forces: Rational and irrational impulses in the play of forces in world politics. Ideology and power politics. Primacy of foreign or domestic politics?--pt. 4. The decisionmaking process: Planning foreign policy.--pt. 5. The area of play: The age of the "Cold War." The era of détente. The world of the 70's.--pt. 6. The rules of play: Power and right in the coexistence of peoples. Reciprocal effects between foreign policy and public opinion. The language of diplomacy.--pt. 7. Push and pull: Ways of handling international conflicts. Art and technique of negotiation. The diplomatic compromise. The significance of the status quo for peace. Peaceful change. Crisis management.

Comprehensive review of recent and current international relations, combining scientific and theoretical abstraction with the author's own experiences as a practicing diplomat. In assessing the prospects for the 1970's, Grewe rejects four popular theories concerning the United States and the Soviet Union (convergence, ideological deemphasis, introversion, and polarity displacement to a North-South axis) and predicts the world will continue "to live with the bomb" under the hegemony of Washington and Moscow. Although partial agreements in the areas of arms control and regional peacekeeping accords may be reached, the Soviet Union will remain in the 1970's an expansionist power seeking to fill every political vacuum and to champion world communism, especially in the developing countries. It is within these parameters, Grewe maintains, that prospects for a Pax Sovieto-Americana must be sought.

1484
Gurney, Ramsdell. SOVIET MOTIVES AND STATESIDE SUSPICIONS. Commonweal, v. 93, Oct. 16, 1970: 63-68.
AP2.C6897, v. 93

A revisionist trend has recently been noted in historians' explanations of the Cold War. Traditional interpretations have assumed that the Soviet Union is an intrinsic aggressor whose refusal to compromise creates tension between the superpowers. The revisionist thesis, on the other hand, would put much of the blame on the United States, as a result of the highhanded policies it pursued and the mistaken assumptions it harbored after the death of Franklin Roosevelt. Depending on U.S. nuclear superiority, the Truman administration was intent on forcing the Soviets out of Eastern Europe, thereby extending U.S. influence and opening new markets for American business. Later administrations remained true to the assumption that dealing with the Russians required an attitude of suspicion and a position of strength. The revisionists conclude that this assumption is wrong and present evidence in their support. Washington, of course, is not likely to admit that "much of American diplomacy toward Moscow has been self-defeating, that the United States must bear a large measure of the responsibility for postwar conflicts and that the Soviet Union is not necessarily the aggressive, bellicose power it has been assumed to be." Proponents of the ABM insist that the United States must deploy a system because the Russians are striving for first-strike capability. This traditional mode of thought "has achieved no significant and lasting success anywhere since the Cold War began." It has in fact impeded the achievement of détente.

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1485
Hancock, M. Donald, and Dankwart A. Rustow, comps. AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [c1971] 375 p. (America's role in world affairs series) E744.H347

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. The new setting of world politics.--pt. 2. Domestic dimensions of policy formation.--pt. 3. Issues in American foreign policy.--pt. 4. Military strategy and arms control.--pt. 5. The role of international organization.--pt. 6. The politics of foreign aid.--pt. 7. America and the future of Europe.--pt. 8. The Communist challenge.--pt. 9. American policies in the non-Atlantic world.--Index.

An introductory survey of international politics and American foreign policy representing a variety of viewpoints and combining two approaches to international relations: the total system and the individual state.

1486
Harmon, Robert B. THE ART AND PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY: A SELECTED AND ANNOTATED GUIDE. Metuchen, N.J., Scarecrow Press, 1971. 355 p. JX1662.H273
Includes bibliographies.

A bibliography, containing 900 entries, "for the student who would like to know a little more about contemporary diplomacy as an important factor in international affairs." The citations are largely American and English, but a number of other works in several foreign languages, including French, Spanish, and German, are presented. A chapter on documents and organization focuses on, among other things, the principles of diplomatic representation, the rules of diplomatic procedure, the powers of diplomatic credentials, and treaties relating to procedures at international conferences.

1487
Hildreth, Arthur M., Leonard R. Derogatis, and Ken McCusker. BODY BUFFER ZONE AND VIOLENCE: A REASSESSMENT AND CONFIRMATION. American journal of psychiatry, v. 127, June 1971: 1641-1645. RC321.A52, v. 127

Randomly selected inmates in a state prison were evaluated for sensitivity to physical closeness and aggressiveness. The results confirmed the conclusion from previous research that aggressive inmates have greater sensitivity to physical closeness than do nonaggressive ones. At variance with earlier findings was the discovery that both aggressive and nonaggressive inmates had an increased sensitivity to approach from the rear as opposed to approach from the front. (Abstract supplied)

1488
Hofer, Walther. [EUROPE AND THE UNITY OF GERMANY. A BALANCE AFTER 100 YEARS] Europa und die Einheit Deutschlands. Eine Bilanz nach 100 Jahren. With contributions by Henryk Batowski [and others]. Köln, Verl. Wissenschaft u. Politik [1970] 366 p. DD221.H64
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Germany and the European equilibrium, by Leonhard von Muralt.--Neutral small states on the border of the Reich, by Hans Ulrich Rentsch.--From historical hereditary enemy to European partner, by Jean-Baptiste Duroselle.--The Netherlands and the founding of the Reich, by Hermann W. von der Dunk.--Germany and the inner conflicts of British politics, by Donald C. Watt.--Scandinavia and the German Reich, by Folke Lindberg.--Difficulty of being a neighbor, by Henryk Batowski.--A little people between two great powers, by Ivan Pfaff.--From German dualism to the Austrian state, by Hugo Hantsch.--Transatlantic perspectives, by Gordon A. Craig.--Europe and the German division, by Richard Löwenthal.--Attempt at a balance, by Walther Hofer.--List of persons.--Biographic data.

A collection of articles on the historic significance of the 100-year-old German state as viewed by its neighbors, sometime military opponents, and neutral European states. The emphasis is on the concept of the role and importance of Germany in the family of nations in the past, present, and immediate future held by those nations most vitally concerned. Lowenthal's article deals largely with the workings of a united Germany on the course of Russian history. While the authors are professional historians, the historical approach is used only to evaluate aspects of the past relevant to today's problems, particularly the problem of a divided Germany.

1489
Howe, Eric Graham. WAR DANCE; A STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR. New York, Haskell House Publishers, 1971. 315 p. illus. U22.3.H68 1971
"First published in 1937."

From the author's series of lectures on the general topics of peace and war. Howe's approach is broadly philosophical, and his discussion ranges from an analysis of the concept of "me," the "Self-Important Self," to the "metaphysic of the four-dimensional system." Short dream descriptions open each chapter and are analyzed in the appendixes. Diagrams are presented as tools to stimulate thought and arouse questions.

1490
Howe, Fisher. THE SEARCH FOR AMERICA'S IMAGE ABROAD. [Salt Lake City] Institute of International Relations, University of Utah [1966?] 16 p. (International study paper no. 5) E169.1.H77

Many variables influence the image that America projects to the world. Actions of the Government are important, and individuals also contribute to the Nation's image. The most reliable way to establish and maintain a good image is to do true

things and eschew false ones. The United States tries to do this and acts internationally according to what is best, not what will help its image. The intellectual and cultural levels of the beholders also influence the way in which a nation will be perceived. Thus a particular image of America cannot be pinpointed, merely a "confused myriad" of impressions.

1491
Kahn, Herman [interview] 'MOST OF THE TRADITIONAL CAUSES OF WAR HAVE DISAPPEARED.' New York times magazine, June 20, 1971: 12-13, 15-16, 18, 20, 22, 24. illus. AP2.N6575, 1971

Comments on various topics, including war and its causes, sources of future international conflicts, the ideology of the "young," problems of post-industrial civilization, Japan's continuing economic climb, the likelihood of a resort to totalitarian solutions to national problems by certain countries, the dilemmas of dysfunctional knowledge, and the attitudes of the American intelligentsia. Kahn believes that "most of the traditional causes of war among the major nations have pretty well disappeared." Thus, he asserts, "it is very difficult to write credible scenarios for formal nuclear war in the nineteen seventies or nineteen eighties." Nevertheless, plausible or not, nuclear war still might occur, and in the underdeveloped world and the divided countries many diverse sources of conflict remain.

1492
Kindleberger, Charles P. POWER AND MONEY: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS. New York, Basic Books [1970] 246 p. HF1411.K518
Bibliography: p. 229-237.

Examines the relationship between international and domestic economics and politics. Kindleberger discusses, among other topics, the political and economic causes and consequences of nationalism, military and trade alliances, imperialism, war, and peacekeeping.

1493
Kussman, Thomas. [CLASS GOAL: FRIEND-FOE PHILOSOPHY. WHAT DOES "EDUCATION FOR PEACE" MEAN IN EASTERN EUROPE?] Klassenziel: Freund-Feind-Denken. Was heisst "Erziehung zum Frieden" in Osteuropa? Politische Studien, v. 22, May/June 1971: 287-297. H35.P66, v. 22

To guarantee the solidarity necessary for victory in the class struggle, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, and other Socialist states in Eastern Europe are vigorously pursuing a program of ideological education in their schools, in a fra[illegible]ork of a friend-foe philosophy. Stressing class and national consciousness, the courses are designed to promote love for, and identification with, other Socialist states, and hate for, and disassociation from, those societies regarded as the enemies of mankind: the capitalists, imperialists, and militarists. These curricula, formulated at the highest levels of state planning, are an integral part of the educational process for young people in Eastern Europe. States may coexist, but ideologies cannot. The courses emphasize the co-responsibility of each Socialist state to defend every other Socialist state and the personal responsibility of each citizen to defend Socialism. This is what is called "education for peace." As long as this Socialist consciousness, shaped and sharpened by intense indoctrination, feels "threatened by imperialists and revisionist demagogs," peace cannot exist in the world.

1494
Leeuwen, Arend Theodoor van. DEVELOPMENT THROUGH REVOLUTION. New York, Scribner [1970] 310 p. HN16.L44
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Pitfalls of universal change.--Technical and social revolutions.--Development.--Revolution.--War.--Revolution in a post-Christian world.--Christianity in a postrevolutionary world.

Analyzes the widening gap between the developing nations and their fully modernized neighbors. Further examination reveals that similar splits are everywhere--between rich and poor, urban and rural, sophisticated and primitive. Leeuwen discusses the terms "revolution" and "development" and suggests that in some ways they are "mutually inclusive." He also discusses the theories and viewpoints of other writers and experts on social change and development.

1495
London. Institute for Strategic Studies. SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: THE TWO AND THE MANY. Mar. 1970. 58 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 66) U162.A3, no. 66

Contents.--The future of the Soviet-American competition, by Marshall D. Shulman.--Changing Soviet policies and interests, by Richard Löwenthal. --The future of the Soviet and American international systems, by Karl Birnbaum.--Unlimited competition of spheres of responsibility, by J. D. B. Miller.--The effect of China on Soviet-American relations, by Pierre Maillard.--The limitations of military power, by Alan Booth.

Examines Soviet-American relations in light of nuclear competition, the extension of Soviet influence, the two bloc systems, and the Sino-Soviet schism. Shulman foresees the possibility of a continued upward spiral of the arms race but some relaxation of the political rigidity characterizing the division of Europe. Noting a decline in Soviet revolutionary zeal, Löwenthal perceives that the Soviets are overtaxing their military resources in their dangerous expansionist policy. Birnbaum looks to continued Soviet assertiveness in Eastern Europe and the risk of further convulsions and repressions, whereas in the West he considers the difficulty to be in diminishing Ameri-

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can authority and responsibility so as not to reduce NATO's capability. Miller holds that both the Soviet Union and the United States will avoid unrestrained competition in Third World areas lest such direct confrontation lead to actual conflict. In this connection, Shulman also sees mutual restraint, except in the Middle East, where Soviet lack of restraint borders on a loss of control of the situation. The Sino-Soviet dispute will have an accelerating effect on the dialog between the two superpowers, according to Maillard, who admits that it will complicate that dialog. Booth sees the sheer deadliness of nuclear weapons limiting the effectiveness of military power and therefore tending to favor the prospects for arms control, especially in the strategic inventory.

1496
[LOST SECURITY] Verlorene Sicherheit. Politische Meinung, v. 16, May/June 1971: 23-74.
H5.P75, v. 16

Partial contents.--Soldiers in democracy, by Gerhard Baumann.--The dialog of the two giants, by Wolfram von Raven.--China--the Soviet Union--Europe, by Botho Kirsch.--Danger from the East, by Manfred Wörner.

Calls attention to the events and trends inimical to the security of Western Europe. Baumann questions the psychological preparedness of the West Germans to participate in their own security, in view of their increasing hostility to military conscription and growing anti-Bundeswehr sentiments. Von Raven fears that the Soviets are intentionally prolonging the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to afford themselves time and cover for a first-strike capability. He is concerned that Europe may become the hostage of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles because the United States, lacking a counterpart weapon, cannot bargain on this issue at SALT. If these talks do not end satisfactorily, Von Raven hopes they will at least continue to serve as an institution for the exchange of views. Kirsch laments the shortsightedness of the Bonn government in not realizing that détente with Moscow only strengthens the position of the Soviets in their coming conflict with China, thereby upsetting the balance of power and frustrating the efforts of Eastern European countries to use the Sino-Soviet rivalry to attain for themselves a greater measure of independence. The balance of power in Europe is in jeopardy, according to Wörner, because of continuing new technological developments, the superiority of the Warsaw Pact countries in conventional forces, and the offensive policy of the Soviet Union, whose call for a European security conference is a major move designed to break up NATO. A policy of détente can be successful, he maintains, only when it is founded on reciprocity, a strengthening of NATO's European contingents, and a common political concept of Europe.

1497
Murphy, Gardner. A NOTE ON THE LOCUS OF AGGRESSION. International journal of group tensions, v. 1, Jan./Mar. 1971: 55-58.
N&CPR

Calls untenable the conclusion, drawn by some scholars from the work of Konrad Lorenz, that innate aggression in man makes war inevitable or that this factor is somehow more important than was believed heretofore. Lorenz's findings are highly significant for the student of war and peace, but they must be viewed in an institutional context. It is "the inner biological factors which in a context of cultural components, maintain the war threat like a sword of Damocles over the head of man," and these factors still await thorough analysis.

1498
Neuhold, Hanspeter. [MODERN METHODS IN THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Moderne Methoden in der Wissenschaft der internationalen Beziehungen. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 10, no. 5, 1970: 287-314.
DB47.043, v. 10
Bibliographical footnotes.

Examines some of the methods used by the "scientific school" of international relations in predicting events for decisionmakers and explores the advantages and disadvantages of each method from the point of view of the traditional approach. Among the quantitative methods discussed, for each of which actual examples from international life are furnished, are internation simulation, content analysis, factor analysis, and communication-flow measurement. Because of the subjective factors involved and the frequently unavailable or fragmented documentation, these methods are limited to an examination of secondary phenomena. They are, however, useful for the precise formulation of thoughts, for bringing peripheral or otherwise overlooked but pertinent information into overall context, and for sorting and evaluating material, the volume of which is sometimes too overwhelming for adequate consideration by more conventional methods. Neuhold concludes that both the modern and traditional methods should be used, since neither is completely satisfactory, and that the method or methods selected should depend on the question and the nature of the material.

1499
Novack, George E. DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION. New York, Pathfinder Press, 1971. 286 p. (A Merit Book)
JC421.N65
Bibliography: p. [280]-282.

Contents.--Foreword.--pt. 1. Precapitalist forms of political democracy.--pt. 2. The rise and decline of bourgeois democracy.--pt. 3. The development of democracy in the United States.--pt. 4. Problems and prospects of postcapitalist democracy.--Notes.--Bibliography.--Index.

Surveys the ongoing "career of democracy" and urges replacement in the United States of the rule of the rich by the supremacy of the majority in order to save the country from nuclear catastrophe and the menace of a reactionary dictatorship. American democracy, falsely idealized through ignorance of history, is dominated by big business

and militarists and is grossly callous of human rights. Its failings can be corrected, Novack asserts, only when capitalist property ownership is abolished. People still have the right to embark upon revolution as the colonists did against George III, and the situation is just as intolerable now. Postcapitalism in the United States will not, however, undergo the Stalinist-type repression that occurred in the Soviet Union because the political and economic histories of the two countries are dissimilar.

1500
Owen-Smith, Norman. TERRITORIALITY IN THE WHITE RHINOCEROS (CERATOTHERIUM SIMUM) BURCHELL. Nature (London) v. 231, June 4, 1971: 294-296. illus. Q1.N2, v. 231

Reports some results of an intensive 15-year investigation of the ecology and ethology of the white or square-lipped rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum). The white rhino was observed to maintain "a social system based on a very clearly delineated mosaic of adult male territories." This system, fundamentally a "space-correlated dominance relationship between rivals," has as its primary function "to increase the reproductive efficiency of prime bulls by reducing the incidence of injury-inflicting combat." Its chief features are range exclusiveness, ritualized encounters, confinement of estrous cows, and scent marking.

1501
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN THE 1970'S. International studies quarterly, v. 15, Mar. 1971: 104-128.
D839.B2, v. 15
"References": p. 126-128.
"Based on the concluding chapter of Contending Theories of International Relations by James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., to be published in 1971."
JX1395.D67

Discerns the appearance of a new stage in the study of international relations on the threshold of the 1970's, which succeeds the present behavioral-quantitative period and thus can be characterized as postbehavioral. Pfaltzgraff characterizes postbehavioral literature as the effort to synthesize existing concepts, develop theories and methodologies "relevant" to international issues, and seek out theories with explanatory and predictive capabilities. The prevailing criticisms of the behavioral-quantitative approach are listed, the assumptions now in question are examined, and basic trends and problems are summarized. Pfaltzgraff foresees a continued search for concepts and methodologies from other disciplines, comparative studies at many levels and units of analysis, and efforts at bridging the gap between normative and behavioral-quantitative approaches to the study of international relations.

1502
Porsholt, Lars. A QUANTITIVE CONFLICT MODEL. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1971: 55-66.
AS9.J6, 1971

The author applies the type of utility reasoning common in microeconomics to conflict theory. The simple model constructed is not meant to reproduce an empirical situation, but to serve as a tool for analyzing and developing concepts. The discussion is limited to conflict between two actors, with two variables: means and goals, and the latter are conceived of as infinitely divisible. Both situations where the opponent is passive or nonexistent, and situations where he competes for the same goal are discussed. Various game-theoretical concepts are fitted into the basic scheme. (Abstract supplied)

1503
[PSYCHOANALYTIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF HUMAN AGGRESSION] International journal of psycho-analysis, v. 52, pt. 2, 1971: 137-178.
BF173.A2I62, v. 52

Contents.--The psychoanalytic concept of aggression, by Charles Brenner.--Within the realm of the death instinct, by Ángel Garma.--Aggression and instinct theory, by W. H. Gillespie.--Psychoanalysis and the aggression of large groups, by Alexander Mitscherlich.--A clinical approach to the psychoanalytic theory of the life and death instincts: an investigation into the aggressive aspects of narcissism, by Herbert Rosenfeld.

Papers on the psychoanalytic interpretation of human aggression and the related question of the death instinct, presented to the 27th International Psychoanalytical Congress at Vienna, Austria. Brenner discusses aggression as the manifestation of an instinctual drive, the relationship of aggression to other psychological phenomena, and matters relating to aggressive aims and the theory of drive fusion. Garma offers evidence to support the death-instinct theory and explores its implications for our understanding of love, aggression, sadism, and masochism. Gillespie examines and criticizes Freud's theory of the death instinct and the instinctual origin of aggression, arguing that Freud's thought on this matter bears unmistakeable marks of a distinctive, empirically untestable weltanschauung that committed him in advance to a bipolar explanation of the dynamics of mental and emotional life. Mitscherlich argues that no single theory of aggression does full justice to the phenomena and that, particularly in the case of the aggressive behavior of large groups, an interdisciplinary understanding is essential. Rosenfeld attempts "to clarify particularly the destructive aspects of narcissism and relate this to Freud's theory of the fusion and defusion of the life and death instincts."

1504
Rapoport, Anatol. THE BIG TWO: SOVIET-AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Pegasus [1971] 249 p. (American involvement in the world) E183.8.R9R23
Includes bibliographical references.

Compares and contrasts the Soviet Union and the United States and analyzes the relationship between the two nations, each of which wields incredible power in its ability to annihilate the

other's population. In practice both governments reign absolute with regard to this power, and their people are not consulted. Rapoport traces the history that brought the superpowers to this point and locates it in a larger conceptual framework of international relations. He examines perceptions of the cold war and attempts to explain the logic behind first- and second-strike capability. In conclusion Rapoport points to the meaning of the nuclear threat for the Third World. He concludes that "Soviet-American relations, irrelevant as they are in themselves to the substantive world issues, will nevertheless determine whether these issues can ever be faced at all."

1505
Ratnam, Perala. NON-ALIGNMENT IN THE SEVENTIES. India quarterly, v. 26, July/Sept. 1970: 258-268.
D410.I44, v. 26

Asks Indians to examine objectively the doctrine of nonalinement from the point of view of their country's probable course in the 1970's. Ratnam points out that nonalinement does not entail a uniform, inevitable foreign policy structure; it is only a base of action for many countries animated by their own national interests. Any scheme for a bloc of nonalined states is a misconception of the principle. Since the states are nonalined for different reasons, no stable grouping is possible to counter the superpower blocs. Ratnam suggests that in practice nonalinement's moral and material results have probably not justified the claims made for it. Examples cited are the behavior of the nonalined nations in the General Assembly voting on 56 critical cold war resolutions from 1959 to 1965 and in the 1962 Colombo conference after the Sino-Indian border dispute. Nonalinement's failure is due to its lack of any real economic or military strength. Since it is not rooted in a set of principles but varies with national circumstances, changes in the expression of nonalinement can be expected in the next decade. The indications are, however, that it is likely to have less rather than more influence in the future.

1506
THE ROLE OF MIDDLE POWERS IN WORLD POLITICS. Bonn, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik [1968] 161 p.
D849.R6
Includes bibiliographical references.

Reports results of a survey conducted by the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs on the place of middle powers in world politics. Questionnaires were sent to "experts on international affairs" in 15 countries, with two basic areas of inquiry: the relationships of the super, big, and middle powers, and the place of each specific country in international politics as well as its methods of foreign policy. The responses are presented country by country, in the words of the answering expert.

1507
Rose, Robert M., John W. Holaday, and Irwin S. Bernstein. PLASMA TESTOSTERONE, DOMINANCE RANK AND AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR IN MALE RHESUS MONKEYS. Nature (London) v. 231, June 11, 1971: 366-368.
Q1.N2, v. 231

Reports the results of an experiment to test "the relationship between normal aggressive behaviour associated with living in social groups and the level of endogenously secreted testosterone." Observations were made of 34 adult male rhesus monkeys over a 3-month period. Positive correlations were observed between high levels of plasma testosterone and aggressive behavior, reception of submission, general tension, and dominance rank. Also observed was a weaker correlation between low testosterone and high submissiveness. Unresolved by these data is the question of "whether the higher plasma testosterone concentration that is frequently seen in more aggressive animals precedes, or is the result of, their dominant and aggressive status."

1508
Rosenau, James N. THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY. New York, Free Press [1971] 472 p.
JX1395.R573
Includes bibliographical references.

A collection of the author's essays dating from 1960-1970, concentrating on formulating a scientific approach to the study of foreign policy phenomena. Rosenau assesses the basic conceptual tools that can be employed to construct a general theoretical model based on the external behavior of societies within the domestic and international contexts. Part 1 elaborates "on the ways in which the very objectivity of science provides a never ending subjective experience"; part 2 is an attempt to outline a science of foreign policy by examining relevant variables, propositions, and quantifiable data; part 3 exposes the inadequacy of the prescientific equipment employed to examine foreign policy; and parts 4 and 5 deal with the domestic and international contexts of nation-state behavior.

1509
Rule, Brendan G., and Elizabeth Percival. THE EFFECTS OF FRUSTRATION AND ATTACK ON PHYSICAL AGGRESSION. Journal of experimental research in personality, v. 5, June 1971: 111-118.
BF1.J62, v. 5

Eighty men were given the task of teaching a peer a list of nonsense syllables. Level, duration, and frequency of shocks administered by the teacher to the learner were measured subsequent to the teachers being either frustrated or not frustrated in their attempts to reach the goal, and being either provoked or not provoked by the learner towards whom sympathy was either induced or not induced. The results of a 2×2×2×4 analysis of variance yielded several findings. Frustration led to heightened aggressive responses. As trials progressed, provocation relative to no provocation

elicited more aggression under nonfrustration conditions but less aggression under frustration conditions. Furthermore, sympathy elicited less aggression under nonfrustration conditions but more aggression under frustration conditions. The interactive nature of the single determinants of aggression suggests that differences in the strength of the determinants of aggression reported in the literature are partially due to variations in the subject's interpretation of his performance, and of the nature of the attack and frustration. (Abstract supplied)

1510
Russett, Bruce M. TRANSACTIONS, COMMUNITY, AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL INTEGRATION. Journal of Common Market studies, v. 9, Mar. 1971: 224-245.
HC241.J6, v. 9
"Part of the research of the Yale University World Data Analysis Program."

Studies the role of transactions in international political integration, that is, "whether community bonds among peoples can be used as indicators or predictors of political integration." Russett comments on the various meanings attached to the term "political integration," for example, institutionalization, the transfer of loyalty to institutions, and the security community with ties at the mass level. He clarifies the role of communication and transaction measurement as related to political integration and the choice of the appropriate indexes to determine whether transactions describe or predict integration, make it possible, or cause it. In studying the conditions for transactions as capabilities he emphasizes that transaction flows should not be counted mechanically and automatically assigned to capabilities. The difficulties of conducting empirical work caused by a lack of data in this area and of refining analytic theory (particularly his own investigations of responsiveness) are acknowledged. The conclusion suggests the substantial potential utility for political integration theory of defining integration as "unity of action in relation to the external system."

1511
Said, Abdul A., and Daniel M. Collier. REVOLUTIONISM. Boston, Allyn and Bacon [1971] 204 p.
JC491.S18
Bibliography: p. 181-191.

Contents.--Preface.--Revolutionism: an ideology.--Style and environment.--Types of revolutionists.--Patterns of revolutionist thought.--Revolutionist visions and models.--Perception of politics.--Directions of revolutionism.--Bibliography.

Offers a systematic framework for ordering the immense amount of data that has been collected by political scientists and sociologists on revolution. Much important and informative detail work has been done on the subject of revolution by modern social scientists, but an overall perspective is needed, one that will encompass normative judgments and the total man. The focus of this study is on revolution in the Third World, using one Western example, the United States, as a point of reference.

1512
Sanford, Nevitt. DEHUMANIZATION AND COLLECTIVE DESTRUCTIVENESS. International journal of group tensions, v. 1, Jan./Mar. 1971: 26-41.
N&CPR

Examines the problem of "the legitimation of evil," or "those processes by which nations or powerful political groups persuade their citizens or members that wars of conquest, imperialist or genocidal wars, the indiscriminate killing or torture of opponents are right and just, or at least sanctioned as being necessary." Dehumanization is both cause and effect of the group destructiveness that results from legitimized evil. Only by fostering the growth of universalism in the human community and wholeness in the personality can the destructive and dehumanizing trends in the American ethos be defeated.

1513
Scheingold, Stuart A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA AS A POLICY ARENA. International studies quarterly, v. 15, Mar. 1971: 32-65.
D839.B2, v. 15
References.
"Adapted from a paper prepared for a conference on 'The United States and the Atlantic Community in the Seventies,' held at Memphis State University on April 18 and 19, 1969."

Examines the area-study methodologies associated with Deutsch and Haas, accepting the assumption that the socioeconomic variables are permanent properties determining the long-term trends in political processes. In Scheingold's opinion, the methodologies are alike in raising the same question of the emergence of a political community in the North Atlantic area, although they focus on different attributes of the political community. Scheingold's concern is not "with political community per se but with capacities relating more directly to policy processes and outcomes." The outcomes of the social community and neofunctional models contradict each other, but he thinks the contradiction can be resolved by accepting the North Atlantic area as a "policy arena," characterized by policy coordination rather than rigid joint policymaking. Post-World War II history suggests that the "policy arena" notion captures the essential nature of the North Atlantic area. Cohesiveness originates in basic socioeconomic forces, that is, it is independent of the cold war and so can be adapted to an increasingly polycentric world. Scheingold concludes that "the preoccupation with political community has . . . diverted attention from the relationship between socioeconomic bonds and policy outcomes."

1514
Schneider, Fernand-Thiébaut. [THE WEST IN THE FACE OF THE MENACE] L'occident face à la menace. Re-

vue militaire générale; general military review, Apr. 1971: 550-567.
U2.R48, 1971
Includes summaries in English and German.

Within the context of the politico-strategic struggle between the West on the one side and the Soviet Union and Communist China on the other, there exists a liberal communism, epitomized by the 1968 "Springtime of Freedom" in Czechoslovakia, that does not pose a direct threat to the West and that could modify the present structure of international politics. The revolt against the masters of Moscow by liberal Communists in Europe must be encouraged by the West in the hope that "human communism" can stop the hardliners in the Soviet Union from continuing a dangerous and costly arms race.

1515
Schweinfurth, Ulrich. [MILIEU AND TASKS OF FOREIGN POLICY] Umwelt und Aufgaben der Aussenpolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Feb. 1971: 69-80.
D839.A885, v. 22

What the Lorenzian ethologists call the territorial imperative explains much of international politics. This basic human drive, usually not consciously recognized, explains East Germany's insistence on recognition, the tragedy of ethnic groups like the Kurds, and the history of the modern Jewish state. The fact that two land-rich Communist powers have fought for sandbanks on the Ussuri River is best understood in terms of the territorial imperative. Now that rapid communications have taught man the dependence of all on all, and now that he has seen his home planet as the American astronauts saw it, man must study how to overcome the workings of the territorial imperative. The pollution of the Rhine, the ocean oil spills, the Alaskan pipeline, and atomic wastes are the examples of the worldwide deterioration of the quality of life. The ability to see the whole Earth, without political boundaries, and to envisage the global ecology problem as an internal problem, the problem of one world, requires the renunciation of the territorial imperative.

1516
Senghaas, Dieter. [AGGRESSIVENESS AND COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE] Aggressivität und kollektive Gewalt. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz, Kohlhammer [1971] 99 p. illus. (Urban-Taschenbücher, Bd. 813. Reihe 80)
JC330.S44
Bibliography: p. 96-[98].

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Methodological considerations.--pt. 2. Factors of aggressiveness and violence.--pt. 3. Sketch of violence and nonviolence.

Cites the psychic gap between expectation and attainment as one of the main causes of social aggressiveness, which is in turn shaped by the existing political order, national culture, and the socioeconomic system. Aggressiveness manifests itself in such phenomena as ethnocentricity, exaggerated patriotism, fixation with authority, and, ultimately, in collective violence. A world without arms need not be illusory, Senghaas maintains, but the realization of that aim postulates a basic change in society itself. The type of political and social order most conducive to that change is a social democracy in which the active participation of the majority would be fostered for the solution of political and public problems and where determined nonviolent solidarity, which Senghaas terms civilian or social defense, would replace the instrumentality of violence.

1517
Shulman, Marshall D. WHAT DOES SECURITY MEAN TODAY? Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 607-618.
D410.F6, v. 49

Current developments cast doubt on the postwar American concept of security as containment of the Soviet Union through military superiority. These developments include Soviet achievement of strategic nuclear parity, expansion of Soviet conventional forces, emphasis on political competition instead of territorial expansion, acceleration of technological change, and the breakdown of the bipolar world under nationalist forces. The disparity between means and objectives was the main cause of Soviet setbacks in the Khrushchev era. Kremlin policy since then has been moving to develop substance commensurate with Soviet Great Power status. With growing military means have come purposeful diplomatic initiatives, reflecting a shift toward the traditional politics of influence and away from the revolutionary mystique. This new effort is the result not of a specific design but of generalized ambition, bureaucratic competition, and opportunistic response to America's diminished position as a consequence of Vietnam. The Soviet effort has eschewed counterproductive crisis diplomacy in favor of low-key conflict situations. Chances for success are limited by economic and other internal deficiencies, polycentrist strains in the Eastern bloc and the Sino-Soviet split, and the arms-length policies of independent-minded states. The goals of Soviet foreign policy are ill-suited for the modern world, where control over peoples is difficult to preserve and Soviet ideology provides few answers. What is required is freedom of economic competition for influence, even in areas marked out as essential for security (a principle not accepted as yet by the Soviet Union), and nonintervention in a state's internal developments. While the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have been going on, development of nuclear armaments has continued, reflecting a failure of the leadership in the United States and the Soviet Union to cope effectively with technology and the military. The security of both powers lies in a strategic balance at the most reasonable level attainable through negotiations. A similar equation holds for confrontation of conventional forces in a given region. This conventional balance suggests that an approach to security will present greater rewards if diplomatic, cultural, political, economic, and other means are also utilized. However, a mili-

tary equilibrium is required as a precondition for the function of these other instruments of security.

1518
Snyder, Glenn H. "PRISONER'S DILEMMA" AND "CHICKEN" MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. International studies quarterly, v. 15, Mar. 1971: 66-102.
D839.B2, v. 15
Bibliographical references: p. 101-102.

Clarifies the kinds of situations depicted by the "prisoner's dilemma" and "chicken" models of conflict, establishing differences in their logical and social implications in the context of international politics. The discussion of prisoner's dilemma cites arms competition as "the most obvious example in international politics" and goes on to its obverse, disarmament. The political counterpart of the arms race is alliance competition. Other international relations phenomena selected to exemplify aspects of the prisoner's dilemma are collective security, 19th century imperialism, and the nuclear arms race. Discussions of the security dilemma and the concepts of mirror image and deterrence are illustrated with examples from the arms race. The simple model of the "chicken" game is made more sophisticated to describe the complexities of real international crises. Since the parties' perception of the probabilities associated with each other's alternatives can be modified by various communication and bargaining techniques, the international game of chicken calls for the high development of such techniques. Failure of the British decisionmaking group in the First World War to perceive the other side's game also illustrates how strategies appropriate to one game may not be appropriate to another. The central characteristic of the chicken game, Snyder notes, may not always hold true in nuclear crises. He suggests that the structure of the international system traps all the major actors in a grand game of prisoner's dilemma, which establishes the context for games of chicken and lesser prisoner's dilemmas played as crisis confrontations over specific issues. The outcomes of these subgames strategically affect the parties' relative capabilities to play future subgames. The power that shifts as a result of the subgames has two components, capabilities and resolve. The "balance of resolve" concept and its empirical qualifications are examined on the basis of the Russian-Austrian confrontation of August 1914. The problem in international relations rises from the fact that the actors are simultaneously playing the primary and secondary games, that is, seeking the advantages of cooperation without yielding position, instilling trust and fear at the same time. Surprisingly, chicken and prisoner's dilemma games do coexist; the arms race does not weaken the general political détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. Snyder concludes that the best hope for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma supergame is for both parties to play the chicken game hard and well, that is, to maintain the equilibrium of power.

1519
THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE; a handbook, edited by George Schöpflin. New York, Praeger [1970] 614 p. illus. (Handbooks to the modern world) DK17.S64 1970b
Includes bibliographies.

A collection of writings by 47 authors, designed to furnish basic information and comment about the Soviet Union and its relationships with its European Communist neighbors. Material is presented topically from political and cultural points of view. Maps of Eastern European countries, as well as natural resources, railways, pipelines, etc., of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are interspersed throughout the text.

1520
[THREE WORLD POWERS AND THE THIRD WORLD] Drei Weltmächte und Dritte Welt. Moderne Welt, v. 11, no. 3, 1970: 227-238.
D839.M58, v. 11

Describes the relationships of the United States and the Soviet Union with the underdeveloped states of the Third World and the change in outlook within the Third World--from international idealism to introspective realism. The article examines China's credentials as a world power--a role it has chosen neither to accept nor to exercise--and Peking's relationship with the Third World. That the states of the Third World have acquired a certain freedom of action is due not to their own efforts but to the superpowers' interest in seeing those states develop and to the mutually canceling effect of the power balance.

1521
UNDERSTANDING AGGRESSION. International social science journal, v. 23, no. 1, 1971: 5-110.
H1.A2, v. 23

Contents.--Editorial.--Introduction, by Lionel Tiger.--Relevance of ethology to human aggressiveness, by Robert Bigelow.--The neurological basis of violence, by José M. R. Delgado.--Recent research on hormonal factors relevant to human aggressiveness, by David A. Hamburg.--The nature and control of aggressive behaviour, by Robert A. Hinde.--Crisis, stress and decisionmaking, by Ole R. Holsti.--Social aspects of international aggression, by N. A. Kovalsky.--Aggressiveness in the human life cycle within different socio-cultural settings, by T. Adeoye Lambo.--Some aspects of aggressive behavior in a group of free-living chimpanzees, by Jane van Lawick-Goodall.--Group aggression and research on violence, by Shib K. Mitra.--Aggressive behavior and social behavior in animals, by Philippe Ropartz.

Articles drawn from material presented to a symposium on the causes and character of human aggression held May 19-23, 1970, in Paris, under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The discussions focused mainly on whether human aggression is instinctual or learned, the role of the sex hormones, and the nature and causes of aggression

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that is characteristic of groups and is "socially stimulated, socially mediated, and socially controlled." The evidence offered in these papers indicates that a synthesis of biological and cultural explanations might be achieved by means of the insight that "the role of biological endowment is to set limits and establish emphases in the profile of activities and enthusiasms around which human learning and teaching revolve." The problems are complex, however, and their solution will require an understanding of "what man is in the widest possible biosociological sense."

1522
U.S. Dept. of the Army. COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE; ANALYTICAL SURVEY OF LITERATURE. Washington, Headquarters, Dept. of the Army [for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1971. 367 p. illus. (Its Pamphlet no. 550-8)
Z2483.U48

Contents.--Communist Eastern Europe and international communism.--Communist Eastern Europe and USSR: an assessment.--USSR and the Communist bloc.--Invasion of Czechoslovakia: the prelude and the avalanche.--Communist Eastern Europe by country.--Source materials for research and reference.--Appendixes.

An annotated bibliography of monographs and articles on Eastern Europe, most of which were originally published in English between 1965 and 1970. The appendixes consist of texts, charts, statistical tables, and maps on political, economic, and military conditions in Eastern Europe.

1523
WHY WAR. International journal of group tensions, v. 1, Jan./Mar. 1971: 9-25.
N&CPR

A reprint of the well-known exchange of letters between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud in 1932, in which the two distinguished scientists outlined their views on the causes of war and its prevention. In his reply to Einstein, Freud discusses his hypothesis that man is ruled by two opposing instincts--a preserving and unifying "erotic" instinct, and an aggressive and destructive "death" instinct. The cure for violence, he suggests, is to be found in the further growth of "culture," which is characterized by a strengthening of the intellect and an internalization of aggressive impulses.

FOREIGN POLICIES

1524
Acheson, Dean. THE ECLIPSE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 593-606.
D410.F6, v. 49

Conventional wisdom has held that the Secretary of State and his department have been in decline, because the President, aided and encouraged by his advisers, has increasingly taken over the prestigious function of shaping U.S. foreign policy. It is an established fact of constitutional law that the President is ultimately supreme in the conduct of external relations. Nothing compels him to rely exclusively or even slightly on the State Department and its Secretary in performing this duty. Soviet foreign policy is controlled not by the ministry but by the Politburo, a historical development left over from the Bolsheviks' distrust of diplomacy and diplomats. The American experience since the Civil War found Secretaries of State with little to do, ignored or bypassed by assertive Presidents. Secretaries left alone accomplished little of lasting substance. The streamlined and modernized department created by Secretary Marshall to replace the "horse and buggy" relic distrusted and circumvented by President Roosevelt was gutted by Secretary Dulles' acquiescence to the McCarthyite onslaught. President Kennedy inherited a purged shadow he distrusted. Following his own predilections he began the buildup of a personal organization. This Politburo setup persists and appears to be here to stay. What many modern Presidents expect from foreign policy makes it difficult to find one figure with all the requisite enabling qualities. The presence of a strong White House adviser does not lessen a Secretary of State's effectiveness in dealing with foreign governments, for a Secretary will always be effective if he speaks for the President, knowledgeably and truthfully. The mass of policy formulation and execution is still the Department's function. The ability of an adviser to formulate more than a few policies is limited. Presidential dissatisfaction with what was being done or not done, not staff ambition, has been the spur to policymaking by White House assistants. The heart of the problem has been ossification of the broad complex policy planning functions of the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Professional exclusiveness and narrow specialized knowledge are no substitute for coordination of all aspects of the molding of a unified, cohesive foreign policy.

1525
Albert, Ernst. [ENGLAND'S EXTRA-EUROPEAN ROLE] Englands Rolle ausserhalb Europas. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Apr. 1971: 209-217.
D839.A885, v. 22

England's extra-European role will be determined ultimately by these factors: its economic capabilities, popular acceptance of the burdens of armament, the relationships with the United States and the Commonwealth, and the action and reaction of global and European politics. The withdrawal from East of Suez was forced on Wilson by economic pressures, but his political courage in making the decision should be emphasized; the realistically modest role envisaged by the successor administration would not have been possible without this precedent. With the evacuation of Aden, the British position in the Persian Gulf became untenable. While the British forces are welcome in Singapore and Malaysia, their value is perhaps as much psychological as military. The political disadvantages of arming South Africa may outweigh the

hoped-for military benefits, although the Commonwealth seems moribund. The Union Jack flying side-by-side with the Stars and Stripes in Asia is a symbolic demonstration of England's special relationship with the United States that is worth a great deal. There is no conflict between the world role Heath now plans for Britain and its future on the European continent. However, denial of admission to the European Common Market might give the signal for a new English isolationism.

1526
Albertini, Rudolf von. [AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1945-1970] Zur amerikanischen Aussenpolitik 1945-1970. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 50, Feb. 1971: 1000-1016. AP32.S47, v. 50
Bibliographical footnotes.

Review of American and German literature on postwar American foreign policy, centering on American relations with the Soviet Union and the American confrontation with the worldwide national liberation movement. Albertini notes the difficulty for the foreigner of understanding the decisionmaking process practiced in Washington despite the "brilliantly informed press." The discussion begins with the writings of Dean Acheson, called "an impressive self portrait . . . [of this] most typical representative . . . [of the] East Coast Establishment." The "insiders' reports" examined are those of J. K. Galbraith and Arthur Krock, who is rather sharply criticized. Along with Townsend Hoopes, Carl-Christoph Schweitzer is cited at length in the examination of the literature over Vietnam. Publications by Gabriel Kolko and Ekkehard Krippendorff are labelled "neo-Marxist attempts at exposure," although Albertini thinks significant Krippendorff's thesis that the "open door" for trade and ideology is the basic goal of American foreign policy. Albertini regrets his inability to communicate to the reader the "depth and illusionless penetration of the analyses" by Hans Morgenthau. On the other hand, he was disappointed by Charles Bohlen, and found no satisfactory answers in Henry Kissinger's essays or the collection America and the World, edited by Robert K. Osgood, although conceding the brilliance of some individual perceptions.

1527
Arbatov, G. AMERICAN IMPERIALISM AND NEW WORLD REALITIES. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, June 1, 1971: 1-3, 8.
D839.C87, v. 23
Condensed from Pravda, May 4, 1971.
Slav Rm

For the United States the past 5 years have been marked not only by mounting internal difficulties but by the increasing connection of these difficulties with foreign policy problems. Imperialism today is confronted by an irreversible change in favor of socialism in the rivalry between the two competing social systems. The realities of the world situation have forced a reexamination of American foreign policy, with two forms: a search for more subtle means of attaining the same reactionary goals and, far less often, the correction of principles. For example, instead of negotiating détente the United States concentrates on improving its military machine; instead of ending the Vietnam War, Washington curtails internal discussion and objection. In evaluating imperialism's efforts to adapt itself to the new world situation, the class approach points out that nothing in the nature of imperialism has been changed. However it also insists that realistic improvements in domestic and foreign policies must not be minimized, since such improvements may have consequences that correspond to the people's interests. The Soviet Union will welcome such improvements and seek resolution of disputes by negotiation while continuing to rebuff American imperialism.

1528
Aronson, James. THE PRESS AND THE COLD WAR. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Co. [1970] 308 p.
DLC

Contents.--One newspaperman's life (a preface). --From Zenger to abdication.--Counterpoint of two wars.--Henry Wallace and hysteria.--The frost on the pumpkin.--The making of Joe McCarthy.--A tale of two editors.--The news from Korea.--The prisoners of war.--The Eastland succession.--The target: the Times.--The Bay of Pigs.--The missile crisis. --Vietnam: the making of a miracle.--The miracle unmade.--Patriotism and policy.--Free rides to the front.--Journalism of the absurd.--Two men of the Times.--Freedom and responsibility.--The alternative press.--Index.

Contends that "the press of the United States has to a large degree become a voluntary arm of established power." Aronson examines press coverage of major episodes in the cold war to support his contention that the press has acquiesced in the suppression of news and views that challenge basic tenets of U.S. foreign policy. He voices the hope that the underground press and the growing number of disillusioned establishment journalists will restore American journalism to its proper function of censor and critic of the Government.

1529
Barber, Stephen. AMERICA IN RETREAT. London, Tom Stacey Ltd [1970] 191 p.
E855.B3

Contents.--Preface, by Tom Stacey.--The mood of retreat.--The Nixon doctrine.--The uncertain foundations of world leadership.--How the U.S. assumed the mantle.--A manufactured nationhood.--Missionary zeal and Manifest Destiny.--The plateau of empire.--The Camelot bubble.--Vietnam and its consequences.--Turning right and turning inwards.-- Black and white.--Power and corruption.--Polarization, decay and isolation.

Surveys modern America from a European viewpoint and finds the future gloomy. A decline in American superiority and influence throughout the world

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seems unavoidable, as evidenced by the probable application in Europe of the Nixon doctrine. After offering his predictions Barber historically reviews economic, political, and diplomatic factors that support his contention. He points out how the two opposite themes of "missionary instinct" and Manifest Destiny have been influential in directing United States activities abroad. Barber, an Englishman, draws heavily on his own experience as a war reporter, foreign correspondent, and 7-year resident of the United States.

1530
Bertram, Christoph. WEST GERMAN PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE. World today, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 115-123.
D410.W63, v. 27

Bonn's Ostpolitik can begin a gradual process that might normalize relations between Eastern and Western Europe and create a new European security system, but until then such guarantees of security as alliance membership and the East-West balance of power remain the bases of West Germany's security perspectives. The Atlantic Alliance must continue to guarantee West Germany's security while Bonn pursues its East European policy to reduce tensions in Europe. Otherwise West Germany, which is more exposed to political and military pressures from the East because of its history and location, would have to stand alone. Ostpolitik confirms the need to maintain the East-West balance of power in Europe, and those who fear that it would allow Bonn to adopt a see-saw policy between East and West need not worry. Bonn's East European policy must be seen as one of small steps, some of which have already been taken; the treaties with Poland and the Soviet Union have done away with unrealistic positions that were potentially harmful to détente. The prospects for détente depend largely upon whether the simultaneous existence of antagonism and cooperation can be resolved by West German policies. The Soviet proposal for a European security conference may have been intended to deal with the instabilities détente might engender. West Germany's desire to include mutual balanced force reductions on the agenda of a security conference is based on the conviction that détente cannot exist independently of the present European military situation. The German Ostpolitik also holds advantages for West European integration, which could go far in reducing the risks inherent in détente and in helping Bonn pursue its foreign policies in Europe unencumbered by the danger of political isolation.

1531
Bex, John E. JAPAN: AN ALIEN ALLY. Naval War College review, v. 23, Nov. 1970: 42-47.
N&CPR

Japan has shown an ability to assimilate Western technology and to practice capitalism that is unique among Eastern nations. However, Americans should not assume that economic similarities indicate cultural similarities; Japanese capitalism has singular characteristics. In the light of Japan's obvious success and growth, its future relationships with China and Korea are of interest. Despite an apparent current coolness, the ties among the three countries are ancient and strong, and future cooperation is not unlikely. Certainly Japan is interested in reducing any dependence on the United States, and that relationship is due for readjustment. Japan may well spring surprises with a bearing on future American national security policy.

1532
Birrenbach, Kurt. [EIGHT CRITICISMS FROM THE OUTSIDE; VOICES AND OPINIONS FROM THE WEST] Acht Einwände von draussen; Stimmen und Stimmungen aus dem Westen. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Mar./Apr. 1971: 79, 81, 83-84.
H5.P75, v. 16

Based on a talk in the foreign policy debate in the Bundestag.

Reviews arguments advanced in the West against the new German Ostpolitik, particularly the Moscow treaty. The basic criticism is that Brandt sees the treaty as a means of improving the status quo, and Moscow sees it as a means of consolidating it. Western critics anticipate weakening of the Western position, reduction of military preparedness, political fragmentation of Western Europe, inhibition of the impetus toward European integration, no improvement in the Berlin situation, and the convening of a European security conference that will recognize Moscow's hegemony and force the United States out of Europe.

1533
Böckenförde, Ernst W. [OSTPOLITIK HAS A NEW LEGAL BASIS] Ostpolitik steht auf neuer Rechtsgrundlage. Neue Gesellschaft, v. 18, Jan. 1971: 36-40.
H5.N36, v. 18

Slightly revised version of an article originally published in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 27, 1970. N&CPR

Refutes criticisms of the new German Ostpolitik advanced by Freiherr von Guttenberg in the Bundestag on May 27, 1970. Böckenförde agrees that the duty of statesmen is to protect and bring to fruition the elementary rights of individuals and nations. He continues, however, that this duty carried to its logical conclusion implies resort to all possible means of defense. In view of the renunciation of war that is the basic principle of German foreign policy and in view of the terrible nature of modern war, Böckenförde asks how Guttenberg intends to achieve his admittedly desirable goals. The alternatives confronting the present generation are not observation of law or capitulation to sheer force, but rather utilizing the consolidation of the present status quo to open opportunities for changing it.

1534
Bowles, Chester. AMERICA AND RUSSIA IN INDIA. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 636-651.
D410.F6, v. 49

After initial friction, the Soviet Union has gradually established closer relations with India in the realization that India provides a counterbalance to China. In contrast, the United States has underestimated India's importance in Asia. American aid has been generous, but given to a people Americans have bothered to learn little about. Attempts to make the United States a major source of military assistance to India in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian border fighting came close to success. The deaths of Kennedy and Nehru led to postponement of a final decision. Thus the Indian Armed Forces have become heavily dependent on Soviet weaponry and equipment. The Soviet Foreign Office tightly controls Indian policy, but the relative isolation of the American Embassy from Washington, a lack of clear policy, and a line of independent and sympathetic Ambassadors have meant a flexible policy and a mission closely in contact with the Indians. Soviet anti-American propaganda has had little effect. Rivalry among India's three major Communist parties suggests that a Communist India might not be an object of Moscow's policy, adding as it would to intrabloc headaches. Concern over China plus dependence on Russian arms have placed the Indians in a closer association with Soviet policy than they like. Both American and Russian behavior toward India has at times been arrogant. India and the Soviet Union are worried about possible extension of Chinese influence south into Asia and east toward Africa, and the chaos in Pakistan offers China an opportunity to achieve a presence on the Indian Ocean and break up the Indian state. The United States and the Soviet Union should realize that they have many common interests. Both should have found that there are limits to what they can accomplish in India and Asia. American policy should be reformed by a reorganization of the State Department regional bureaus, regularly scheduled visits to India by officials, an immediate halt of military aid to Pakistan (which only intensifies the area's arms race), an effort to better understand the Soviet Union, India, and especially China, and, without conditions, all necessary aid for ensuring Indian progress, including a 10-year moratorium on payments due. A strengthened India could make an essential contribution to the balance of post-Vietnam Asia.

1535
Buss, Robin. WARY PARTNERS: THE SOVIET UNION AND ARAB SOCIALISM. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, Dec. 1970. 28 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 73) U162.A3, no. 73

Contents.--Introduction.--What is Arab socialism?--The non-capitalist path.--Case histories.--Conclusions.

Examines Soviet attitudes toward Arab socialism and Soviet expectations about its future development. Buss seeks to anticipate future Soviet activities in the Arab domain and to gain a clearer picture of basic Soviet policies regarding the Third World. Although the major Soviet concern with the Arabs is one of expediency and self-interest, any ideological compatibility that might be achieved would be desirable. Paradoxically, Buss believes that the gravest threat to the Soviet presence in the Arab world comes from the revolutionary "New Left" factions among the Socialists.

1536
Byrnes, Robert F. RUSSIA IN EASTERN EUROPE: HEGEMONY WITHOUT SECURITY. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 682-697. D410.F6, v. 49

The Soviet position in Eastern Europe is a major factor in Soviet security and the central cause of the conflict between the Soviet Union and NATO. Although Soviet domination seems stronger than ever, in fact it has weakened considerably in the past quarter century. Basically the Soviet military and political position is endangered by nationalist, economic, social, cultural, and intellectual developments that cannot be effectively dealt with by resort to Soviet domestic methods. The Soviet Marxist world view, along with the conservatively rigid nature of the regime, hampers policy in Eastern Europe. The existence of China and Yugoslavia as Communist alternatives and the "Great Fear" of Westernization also place limits on Soviet policy options. Difficulties appear in any of the choices the Soviet Union could make to bind the Eastern European regimes closer to it. Closer political association or union of some sort would meet resistance throughout the bloc, economic aid or coordination founders on Soviet myopia and bureaucratic unwieldiness, and economic reform or expanded trade involves intrusion of undesirable Western influences. An accord with Bonn would unsettle the East German regime; even creation of a neutral, disarmed, and reunified Germany would open a hole in Soviet defenses and increase the chances of Western ideas infecting Eastern Europe. Soviet intervention in a post-Tito Yugoslavia would lead directly to a dangerous East-West confrontation. Although the Soviet Union is indisputably in control of Eastern Europe, the corrections necessary cannot be made without creating thornier problems. The forces pressing upon Western society are pressing the Soviet system as well. The Kremlin response will be repression and tighter control to stabilize the status quo, solving nothing while perpetuating and increasing the instability of the situation.

1537
Cain, Edward R. PROTEST AND FOREIGN POLICY. Christian century, v. 88, June 16, 1971: 742-744. illus. BR1.C45, v. 88

Asserts that expressions of protest are essential if public opinion is to have any effect on foreign policy. Rejects the assumption that foreign policy should be above criticism. Repression of noisy protest usually only increases the protesters' level of desperation. On the other hand, an "overdose of freedom" might show the flaws in extremist positions by exposing them to public scrutiny. As all sides become more polarized

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opinions become more rigid, and chances for a flexible and pragmatic security policy are reduced.

1538
Carter, James R. THE NET COST OF SOVIET FOREIGN AID. New York, Praeger Publishers [1971, c1969] 134 p. (Praeger special studies in international economics and development)
HC60.C296
Bibliography: p. 127-134.

Compares net costs of Soviet foreign aid over the period 1955-68 and concludes that more aid was extended to more countries in 1968 than in 1955. Such analysis is made difficult by a shortage of information and the problems of converting ruble values. Carter observes that although Moscow's goal is still the worldwide spread of communism, its methods of attaining that goal have changed since the Stalinist days. Previously the Soviets sought to take over governments by force if necessary. Under the more recent policy of peaceful coexistence, they seek to extend their influence and prestige, even offering economic aid to some non-Communist countries.

1539
Clark, Donald L. SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES. Air University review, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1971: 2-18. illus. TL501.A5574, v. 22

In the coming decade the Soviet Union will eschew nuclear war and pursue détente in those areas where it feels nuclear war could develop, but in areas where U.S. interests are low, Moscow will continue the so-called class struggle for expanded influence. This "détente and expand" strategy should provide the Soviet Union with a means for achieving such goals as the survivability of the motherland, nuclear parity with the United States, avoidance of nuclear war, Soviet hegemony in the peripheral regions, and economic growth. The Soviet Union is likely to seek limited détente in Western Europe and in the arms race in view of its newly acquired nuclear parity and its concern over Communist China. In the Middle East the Russians will endeavor to coopt the Arab States, while in Asia they will seek to establish working relations with as many Asian states as possible, keeping away from those areas to which the United States is directly committed. Moscow's China policy will be tough and aggressive politically, economically, and militarily, and the only factor that might militate against this would be the death of Mao Tse-tung and the takeover of a friendly Chinese government.

1540
Clark, Gregory. SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS--AN ANALYSIS. Australian outlook, v. 25, Apr. 1971: 58-68. DU80.A947, v. 25

Examines the historical record of recent Sino-Japanese relations, with a view to identifying the sources of estrangement and friction between the two countries and determining responsibility for their long-standing mutual hostility. Clark reviews the course of Sino-Japanese diplomacy, focusing particularly on the critical years 1964-65, when the opportunity for a substantial improvement in relations was greatest; he analyzes the foreign policy perceptions of Chinese Communist and Japanese Liberal-Democratic decisionmakers, identifying major sources of misunderstanding and conflict; and he weighs the gains and losses each side might expect from improved relations. China has strong subjective reasons for fearing Japan and its ruling Liberal-Democratic party. Realizing this, some Japanese are urging the government to make concessions to China that will convince it of the sincerity of Japanese intentions. Mr. Sato and his cabinet are not persuaded, however, that concessions would be to Japan's advantage.

1541
Clubb, O. Edmund. CHINA'S PLANS: AN INFORMED GUESS. Nation, v. 212, May 17, 1971: 613-615. AP2.N2, v. 212

The Nixon administration's position is that the next step forward in renewed Sino-American relations is up to China. Yet Peking will not make any concessions on basic differences between the two nations, such as China's hostility toward continuing American support for the Nationalist government on Taiwan or its hard-line encouragement of the North Vietnamese. American policy in Asia has suffered reverses, while China has succeeded in overcoming American efforts to isolate it. The objectives the Chinese probably hope to realize from their return to the post-Bandung policy of "people-to-people diplomacy" are: weakening the standing of the Nationalists and their U.S. support through increased good will in American public opinion toward Communist China; advantageous developments in other nations, notably Japan and the Soviet Union, as a consequence of Peking's improved relationship with the United States; and easing the impact of a possible Sino-American confrontation developing over final American disengagement from Vietnam. China has aimed its policy solely at advancing its national interests when it feels it has the diplomatic and political advantage.

1542
Clubb, O. Edmund. CHINA'S STRATEGIC SHIFT. Progressive, v. 35, Aug. 1971: 19-22. AP2.P8655, v. 35

Although it continues to speak loudly of Maoist revolutionism, the Government of the Chinese Peoples Republic is in practice dealing with several nations in an unrevolutionary way by practicing "peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation." Maoist doctrine teaches the importance of maintaining contradictions and clashing forces as the mechanisms for eventually achieving a classless, stable, and peaceful society. However China has not made the economic advances Mao intended nor

has it become the leader of Third World revolutions, so its position is not secure. In practice it is conducting increased dealings with "revisionist" Communist Yugoslavia and Rumania, revived negotiations with the Soviet Union, and increased trade with "militarist" Japan. There are even signs of easing its relations with the "imperialist" U.S.A.

1543
Duffee, Eldridge B. A "NEW" CHINA POLICY? In United States Naval Institute. Proceedings, v. 97, July 1971: 18-23. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

Rejects the possibility of a Washington-Peking rapprochement in view of the irreconcilable conflict of national interests and ideologies. The Chinese cannot tolerate the existence of a power that bars their natural access routes to South Asia and the South Seas and maintains a string of naval bases on their country's sea perimeter from Thailand to Korea. Since America's assumption of world-power status, it has learned that it is vital to American interest to deny China the naval avenues of expansion. Duffee argues that Peking's drive toward Asian hegemony underlines the necessity of a naval-oriented American strategy, and he defines the strategic missions of American seapower in Asia and the Western Pacific.

1544
Efremov, A. FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND PROGRESS--A NEW WORK ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, June 15, 1971: 31-32.
D839.C87, v. 23
Condensed from Pravda, May 19, 1971.
Slav Rm

Review of The History of U.S.S.R. Foreign Policy, edited by B. N. Ponomarev, A. A. Gromyko, and V. M. Khvostov, described as the first book to deal with international relations in their entirety and to show the influence exerted by Soviet foreign policy. The great changes in the international situation are described as the steady shift in the balance of power to socialism in its conflict with imperialism, and the "big foreign-policy successes of the Soviet Union, achieved under the leadership of the Communist Party." Included among these successes are the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and aid to the national liberation movements and to the Vietcong (which would have been more successful if the Chinese had coordinated their efforts with those of the U.S.S.R.). The manner in which Lenin's thesis that "disarmament is the ideal of socialism" has influenced Soviet policy from June 1946, the time of the draft convention for the complete ban of atomic weapons, until the signing of the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement is characterized as one of the main trends in Soviet foreign policy.

1545
Fairbank, John K. THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA. 3d ed. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971. 500 p. illus. (The American foreign policy library)
DS735.F3 1971
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction to the third edition, by Edwin O. Reischauer.--The Chinese scene.--The nature of Chinese society.--The Confucian pattern.--Alien rule and dynastic cycles.--The political tradition.--The Western impact.--The revolutionary process: rebellion and restoration.--The revolutionary process: reform and revolution.--The rise of the Kuomintang.--Problems of national development under the Kuomintang.--Authoritarianism and liberalism during the war of resistance.--The rise of the Communist Party.--Our inherited China policy.--United States policy and the Nationalist collapse.--The People's Republic: establishing the new order.--The People's Republic: the struggle for socialist transformation.--The continuing revolution.--Perspectives on China and ourselves.--Suggested reading.--Index.

Third edition of a "now classic" basic reference work first written in 1948 and last updated in 1958. Fairbank surveys Chinese society, culture, and history, with emphasis given to 20th century developments and U.S. relations with China.

1546
Fann, K. T., and Donald C. Hodges, comps. READINGS IN U.S. IMPERIALISM. Boston, P. Sargent [1971] xvii, 397 p. (An Extending horizons book)
HF1455.F26
Bibliography: p. 383-386.

An anthology of essays on U.S. imperialism selected from Monthly Review, Studies on the Left, New Left Review, and other leftist periodicals. The essays focus on the U.S. economic domination of Latin America but also examine the effects on the United States and Asia of what the authors and editors consider to be U.S. imperialism.

1547
Fîntînaru, I. THE RESPONSIBILITY OF EVERY NATION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DÉTENTE AND PEACE. Romania today, no. 4/197, 1971: 35, 63.
DR201.R78, 1971

Advocates an important role for small states in promoting peace. The article outlines Rumania's foreign policy objectives and the initiatives that the Ceausescu government has taken to attain them. Through the normalization and multiplication of its relations with other states, including those in the capitalist world, Rumania has made a major contribution to the improvement of the political climate in Europe. Rumania's foreign policy emphasizes the paramount significance of basing interstate relations on the principles of national independence, equal rights, and noninterference in domestic affairs.

1548
THE FOREIGN POLICY BUREAUCRACY. Foreign policy, no. 2, spring 1971: 69-113.
N&CPR

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Contents.--Why bureaucrats play games, by Morton H. Halperin.--Lying around Washington, by Anthony Lake.

Two analyses of bureaucratic politics in the U.S. foreign policy machinery. Halperin describes the struggle for power and influence among Government departments and agencies and offers some suggestions as to how the worst effects of this struggle can be prevented or mitigated. If the President is to be the master rather than the prisoner of the bureaucracy, he and his senior associates must be "clear about their own priorities, select options with care, and understand that the name of the bureaucratic game is 'organizational interests.'" Lake tackles the problem of Government secrecy and official dissembling--the institutional causes, consequences for public policy, and impact on public confidence. "Lying around Washington" is largely a consequence of national security and domestic political considerations on the one hand and organizational loyalties on the other. Lake offers some specific remedies, none of which is as important, in his estimation, as the general recommendation that public officials recognize the long-term dysfunctionality of lying.

1549
Fulbright, James William. THE CASE FOR A NEW INTERNATIONALISM. War/peace report, v. 11, May 1971: 3-7. JX1901.W38, v. 11
Remarks delivered April 4, 1971, at Yale University.

Severely criticizes the Nixon administration for its stubborn insistence on worshipping power politics, seeking victory in Vietnam, and rejecting the United Nations by asserting that the peacekeeping powers of the United States can be substituted for those of the United Nations. In the Middle East the United States is trying to force a solution on the Arabs and Israelis, and in so doing is running the risk of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. A more realistic answer would be to employ the peacekeeping procedures of the United Nations, imposing the settlement that everyone but Israel considers fair and reinforcing it with appropriate sanctions. Senator Fulbright emphasizes that such measures are fully covered in the United Nations Charter, to which every nation involved in the Middle East crisis has subscribed. Through such action the organization of nations, rather than the United States, would be the true world superpower.

1550
Granatstein, J. L., ed. CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945: MIDDLE POWER OR SATELLITE? Toronto, Copp Clark Pub. Co. [1969] 201 p. (Issues in Canadian history) F1034.2.G7
Bibliography: p. 201.

A collection of speeches, statements, excerpts from books, and articles, dating from 1939 to 1969, which trace Canada's role in the international community and discuss the future of Canadian foreign policy. According to Dalton K. Camp, Canadian foreign policy should be based not on NATO, the North American Air Defense Command, or the United Nations, but on disarmament, nonproliferation, and the development of a special role in foreign aid.

1551
Greene, Felix. THE ENEMY: NOTES ON IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION. London, Cape [1970] 341 p. E840.G7
Includes bibliographical references.

Analyzes the nature of imperialism and its effects on the peoples of the dominating and dominated countries. Greene argues that the downfall of U.S. imperialism, which he considers to be the foremost example of imperialism in the modern world, is inevitable because an increasing number of Americans, as well as peoples dominated by the United States, are no longer willing to accept the economic and psychological enslavement required to maintain capitalist society. He calls for a growth in revolutionary consciousness to overthrow U.S. imperialism from within.

1552
Grossman, Kurt R. [HISTORY OF THE GERMAN-POLISH UNDERSTANDING] Die Geschichte der deutsch-polnischen Verständigung. Neue Gesellschaft, v. 18, Jan. 1971: 28-35. illus. H5.N36, v. 18

Comments on the history of Polish-German relationships in the period between the two world wars. Grossman, a prominent advocate of understanding between the two countries, sketches the barriers to understanding erected by historic memories and by immediate difficulties. He concludes that the Federal Republic must seize the opportunity for reconciliation and friendship even with a Communist Polish state.

1553
Haack, Dieter. [THE OSTPOLITIK OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE] Die Ostpolitik der Bundesregierung und ihr Verhältnis zum atlantischen Bündnis. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Apr. 1971: 169-172. U3.W396, v. 20
Presented to the 8th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Feb. 20-21, 1971.

A justification of the Ostpolitik of the present German administration. Haack calls the new Ostpolitik an integral part of German security policy, since military superiority cannot in itself guarantee security. By abandoning its special claims, West Germany assures its allies that it has the same interests in Eastern Europe and no longer requires solution of the "German problem" before it will cooperate in bringing détente to Europe. Haack concludes that the new Ostpolitik should be understood as a political extension of the NATO concept and that it does not in any way alter Germany's status within NATO. West Germany

believes that the Atlantic Alliance is supplemented rather than supplanted by the new Ostpolitik.

1554
Hall, Martin. [SHOULD NIXON BE OPTIMISTIC?] Hat Nixon Grund, optimistisch zu sein? Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Feb. 1971: 126-134. D839.B57, v. 16

Disputes the U.S. administration's optimistic forecast about the world situation in 1971 and 1972, as the author characterizes President Nixon's January 1971 television interview. Hall foresees the failure of Vietnamization, a decline in morale of American forces, a domestic economic crisis, a worsening of relations with Europe, and a general deterioration of America's international position. He calls Nixon's failure to explicitly endorse the new German Ostpolitik a "stab in the back," which will eventually result in crises of confidence with the other NATO allies.

1555
Harlech, David Ormsby-Gore, baron. SUEZ SNAFU, SKYBOLT SABU. Foreign policy, no. 2, spring 1971: 38-50. N&CPR

Comments on issues raised by Richard Neustadt in Alliance Politics (cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography), a study of Anglo-American relations during the Suez crisis in 1956 and the Skybolt controversy in 1962. From a study of these two crises, Neustadt reached some general conclusions regarding the dynamics of alliances. Lord Harlech, who was a Member of Parliament during the first crisis and British Ambassador to Washington during the second, differs with Neustadt on significant points and, in particular, takes issue concerning the extent to which these breakdowns in the usually close Anglo-American relationship can be explained by the malfunctioning of government machinery or ignorance on both sides of the other side's political processes.

1556
Holmes, John W. CANADA AND THE PACIFIC. Pacific affairs, v. 44, spring 1971: 5-17. DU1.P13, v. 44

The old dream of Eastern markets has been reawakened in an economically greater Canada, but now, because of the growth of Japan and the sale of wheat to China, the notion has a foundation in reality. The Canadian Government's recent white paper on Pacific policy is basically commercial in nature, with no real interest in security. It apparently and unwarrantedly envisages that Canada can have a common policy toward an assumed "Pacific Rim." Canada has had no historic concern with Pacific security, but as economic and other contacts increase the subject will force itself on Canada's attention, possibly leading to necessary commitments. Increased Asian immigration is a sign of the new Canadian outlook toward Asia. The recently established relations with China may prove to be a demonstration of how a middle power can help determine the shape of the international system, although Canada's future role in Chinese developments will prove to be limited. Canadian attention to other Asian nations has largely centered on the Commonwealth members. The move toward Asia can be seen as part of an effort to balance off the dominance of Europe and the United States in Canadian affairs. "What is involved is not a Pacific policy but a Pacific direction." Canada has been dealing with the disparate nations of the region on a one-to-one basis, and a community feeling, as with the Atlantic nations, or a common policy is not possible. What is important is the realization that the Pacific nations are there and need not be ignored.

1557
Holyoake, Sir Keith. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1970. In New Zealand. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign affairs review, v. 20, Dec. 1970: 3-7. JX1591.A35, v. 20

Reviews events in international relations of 1970 with particular emphasis on the results of West Germany's Ostpolitik and the prospects for mutual balanced force reduction within the context of European security, the implications of the negotiations concerning Great Britain's entry into the European Economic Community, and U.S. policies in Southeast Asia. Holyoake praises the British Commonwealth, noting that it can significantly reduce New Zealand's sense of isolation more than any other organization.

1558
Imhoff, Christoph von. [IRAN AND ITS SOVIET NEIGHBOR] Iran und sein sowjetischer Nachbar. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Jan. 1971: 28-37. D839.A885, v. 22

Iran's industrialization and the exploitation of its raw-material resources are rapidly increasing in tempo. The Soviet Union's interest in these developments, particularly in the area of energy and petroleum, is especially notable. The north-south political axis from the Persian Gulf to Astara on the west bank of the Caspian now flourishes because of the closing of the Suez Canal. The east-west axis from Turkey through Pakistan represents the ideologically countervailing force of the West. As long as both economic lifelines remain in approximate equilibrium, Iran will retain its independence. The vacuum left by British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf may cause a slowdown of industrialization and force the purchase of arms at the expense of the agricultural poor.

1559
Jan, George P. PARTY POLITICS AND JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA. Orbis, v. 14, winter 1971: 973-991. D839.068, v. 14

Examines the role of party politics in the development of Japanese policy toward Communist China. Jan contends that in view of its parliamen-

tary elections victory, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will face no effective opposition for some time to come regarding its China policy. The main pressures for change on the government will stem from the factions within the LDP that desire an improvement in Sino-Japanese relations, from Japanese public opinion, and from extraparliamentary activities of the opposition parties. Jan concludes that any change in the present government's China policy will be minimal, and that barring any drastic developments in the international environment, relations with Peking will remain troublesome in the coming decade.

1560
Kaminski, Gerd. [RECOGNITION OF THE PEKING GOVERNMENT?] Anerkennung der Regierung in Peking? Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 11, no. 1, 1971: 4-22.
DB847.043, v. 11
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Examines the international legal status of the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of China as well as the legitimacy of the Peking and Taipei governments. Kaminski also addresses the problem of China's representation in the United Nations, the position of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the "theory of two Chinas." In discussing Austria's position, Kaminski states that although Austria voted in the United Nations for the China question being considered an "important question" requiring a two-thirds vote and then voted for the admission of Peking, Austria's stance need not be interpreted as support for a two-China policy. The experience of other states dissuades Austria from taking that course now.

1561
Kekkonen, Urho Kaleva, Pres. Finland, 1900- . NEUTRALITY: THE FINNISH POSITION; speeches; edited by Tuomas Vilkuna, with a preface by Jan-Magnus Jansson. London, Heinemann [1970] 234 p.
DK451.7.K44

A series of lectures given between 1943 and 1969, in which Kekkonen attempts to illuminate Finland's position and its "special relationship" with the Soviet Union. At the same time he attempts to explain the apparent inner contradictions in Finland's cold war relationships.

1562
Kennan, George F. ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY. Arbitration Journal, v. 26, no. 1, 1971: 1-33. LL

In a 1952 essay, the author expressed the view that there has been a "lack of realism" in much of what American statesmen have done in the past to advance arbitration and conciliation of political disputes between nations. As a consequence, the result of those efforts has been "over-elaborate and schematic" machinery which was, in fact, practically never used. Between 1899 and 1933, for instance, the United States negotiated 97 treaties for conciliation and arbitration, one of them being the Hague Convention. During this time, only two cases involving the U.S. were heard by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. One was a fisheries dispute with Great Britain, and the other a conflict with the Netherlands over sovereignty of the Island of Palmas. But in view of recent developments, particularly the emergence of nuclear power as a military force, he sees an improved outlook. Arbitration will never become the "sole means of settling international differences," the author states, but the arbitral principle "may come to have a more serious significance for us that it had in the years immediately before and after World War II." In that event, "one may hope that the American legislators and statesmen of the future will show a greater boldness in the development of these possibilities than did their counterparts of some seventy years ago." (Abstract supplied)

1563
Keohane, Robert O. THE BIG INFLUENCE OF SMALL ALLIES. Foreign policy, no. 2, spring 1971: 161-182. N&CPR

Alliances often increase the leverage of small powers in dealing with larger ones. For reasons relating to U.S. perceptions of the Communist threat and to the nature of the U.S. political system, this is especially true with respect to the United States. America's crusading spirit enables smaller powers to take U.S. support for granted, which greatly strengthens their bargaining position. At the same time, the U.S. political system is so constituted that this bargaining need not be confined to the level of formal state-to-state relations: small states can and do exploit differences between separable elements within the U.S. Government--for example, the executive departments--or make direct appeals to public opinion or private interest groups. Thus many small states value their membership in a U.S. alliance in good part for the influence it gives over U.S. policy. The cumulative impact of 40 or so small allies on that policy is not negligible and can be costly, as demonstrated by U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Organizational reform alone cannot correct this "overresponsiveness and excessive solicitude for small, poor allies closely tied to the American military and diplomatic structures." A retrenchment and redirection of U.S. foreign policy would go far toward restoring the balance, however. The point to be remembered is that "the big influence of small allies is an unplanned but natural result of [America's] globally active foreign policy."

1564
Kim, Youn-Soo. [NORTH KOREA: KIM IL-SUNG'S POLITICAL DILEMMA] Nordkorea: Kim Il-Songs politisches Dilemma. Moderne Welt, v. 11, no. 3, 1970: 280-286. D839.M58, v. 11

Reviews the political and economic difficulties confronting North Korea as a result of the Sino-

Soviet conflict and outlines the independent Communist course Kim Il-Sung is consequently pursuing. The North Korean party chief knows from personal experience (reduced Soviet aid following his criticism of Moscow's policy of peaceful coexistence) that his country cannot really achieve what he calls chu ch'e--political independence, economic self-confidence, and national self-defense--until it attains some measure of self-sufficiency. For this reason he has established as a primary state goal the establishment of an industrial base for heavy industry, an enlightened Socialist agricultural system, and a training program for technicians. While his relatively independent foreign policy, obdurately and circumspectly pursued, has worked rather well, there is no guarantee how long it will last so long as North Korea must rely on outside economic assistance and the principles of chu ch'e remain unrealized.

1565
Köhle, Klaus. [ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1949; A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE] Zur Entwicklung der westdeutschen Aussenpolitik nach 1949; Ein Literaturbericht. Politische Studien, v. 22, Jan./Feb. 1971: 88-96.
H35.P66, v. 22

Treats the literature of West German foreign policy with emphasis on comprehensive studies of the entire postwar period, the rearmament question, the relationship with France, England, and the developing countries, the current Ostpolitik, and present problems. The last category includes the enemy-state clauses of the United Nations Charter, the Oder-Neisse boundary problem, the proposed European security conference, and Christian-Democrat criticism of the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement.

1566
Loch, Theo M. [AGAINST THE EUROPE OF THE WESTERN STATES; MOSCOW REMAINS ON A COUNTER COURSE] Gegen das Europa der Weststaaten; Moskau bleibt auf Gegenkurs. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Mar./Apr. 1971: 85, 87, 89, 92.
H5.P75, v. 16

Brandt's Ostpolitik, particularly its reception of the proposed European security conference, is hardly to be reconciled with his depiction of the European Economic Community as a structural element in a new, emerging all-European order. It is clear that the Soviet Union will strongly counter any measures of the kind proposed at The Hague in December 1969 for an economic and customs union that will tighten Western resistance to Soviet encroachments. Brandt has set the ominous precedent of independent Eastern policies individually conceived by each of the Common Market nations without consultation with the others.

1567
Luchsinger, Fred. THE DRAGON AND THE BEAR [editorial] Swiss review of world affairs, v. 21, May 1971: 2-3. D839.S9, v. 21

The tentative rapprochement between Peking and Washington contrasts with Moscow's rigidity and regression in international relations. The Soviet Union has made treaties with the West and is engaged in arms limitation talks with the United States, but none of this has led to a balanced détente nor to an honest give and take between the West and the Soviet Union. The Kremlin considers maintaining its positions in Europe and increasing its strategic weapons production far more important than political arrangements with the West. Needless to say, acceptable settlement of European problems in the near future is unlikely. Soviet rigidity in Europe is linked with China within the context of the tentative signs of movement now beginning to show between Peking and Washington. Just how an improvement in relations between these two countries will affect the Soviet Union remains to be seen.

1568
McIntyre, William David. NEUTRALISM, NON ALIGNMENT AND NEW ZEALAND. [Wellington] New Zealand University Press, Price Milburn [1969] 19 p. (Liberal studies briefs, 3) JX5371.M23
Includes bibliographical references.

Reevaluates New Zealand's alliance policy in the context of Great Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez and the incipient American disengagement from Southeast Asia. McIntyre offers arguments for and against nonalinement and discusses some future trends in the nation's foreign and defense policies. He concludes that New Zealand will probably follow a middle course of qualified alinement in which, according to former Secretary of Defense Jack Hunn, it would not feel obliged to support all American policies in Asia but would attempt to exercise a moderating influence.

1569
Mahnke, Hans Heinrich. [CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE MOSCOW AND WARSAW TREATIES] Verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte der Verträge mit Moskau und Warschau. Neue Gesellschaft, v. 18, Jan. 1971: 41-44. H5.N36, v. 18

Rejects arguments of the unconstitutionality of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, which have been advanced by opponents of the Brandt administration. Mahnke concludes that the freedom of executive action implied in existing laws overrides the charges that the right to self-determination of all Germans and the concept of the continued existence of the German state have been violated.

1570
Matthiessen, Gunnar. [ON THE CURRENT U.S. POLICY TOWARD WESTERN EUROPE] Zur gegenwärtigen Westeuropapolitik der USA. Marxistische Blätter, v. 8, Nov./Dec. 1970: 17-25.
HX6.M32, v. 8

Stresses that the focus of American global policy is still fixed on Europe, where the two world systems confront each other geographically. In

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view of its many imperialist commitments, the United States has been forced to grant greater flexibility in foreign policy to Western Europe, in general, and to the Federal Republic, in particular. The Nixon administration, however, harbors suspicions that this very flexibility may lead to East-West rapprochements on the continent that are inimical to American designs for strengthening its hegemony over Western Europe. The United States therefore seeks to block a European security conference.

1571
Moore, John H., comp. THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE; AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED STATES: 1940-1970. [Melbourne] Cassell Australia [1970] 257 p. E183.8.A8M6
Bibliography: p. [228]-232.

Articles and statements that survey U.S. relations with Australia and New Zealand from 1940 to the present, with particular emphasis on the impact of the American soldier on Australia during World War II, the Pacific Security Treaty (ANZUS treaty), and the problems posed by this alliance in the framework of the Great Power rivalries in Southeast Asia. A table listing heads of state, foreign ministers, and diplomats, and a chronology of U.S. relations with the two countries are appended.

1572
Moorsteen, Richard H., and Morton Abramowitz. REMAKING CHINA POLICY; U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONMAKING. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971. xxxviii, 136 p. E183.8.C5M55

Proposes some points of departure for U.S. policy toward Communist China in the form of policy planning exercises. Through these approaches, both countries could begin to understand each other and reduce tensions: Washington by showing some concern for Peking's fears over U.S.-Soviet collusion, Peking by demonstrating restraint in Southeast Asia, and both by creating an environment that would discourage Japanese nuclear weapons acquisition. The authors advocate a U.S. position on Chinese representation in the United Nations that would allow Washington to acquiesce in Peking's admission and one that would lessen Chinese apprehensions over the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. They conclude that although better relations with China are desirable, they are not America's most important objective in Asia in view of its other, more pressing, interests in the region.

1573
Neustadt, Richard E. ALLIANCE POLITICS. New York, Columbia University Press, 1970. 167 p. E183.8.G7N47 1970
A reworked version of the author's Radner Lectures, delivered at Columbia University in 1966.
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Allies at odds.--The Suez crisis.--The Skybolt affair.--Crisis behavior.--London and Washington.--Limits on influence.--Index.

Explores the nature of alliance politics through an examination of Anglo-American relations during the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Skybolt affair of 1962. Neustadt attributes both crises to "muddled perceptions, stifled communications, disappointed expectations, [and] paranoid reactions" arising out of the nature of the policymaking machinery in Great Britain and the United States.

1574
Pick, Otto. THE AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE IMPACT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ON EUROPE. In Teaching about the American impact on Europe: report of an international seminar for teachers organised at Füssen, Germany, by the Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers, 23-28 November 1969. London, Atlantic Information Centre for Teachers [1970] p. 15-21. D1065.U5T4

Comments on the American position with regard to Europe. Complexities of the U.S. commitment to NATO and the special relationship between Washington and Moscow are discussed. Pick is particularly concerned with the problems of presenting material of this sort in schools. Students should gain a good understanding of the international system, the concept of national interest, and "the very difficult intricacies of the theory of nuclear deterrence," but the teacher is handicapped by a shortage of time and textbooks.

1575
Ranganathan, A. [INDIA BETWEEN THE POWERS] Indien zwischen den Mächten. Moderne Welt, v. 11, no. 3, 1970: 287-290. D839.M58, v. 11

Reproaches Indian policy toward the Soviet Union and Communist China as amateurish and short-sighted. The article outlines India's manipulation by the two Communist powers, especially Moscow. In trying to serve two masters, India has beclouded its relations with other Asian governments, permitted the power vacuum in the Indian Ocean to be filled by the Soviet Union, and refused to participate in a common Asian defense pact. Both the Soviet Union and China are intent on burying Indian democracy, albeit by different means and on different levels.

1576
Rasch, Harold. [THE IMMEDIATE TASKS] Die nächsten Aufgaben. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Jan. 1971: 12-22. D839.B57, v. 16

West Germany's prime task in the next decade is to contribute constructively to the achievement and maintenance of peace in Europe. The Bonn-Moscow renunciation-of-force agreement and the Bonn-Warsaw treaty should mean that West Germany has finally abandoned the fantasies of German unification "in peace and freedom" and the "return to the

borders of 1937" that threatened European peace. What remains to be done? There is no meaningful military sense in which West Germany can be defended. Whatever the "balance of terror" may mean in the relation of the superpowers, West Germany, acting in combination with NATO, cannot defend against aggression. This recognition forces the conclusion that Bonn must seek out agreements with Prague and Potsdam and actively promote the proposed European security conference. American war-weariness makes it probable that the balance of terror in its present terms will not endure. West Germany must begin by correcting the anti-Communist phobia disseminated by communications media. The Russian interest while it watches China is peace in Europe. Germany cannot pursue a peace policy with the East while at the same time arming NATO.

1577
Rass, Hans-Heinrich. [GREAT BRITAIN'S EASTERN POLICY--END ON THE VLTAVA] Grossbritanniens Ostpolitik--Das Ende an der Moldau. Dokumente, v. 27, Apr. 1971: 54-62. H5.D65, v. 27

Sketches the failure of Great Britain's policy toward East Europe during the 1950's and 1960's. The first decade revealed London's loss of world-power status and its consequent inability to maneuver and mediate between the two world systems. The coup de grace to its pretensions came with its Suez "police action" in 1956. During the second decade Great Britain sought to pursue a policy of rapprochement with Moscow. This flirtation failed, however, because of London's equivocal stand on the American engagement in Vietnam. The entire eastern policy shattered when the Soviets intervened in Czechoslovakia. The only successes Great Britain has scored have been in the area of foreign trade.

1578
Reinhold, Otto. [THE SOCIALIST WORLD SYSTEM--MAIN FORCE IN THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE] Das sozialistische Weltsystem--Hauptkraft im antiimperialistischen Kampf. Marxistische Blätter, v. 8, Nov./Dec. 1970: 9-16.
HX6.M32, v. 8

Sketches the current social and economic struggle between East and West. Citing Socialist achievements and the declining economic lead of monopoly capital, the article shows how the growing influence of socialism throughout the world is forcing bourgeois ideologies to accommodate their theories to the new power relationships. The imperialists' policy of accommodation, the article concludes, does not signify that they have abandoned their aggressive goals; they have simply changed their tactics.

1579
Richer, Philippe. [CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD (1949-1969)] La Chine et le tiers monde (1949-1969). Paris, Payot, 1971. 444 p. (Bibliothèque historique) DS740.4.R5
Bibliography: p. [395]-412.

Surveys mainland China's relations with Third World countries from 1949 to 1969, emphasizing Communist Party movements in Asia and Africa and economic and technical assistance to developing countries. An index of developing countries and a chronology of the principal events and agreements between China and over fifty Third World nations are appended.

1580
Roberts, Sir Frank. [PLEA FOR THE GERMAN OSTPOLITIK] Plädoyer für die deutsche Ostpolitik. Monat, v. 23, Mar. 1971: 7-14.
AP30.M56, v. 23

Comments on the course of Bonn-Moscow relationships leading to the framing of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik. Roberts, who has ambassadorial experience in both capitals, emphasizes that Brandt has explicitly recognized that negotiation with Moscow is possible only on the basis of Atlantic unity in NATO and European unity in the coming European Community. These causes can be considered endangered only if Bonn is forced into isolation by American withdrawal from NATO. He rejects the comparison with Rapallo and ascribes the new Ostpolitik to the assumption of power by a generation that did not fight the Hitler war and that sees the best hope for a united Germany in the general abatement of European tensions. Political pronouncements with this theme antedate the Brandt administration. Moscow's willingness to enter into negotiations realistically must be ascribed to its strategy of retaining the European status quo while aggressively expanding in the Middle East and Asia. In addition, such factors as the old Russian admiration for German skills and the hope of luring Bonn out of NATO or of securing its participation in the proposed European security conference play a part. The cost for Moscow includes forfeiting the German bogey it uses to terrify its satellites, possibly offending East Germany, and opening the way to improvement of the legal status of West Berlin. Roberts concludes that Bonn gave up nothing that had not already been lost and that the opportunities opened are worth the price.

1581
Roegele, Otto B. [CONTRADICTIONS OF BONN'S OSTPOLITIK: BETWEEN EUPHORIA AND RENUNCIATION] Die Widersprüche der Bonner Ostpolitik; zwischen Euphorie und Verzicht. Politische Meinung, v. 16, Mar./Apr. 1971: 61-78. H5.P75, v. 16

Western apprehensions concerning the foreign policy and security consequences of the new West German Ostpolitik and its legal and moral aspects indicate a deterioration in the general confidence that made German economic and political recovery possible. Bonn's unilateral concessions, made without asking for alleviation of the Berlin situation, deprive the four-power ambassadorial talks of substance. It is Germany's friends, Acheson, Ball, McCloy, Clay, and the American labor leaders, who complain of the rationale, the methods, and the tempo of the new Ostpolitik. President

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Nixon's foreign policy address specifically warned against the proposed European security conference advocated by Brandt's policy. The Yugoslavs, who thoroughly understand the meaning of the Brezhnev doctrine, have also expressed their misgivings privately to German diplomats. The new Ostpolitik has not altered the fundamental fact that while the West strives to maintain a balance the East works to change it. The détente euphoria in the West, which is not permitted in the East, is in effect defeatism. Brandt can claim success for his policy only if he reduces his goals to the barest minimum. The use of taunts to still the complaints of those hurt by the Ostpolitik, the refugee and the dispossessed, is particularly unworthy of his administration. There are explicit contradictions between the new Ostpolitik and international law: Can Bonn, without Potsdam, sign a treaty renouncing the Oder-Neisse lands? If the right to self determination of the East Germans must be recognized, why not that of the Poles, Czechs, and Soviet Jews?

1582
Rostow, Eugene V. IN SEARCH OF A MAJOR PREMISE: "WHAT IS FOREIGN POLICY FOR?" Round table, the Commonwealth quarterly, no. 242, Apr. 1971: 239-251. AP4.R6, 1971

Recalls the aspirations of the makers of the United Nations Charter, the condition of the international society toward which the charter was addressed, and the provisions of the charter. Rostow points out that while American response to aggression has been very uneven, there has been no offensive effort to remake the world in an American or Western image. In using force or the threat of force to enforce acceptance of the rules of restraint in international affairs, American presidents always knew they might lose popular support, since public opinion has been dubious and sometimes hostile about postwar foreign policy. Despite the lack of a widely accepted intellectual foundation for the conduct of foreign affairs, in Rostow's opinion, an inarticulate majority favors foreign engagement sufficient to remove the risk of general war. Whether this conviction implies full acceptance of the U.N. Charter provisions against aggression or a selective opposition to acts of aggression remains unclear. With Korea and Vietnam, however, the assumption that a willingness to endure small wars would prevent big ones became increasingly unacceptable to the American people. In summarizing the ensuing debate on what foreign policy is to do, Rostow derides John K. Galbraith's opinions as self-contradictory. He offers as his own basic premise that "foreign policy should be addressed to national interests, which alone can justify sending troops into battle," emphasizing that immunity from invasion is not the only measure of national security in a nuclear age. American foreign policy functions at two levels, nuclear deterrence and conventional diplomacy, and must be supported by nuclear and conventional armaments. The focal question today is the scope of the interest of the pan-Atlantic community in the Third World, where cold war tensions are apparently not soluble except by superpower restraint. The failure of the search for peace through universal rules and recognition of spheres of influence forces the United States and its allies to return to the line of policy they have followed since 1947. The best way to attain tacit international acceptance of reciprocal rules defining the limits of conflict remains Western actions like those in defense of Iran, Western Europe, and South Vietnam, perhaps better executed tactically. The present crisis of understanding and will caused by the anguish of Vietnam has provoked a very necessary and useful examination of the question: what is foreign policy for? Rostow warns: "the tension between reality and the state of public opinion is much too great for safety."

1583
Schäfer, Max. [THE WORLD STRATEGY OF U.S. IMPERIALISM] Die Weltstrategie des USA-Imperialismus. Marxistische Blätter, v. 8, Nov./Dec. 1970: 1-8. HX6.M32, v. 8

Traces the tactical changes in the "imperialist policy" of the United States toward the Socialist world from 1946 to the present. Enumerating past American aggressions, interventions, and incidents of blackmail, the article explores the tactics of containment and roll-back and examines the current Western policy of Ostpolitik and accommodation, which is termed merely an economic and psychological assault on the Socialist world. While American imperialism is no paper tiger, the article concludes, it is no longer capable of recouping its lost historical initiative.

1584
Scheel, Walter. [FOREIGN POLICY PARTIAL BALANCE SHEET: WHERE DO WE STAND?] Aussenpolitische Teilbilanz: Wo stehen wir? Aussenpolitik, v. 22, May 1971: 253-260. D839.A885, v. 22

Three fundamental points direct the foreign policy of the German Federal Republic: European unity, security, and détente in relations with Eastern Europe. Representative of the more recent steps in the pursuit of European integration have been Bonn's participation in a European Economic Community (EEC) foreign ministers' conference, where for the first time discussions centered on non-European problems; in EEC negotiations on the entry of Great Britain into the Common Market; and in EEC's approbation of a resolution for the creation of the European Economic and Monetary Union, which foresees by 1980 the free flow of goods, labor, and capital among EEC states under the aegis of a uniform economic policy and a common currency. In order to conduct its foreign policy West Germany needs an environment of stability. It is for that reason that the Federal Republic is firmly committed to NATO and maintains a close relationship with the United States. The Bonn government welcomes President Nixon's promise to continue stationing American troops in Europe. Without their presence, there is no balance in Europe, no security, and no détente. It must be remembered that security through détente is the comple-

ment to security through defense, not the alternative to it. The relaxation of tensions vis-a-vis Eastern Europe is a long-range goal to be attained step by step. The first step has been taken, but the outcome of current negotiations on Berlin will test the entire détente process. All in all, the prospects for the role of the Federal Republic in international affairs are promising.

1585
Schlesinger, Arthur M. THE NECESSARY AMORALITY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Harpers, v. 243, Aug. 1971: 72-77. AP2.H3, v. 243

Except in extreme cases moral principles do not provide an acceptable basis for decisions on foreign policy issues. A leader who insists on viewing international politics in terms of right and wrong quickly assumes a moral superiority that may approach fanaticism, for he is convinced he knows "better than other people what is right for them." This moral absolutism may indiscriminately afflict the Right or Left or both as exemplified in their statements about the Vietnam War. The assumption that what is moral for an individual is also moral for a state cannot be accepted. While love and sacrifice may be considered the duties of an individual, they are not appropriate for a nation which must instead be concerned with self-preservation. National interest, moderated by ethical standards and the realization that other nations have legitimate self-interests too, is a better guide for determining foreign policy. Even in areas of obvious injustice, such as colonialism, war crimes, world poverty, and racism, a considered program of national self-interest "joined to unremitting respect for the interests of others" will produce the fairest policy.

1586
Shun'ichi, Matsumoto. OUR NEIGHBOR CHINA. Japan quarterly, v. 18, Apr./June 1971: 148-154. DS801.J274, v. 18

Lasting peace is impossible for Japan until its differences with China have been settled. A complicating factor is Japan's treaty with Chiang Kai-shek, signed in the 1950's. Japanese leaders, furthermore, are sworn opponents of communism, as was demonstrated recently when Prime Minister Sato, in a joint communique with President Nixon, reaffirmed the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and implied Japan's support for South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam. A majority of the Japanese people, however, probably rejects this policy, and any suggestion of cooperation with the Soviet Union, in favor of improved relations with China. China is clearly the leader in the Communist areas of Asia. World opinion is shifting; Canada and Italy are resuming relations with Peking, and representation in the United Nations seems inevitable. China will attempt to reduce the Soviet threat by negotiating its border dispute. If both superpowers pull back in Asia (the Americans under the Nixon doctrine), Japan will have its chance to assume a role of major responsibility and importance in Asia. First it must achieve a cooperation with China that will "secure the peace and even the prosperity of the Far East."

1587
Stehle, Hansjakob. [NEIGHBORS IN THE EAST; CHALLENGE FOR A NEW POLICY] Nachbarn im Osten; Herausforderung zu einer neuen Politik. [Frankfurt am Main] S. Fischer Verlag [1971] 284 p. DR48.5.S76

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Predominance or partnership: Moscow's burden of size.--pt. 2. Many roads to the "Red Council."--pt. 3. The Czechoslovak example.--pt. 4. The Balkan balancing act.--pt. 5. The uncommon market.--pt. 6. The mutual problem: Germany.--Index of names.

Focuses attention on those events in postwar Europe illustrating the nonmonolithic nature of the Communist bloc and on their significance in ushering in a period of active coexistence and hastening a security order for Europe. Meaningful steps in that direction, Stehle maintains, were the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, wherein West Germany laid to rest the fears of revanchism.

1588
[STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC] Strukturwandlungen der Aussenpolitik in Grossbritannien und der Bundesrepublik, hrsg. von Karl Kaiser und Roger Morgan. München, R. Oldenbourg, 1970. 264 p. (Schriften des Forschungsinstituts der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bd. 29) DD259.4.S867

Papers from a joint conference organized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in London, April 1969.
Simultaneously published in English.
Bibliography: p. [257]-260.

Contents.--Introduction: Society and foreign policy: implications for theory and practice, by Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan.--Parameters for action in foreign policy: The Federal Republic and Great Britain: the new international environment, by Michael Donelan. Interdependence and autonomy: the Federal Republic and Great Britain in the multinational environment, by Karl Kaiser.--The conceptual framework of foreign policy: The intellectual bases of British foreign policy, by Joseph Frankel. The struggle of traditions: over the historical bases of West German foreign policy, by Waldemar Besson.--Social factors and foreign policy: Social structure, social change and British foreign policy, by Philip Abrams. Social factors and foreign policy decision: the German Federal Republic, by Wolf-Dieter Narr.--The institutions of foreign policy: The institutions of British foreign policy, by Anthony Sampson. The institutions of West German foreign policy in the Adenauer era, by Arnulf Baring.--German-British relations: German-British relations after the war, by Hermann Preobst. German-British relations today and tomorrow, by Donald Watt.--The role of medium-sized powers in today's world policy: The role of

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Great Britain as a medium-sized power in world policy, by Roger Morgan. The roles of the Federal Republic in the community of states, by Hans-Peter Schwarz.--Selected bibliography for British and West German foreign policy.--Index of names.

Papers discuss the gradual restructuring of British and West German foreign policy as a consequence of the changed power relationships following the Second World War. No longer world powers, both states are adopting roles and fulfilling functions that take into account the power preeminence of the United States and the Soviet Union. Morgan holds that it is in Great Britain's long-term interests to continue to rely on its close ties with the United States while at the same time seeking for itself a European role against the day when ties with Washington may not be as close. Schwarz foresees West Germany as playing several roles vis-a-vis the United States, the Soviet Union, and its British and French partners and urges Bonn to pursue a policy, based on interdependence, wherein the Federal Republic will regard itself as one of a community of many states irrespective of its own relative power position.

1589
Taylor, John J. [TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE MAOIST STRATEGY OF REVOLUTION IN ASIA] Wandlungen Maoistischer Strategie der Revolution in Asien. China-Analysen, v. 10, May 1971: 24-26.
DS701.C356, v. 10

Traces the shifts in Mao's policy of revolution away from the Soviet view of working toward revolution through association with neutralist governments and comments on the newly emerging reorientation of Peking in light of current realities. Mao sees the drama in Asia today as a repetition of the Chinese revolution with a change in roles. The Soviet Union has assumed the part of the Kuomintang and the United States, that of Japan. Nevertheless, for long-term gains, Taylor asserts, Peking must accommodate itself to the new realities, the most important of which are the danger of an attack by the Soviet Union and the growing threat from an independently inclined Japan. Contributing factors to a change in Peking's policy may also include the Nixon doctrine, American desires for an improvement of relations with China, and a realization of China's own nuclear stature.

1590
Thompson, W. F. K. THE EAST-WEST BALANCE. In "We will bury you"; studies in left-wing subversion today. Ed. by Brian Crozier. [London] Tom Stacey Ltd. [c1970] p. 155-164.
HX518.S8C76

The present so-called détente (a resolution of all points of friction) is in reality a stalemate of military forces whose maintenance is essential if this balance is to continue. This depends not just on military readiness but also on the political, social, and economic health of the West European nations. The lesson of Czechoslovakia is that a true détente in Europe is further off and more difficult to achieve than many had thought. Moscow's objective in a European security conference is to secure its empire's western borders, freeing Soviet resources for a greater effort in the rest of Eurasia. Real détente is possible, but only over much time through firm patience. Western Europe and the United States should hold to a common position in any general security conference, seeking concessions the Russians should quite rightly give in exchange for desired guarantees. The British electorate must nurture an attitude of sober realism toward ongoing developments. A change in Soviet methods (peaceful coexistence) should not be confused with a change in objectives (détente). National morale must be kept high, and here Britain is weakest of all the nations in the East-West confrontation.

1591
Tung, Lin. CHINA AND THE FOREIGN POWERS: THE IMPACT OF AND REACTION TO UNEQUAL TREATIES, by William L. Tung. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1970. xxii, 526 p. map.
DS740.4.T79
"Bibliographical note": p. 473-477.

Contents.--Chronological chart of Chinese history.--Introduction.--Western demand for trade and other privileges through diplomacy and coercion.--Imperialistic aggression and the anti-foreign outburst.--Extent of foreign intrusions on China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.--Administrative, judicial, and economic encroachments.--China awakened but frustrated under international pressures.--Western response to China's appeal at the Washington Conference (1921-1922).--Vicissitudes of China's reoriented foreign relations.--China's diplomacy in peace and war for the abolition of unequal treaties.--China in transition after emancipation from unequal treaties.--Crucial problems of China as a major power.--Reassertion of China's position in Asia and beyond.--Appendices.--Index of treaties.--Subject index.

A history of Chinese foreign relations from the mid-19th century to the present, focusing on the impact of unequal treaties on current Chinese foreign policy. Tung discusses various forms of foreign encroachments on Chinese sovereignty, the efforts of both the Nationalists and Communists to reestablish Chinese sovereignty, and China's national aspirations with regard to the recovery of lost territories, demarcation of boundaries, and reassertion of influence in Asia and the world.

1592
U.S. Dept. of State. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1969-1970; A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Documents, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] xx, 617 p. illus. (U.S. Dept. of State. Publication 8575)
DLC
General foreign policy series 254.

Contents.--American foreign policy: a new unity and purpose.--Policy developments by geographic

region.--International security.--Economic affairs.--International organizations and law.--Social and scientific dimension.--Management.--Annex.

Surveys U.S. foreign policy during the first 2 years of the Nixon administration and outlines the basic goals of present policies. Rogers stresses the need for new policies to deal with changes in the international situation brought on by a quarter century of global insecurity. The annex includes "principal policy speeches and statements, important messages, and treaties and agreements signed or ratified in the past two years."

1593
Váli, Ferenc A. BRIDGE ACROSS THE BOSPORUS; THE FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1971] 410 p.
DR471.V3
Bibliography: p. 387-399.

Contents.--From empire to nation-state.--Foundations of Turkey's foreign policy.--Political parties, public opinion, and foreign policy.--Turkey, the United States, and NATO.--The USSR, the Straits, and the Balkans.--Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus.--Turkey and the Middle East.--Development: A foreign policy goal.--Ambitions and realities of Turkish foreign policy.--Chronology.--Bibliography.--Index.

Surveys the historical background, domestic elements, and main concerns and actions of Turkey's foreign policy. Ever since the Turkish republic was founded, Váli believes, the nation has followed one "continuous national policy" of Westernizing without abandoning its Islamic heritage. He sees foreign policy as supplementing and protecting this goal.

1594
Valsalice, Luigi. [ITALY'S EASTERN POLICY--DÉTENTE AND EUROPE] Italiens Ostpolitik--Entspannung und Europa. Dokumente, v. 27, Apr. 1971: 47-54.
H5.D65, v. 27

Traces Italy's East European policy, which has at times been laced with an undercurrent of neutralism and has occasionally exceeded the realities of its own political potential, but has been characterized by maneuverability and economic initiatives. Italy's strong and active Communist Party has exercised remarkably little influence on the country's foreign policy. Its campaign to have the government withdraw from NATO foundered with the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Italy's effectiveness in contributing to peace and security in Europe is in some measure due to the moderation of the Italian Communist opposition. Italy's eastern policy today, the author finds, is directed toward a relaxation of East-West tensions, primarily through trade relations. This policy is anchored to the secure ties existing between the United States and Europe and to a firm commitment to the realization of European unity, two essential contributions to equilibrium in Europe and the world.

1595
Verfürth, Heinz. [YUGOSLAVIA FINDS SECURITY IN EUROPE] Jugoslawiens Absicherung in Europa. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Feb. 1971: 92-104.
D839.A885, v. 22

Belgrade is examining critically its nonalinement policy and its probable consequences. While this reappraisal does not necessarily imply an immediate break in foreign policy, some new ideas and tendencies begin to be manifested. Events have demonstrated that there can be no alliance of the nonalined, that is, no "bloc of the blocless" capable of coping with the superpower-centered blocs, and that the United Nations does not equalize the balance. Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia and the implications of the Brezhnev doctrine advanced in justification have obviously sobered the men around Tito. Yugoslavia's turn toward the West can be exemplified by Nixon's visit and the increased interest in the European Common Market. This coordination of national economic systems is one way of getting NATO military support in the event of political confrontation without seeming to ask for it. The new law on military service and the discussion of the succession to Tito are other evidences of Yugoslavia's unease with its present situation.

1596
Wechmar, Rüdiger von. BONN'S "OSTPOLITIK" AS ONE COMPONENT OF LONG-RANGE EFFORT. In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, v. 19, Apr. 20, 1971: 91-93. illus.
DD259.A35, v. 19
Based on recent address by a West German spokesman to the American club of Zürich.

Although they repudiate the use of force, the treaties of the German Federal Republic with the Soviet Union and Poland represent neither an abandonment of claims nor substitutes for a peace treaty. They reflect the current geopolitical reality of Europe, but they do not constitute de jure recognition of that reality. These agreements, which are clearly consistent with NATO objectives of effecting a relaxation of tensions between East and West, supplement the détente policies of the Federal Republic's major allies. The first test of the sincerity of the Soviet Union in relaxing tensions will be in the Berlin negotiations. Satisfactory settlement would include Soviet recognition of the homogeneous interrelationship of West Germany and West Berlin. This recognition would also enable the Federal Republic to submit its treaty with Moscow to the legislature for ratification.

1597
Welfield, John. JAPAN AND NUCLEAR CHINA; JAPANESE REACTIONS TO CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS. Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1970. 46 p. (Canberra papers on strategy and defence no. 9)
DS849.C6W42
"A publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre."
Includes bibliographical references.

Analyzes official and unofficial Japanese reactions to China's emergence as a nuclear power, by examining the Japanese press and official documents. Welfield notes that Japan's future foreign and defense policies will depend less upon public opinion than upon the state of the balance of power in Asia and the subsequent course of Sino-American relations. He concludes that since only a few Japanese leaders see Peking as a direct threat, the questions of strengthening Tokyo's alliance with Washington or deploying an independent Japanese nuclear force do not arise.

1598
Wolf, Alvin. FOREIGN POLICY: INTERVENTION, INVOLVEMENT, OR ISOLATION? Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall [1970] 112 p. (Inquiry into crucial American problems)
E840.W6
Bibliography: p. 105-112.

Reviews examples of U.S. military, economic, political, and humanitarian involvement in foreign countries. Each chapter deals with specific cases of U.S. involvement or intervention and instead of reaching conclusions poses a number of discussion questions to enable the student to reach his own conclusion. The last chapter discusses the future role of U.S. foreign policy.

1599
Wolf, Charles. IS UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY BEING MILITARIZED? Orbis, v. 14, winter 1971: 819-828. D839.068, v. 14

"Militarizing" foreign policy is not inherently bad. U.S. foreign policy should be militarized to a certain degree, for it requires effective military programs and military protagonists. On the other hand, the military should be closely scrutinized with respect to its influence over the means and goals of foreign policy. The present international situation, especially Soviet expansionism and the threat of nuclear proliferation, offers compelling reasons for having the military play an important role in foreign policy formulation. In other areas, such as strategic arms limitation, regional cooperation, and the development of developing countries, foreign policy initiatives should be taken beyond military preparedness. Balance between the two will be difficult to achieve, but "slogans that simply decry military influence on foreign policy distract attention from the serious effort needed; they contribute emotion and distraction rather than coolness and information."

1600
Wolfe, Thomas W. SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE, 1945-1970. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1970] 534 p. (A Rand Corporation research study)
DK67.W6 1970
Johns Hopkins paperback, 76.
"Prepared as part of a continuing program of research undertaken by the RAND Corporation for United States Air Force Project RAND."
Includes bibliographical references.

Traces the evolution of Soviet policy toward West and East Europe from 1945 to 1970; analyzes the political and military aspects of this policy within the framework of the Soviet-U.S. power rivalry; and studies the effects of Moscow's internal problems and global interests on its European policy, with particular attention to the changing superpower strategic balance of the late 1960's. Wolfe notes that nationalist trends in Eastern Europe were developing well before Khrushchev's downfall in late 1964 and that in the face of such developments the Soviet Union sought to improve relations with its satellites through multilateral military and economic aid programs. He contends that Khrushchev, whom many students regard as essentially a transitional figure between Stalin's autocracy and the less rigid oligarchic rule of today, recognized "that governance through coercion and ruthless goading from above had become more and more unsuitable as the Soviet Union evolved into a more mature and complex industrial society." The author analyzes three possible Soviet objectives with respect to their strategic buildup and its relation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: stability through parity, pursuit of strategic superiority, or a combination thereof.

1601
Ziebura, Gilbert. [THE EASTERN POLICIES OF FRANCE AND GERMANY--CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?] Frankreichs und Deutschlands Ostpolitik--Konvergenz oder Divergenz? Dokumente, v. 27, Apr. 1971: 33-47. illus. H5.D65, v. 27

Although France and the German Federal Republic had agreed under the terms of the 1963 Treaty of Friendship to coordinate their foreign policies closely, both states have followed separate paths in opening avenues to the East. Historically oriented, France's policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou has been directed toward the reestablishment of a truly European system of independent national states, based on self-determination, and the restoration of the traditional relationship between France and Russia, implicit in which is a reduced role for Germany. The French policy foresees the gradual dissolution of the Eastern bloc and Russia's resumption of its historic role as guardian of Europe's eastern gates. Pragmatically oriented, the West German policy, belatedly pursued following the scrapping of the Hallstein doctrine and the "exclusive spokesman" role, accepts the reality of a Europe divided into opposing blocs and, with this as its point of departure, seeks to improve relations with its Eastern neighbors in concert with the Atlantic Alliance and the United States. Both France and West Germany have placed great value on economic means for opening avenues to the East. The Germans, however, have been much more successful in expanding trade, eliciting comments that the German Democratic Republic has become an indirect member of the European Economic Community by virtue of its dependence on certain West German goods and that Europe is facing an industrial Germanization. These comments indicate the extent to which both France and

West Germany have committed themselves to the pursuit of narrow national economic interests instead of to a joint policy for a general system of peace for all Europe.

TENSION AREAS

1602
Balniel, Robert Alexander Lindsay, Lord. [EUROPEAN DEFENSE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Europäische Verteidigung und europäische Sicherheit. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Mar. 1971: 114-116.
U3.W396, v. 20
Presented to the 8th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Feb. 20-21, 1971.
Reprinted in Congressional Record [daily ed.] 92d Congress, 2d session, v. 117, Mar. 23, 1971.
J11.R52, v. 117

The background against which the problems of European defense and security should be studied must now include such factors as the existence of nuclear parity, the popular desire for peace, and the expansion of the European Common Market. For NATO, the year 1970 was marked by such achievements as the European Defense Improvement Program, but it is obvious that NATO's problems have no simple, easy solutions. In view of the Soviet attainment of nuclear parity, NATO cannot accept any limitation on its potential, even in the form of mutual balanced force reductions. Since NATO is concerned with the stability of the balance of power throughout the world, it also cannot accept with equanimity Soviet naval expansion in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Despite popular enthusiasm for détente, responsible Western governments must not attempt to prove their love of peace by unilateral disarmament. The European Economic Community can do much to strengthen Europe within the next few years, but it cannot do everything. Any reasonably optimistic view of the future predicates a strengthened, effective NATO.

1603
Barnett, A. Doak. THE NEW MULTIPOLAR BALANCE IN EAST ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY. United Asia, v. 22, Nov./Dec. 1970: 300-309.
DS1.U55, v. 22

The multipolar balance of power now emerging in Asia may create new problems and greater competition among the powers involved, but it may also prove stable in view of the severe limits on the extent to which any of the four countries involved--the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Japan--will be able to manipulate this balance to its own advantage. The new balance could reduce the likelihood of big-power military conflicts in Asia and defuse some of the automatic hostility characteristic of the cold war by blurring ideological lines, thus allowing for greater flexibility and even compromise. It should provide an opportunity for the United States to develop a new approach to Asia. In the years ahead, America must move toward reducing its presence in Southeast Asia and strive for agreements among the major powers in the area to prevent future military interventions. It must accept Japan's increasing independence, encouraging it to play a greater political and economic role in Asia while urging Tokyo to continue its nonnuclear policy. Washington should also free itself from the rigidities that have hindered normalizing relations with Peking.

1604
Bender, Peter. [OSTPOLITIK OR THE GREAT EXAMINATION OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC] Ostpolitik oder Das grosse Examen der DDR. Monat, v. 23, Feb. 1971: 6-10. AP30.M56, v. 23

Comparison reveals that the essential difference in the West and East German approach to negotiations is that Bonn need have no fears, while East Germany must at all costs avoid the dangerous infection of Western economic and political liberalism. A Dubcek in East Germany would invoke Soviet reaction more swiftly and violently than in Czechoslovakia. Pankow's problem is to maintain its posture and exploit any new opportunities that may present themselves, while acting within the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Pankow's delaying tactics, for example its rejection of Bonn's offer to forgo the Hallstein doctrine and its insistence on international recognition, have now been invalidated by the course of events. The Bonn-Moscow and Bonn-Warsaw negotiations make it clear that East Germany's allies intend to continue the pursuit of détente without consulting it. Now Pankow will push the idea of a European security conference in which it can participate as an equal of the other states. The four-power talks on Berlin will provide another opportunity for East Germany to assert its presence as a state. How the new leadership will attempt to take advantage of Bonn's campaign for normalization of relations is still uncertain.

1605
[BERLIN REALITY] Realität Berlin. Europäische Begegnung, v. 11, Apr. 1971: 28-31. illus.
AP30.E78, v. 11

Entrepreneurial anxiety, political insecurity, and personal inconvenience have contributed to a marked decline in the economic and social viability of West Berlin. Businessmen, skilled workers, technicians, and students have left the city. To revitalize Berlin's economy and general life style, the chief goal of Bonn's Ostpolitik must be the securing of guarantees for the city that recognize its economic integration with the German Federal Republic, its constitutional freedoms, and the absolute security of its access routes. These are indispensable realities for which the Federal Republic should be ready to make some sacrifice, such as renouncing some part of its political presence in the city. Only when the Berlin question is satisfactorily solved can the Federal Republic claim success for its Ostpolitik.

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1606
Berner, Wolfgang, and others. [MOSCOW TREATY AND BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS; COMMENTS FOLLOWING A DISCUSSION] Moskauer Vertrag und Berlin-Verhandlungen; Stellungnahmen nach einer Diskussion. Osteuropa, v. 21, June 1971: 400-411.
DR1.08, v. 21

The West German discussants' views on whether nonratification of the Moscow Treaty would lead to a disaster in the relations of the German Federal Republic with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries and on critical observations that may be made on the current status of the Berlin problem. The consensus is that failure to ratify the treaty might have serious consequences but would not lead to a disaster. The discussants seem to feel that optimism is misplaced about reaching a Berlin settlement satisfactory to the West.

1607
Bredow, Wilfried von. [THE CONSEQUENCES AND AVOIDANCE OF WAR: RESULTS OF THE WEIZSÄCKER STUDY] Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung: Konsequenzen aus der Weizsäcker-Studie. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 17, Apr. 1971: 369-375. D839.B57, v. 17

Review of Consequences and Avoidance of War, prepared by a study team under the direction of C. F. von Weizsäcker (an abstract of which appears elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography). Bredow calls publication of this study an important contribution to the informed public opinion required by the democratic process. The study team does not present as new discoveries facts already long known to the technicians, but it does show the contradictions between these facts and the propaganda shibboleths used to mislead the public. Bredow describes the Weizsäcker study as a "comprehensive, convincing plea for the institutions and procedures capable of resolving the problems and questions confronting East and West Europe, and for a step-by-step cooperation policy that will respect the differences in socio-economic systems." He concludes that a European security conference will combine all these concepts.

1608
Bromke, Adam, and Harald von Riekhoff. THE WEST GERMAN-POLISH TREATY. World today, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 124-131. D410.W63, v. 27

The Warsaw treaty between West Germany and Poland, essentially "a border treaty with additional provisions for the renunciation of force," is a most important contribution to the stability of Europe and the improvement of East-West relations. Both sides made significant concessions in negotiating the agreement. In Germany ratification faces strong opposition from Christian Democrats and refugee groups, but for various reasons it does not seem now that the treaty can be stopped. Poland, which is expecting substantial rewards from the treaty, will raise no obstacles to ratification. The most notable aspect of the agreement is that it is a genuine attempt to reach an understanding and thereby reduce tensions and political inflexibilities, and not a power play aimed at some particular country. The agreement will not normalize German-Polish relations, but it will open the door to progress toward that goal. For the Germans, the treaty will mean a more credible peace policy in Eastern Europe, expanded relations with both East and West, and, gradually, an overcoming of the division of Europe, followed in due time by pan-European cooperation. For the Poles, it means important economic advantages and greater flexibility in foreign policy, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The treaty is an expression of a mutual dissatisfaction with the status quo and a hope that gradually it can be changed for the better. The abandonment of German territorial claims removes the major stumbling block in the way of cooperation between the two powers, who evidently have broken through the barriers erected by the past to "an instinctive realization of the future unity of their purposes."

1609
Bull, Hedley. THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 669-681. D410.F6, v. 49

The new balance of power emerging in Asia will depend largely on three great powers--the United States, the Soviet Union, and China--and possibly a fourth, Japan. Each of these great powers has an interest in preventing a coalition between the other two. U.S. power in Asia is likely to decline drastically during the 1970's, beginning with disengagement from Indochina but including reductions in U.S. forces throughout Asia and the western Pacific. The Nixon doctrine, which stresses the need for greater self-reliance by Asian states now dependent in varying degrees on U.S. support, may be only a milestone toward more radical disengagement as American public and congressional opposition to postwar U.S. foreign policy grows. Although China is unlikely to achieve strategic nuclear parity with either the Soviet Union or the United States during the next decade, the development of a Chinese ICBM will probably serve as an adequate nuclear deterrent and may accelerate nuclear proliferation in Asia. The middle powers of the region, notably Australia and Indonesia, are primarily interested in maintaining an equilibrium among the great powers and increasingly may cooperate with traditional antagonists (for instance, Australia with the Soviet Union) to achieve this. Military cooperation among middle and lesser powers is unlikely to compensate for the continued decay of the U.S. alliance system in Asia, although a regional collective security organization analogous to the Organization of American States may become possible later in the decade.

1610
Cottrell, Alvin J. INDIAN: OCEAN OF TOMORROW. Navy, v. 14, Mar. 1971: 10-16. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

Calls attention to the strategic value of the Indian Ocean, recapitulates the major steps in the Soviet Union's naval penetration of the region, and urges the United States to take strong action to counter the Soviet menace. Even more than its location, bordering on three continents and constituting, in a manner of speaking, the maritime center of the Third World, its strategic value stems from the fact that with the withdrawal of British military forces from East of Suez, the area has become a power vacuum and, as such, a temptation to powerful states and a source of rivalry and conflict. The United States alone has the capability to counter the Soviet military and political threat to the region; whether it is willing to do the job remains to be seen.

1611
Csizmas, Michael. [THE POLISH PEOPLES ARMY AND THE DECEMBER DISORDERS] Die polnische Volksarmee und die Dezember-Unruhen. Schweizer Soldat, v. 46, no. 6, 1971: 9-11. U3.S23, v. 46

The Polish disorders on the Baltic seacoast represent a dangerous precedent for the strategic planning of the Warsaw Pact, for in a matter of days an established Communist government was toppled through the peaceful demonstration of public wrath. With an army second only to that of the Soviet Union in the East bloc, Poland sits astride the lines of communication and supply the Soviets require to support their elite divisions in East Germany. The Soviets and the Polish Communist leadership have long been aware of Poland's sensitive position and have taken measures to safeguard it, such as assigning Soviet officers to major posts in the Polish Armed Forces and carrying out frequent purges of unreliable Polish officers. That as many as 100 unarmed civilians were killed by Polish military forces during the disorders was as much a matter of embarrassment to Polish officials as was the loyalty of some units that sided with the demonstrators or failed to fire upon them. The seriousness with which the Soviets regarded the disorders is evidenced by the rapidity with which the two Soviet divisions in Poland were alerted.

1612
Dodd, Clement H., and M. E. Sales. ISRAEL AND THE ARAB WORLD. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul [1970] 247 p. DS119.7.D62 1970b

Contents.--Place and people.--The basic argument.--The written undertakings.--The peace settlement.--'Partition means that neither will get all it wants?'--The UN and the emergence of the state of Israel.--An early UN attempt at peace: the conciliation commission for Palestine.--The basis of relations: the armistice regime.--The re-entry of Russia.--From co-existence to war.--The Suez peace.--Arab unity and Israel, 1964-65.--The outbreak of war, 1967.--The Arabs in defeat.--The UN attempt at a peace and the Israeli nine-point peace plan.--Continuing problems: guerrilla warfare, the military balance, Jerusalem, refugees.--Conclusion.

Presents selected documents dating from 1900 to 1968 relevant to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Included is a variety of speeches, statements, United Nations materials, and excerpts from periodicals. The book is aimed at the reader who is just beginning to gain familiarity with the problem. It exposes him to a balanced selection of source materials and invites him to develop a historical perspective.

1613
El Kodsky, Ahmad, and Eli Lobel. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL; TWO ESSAYS. Translated by Brian Pearce and Alfred Ehrenfeld. New York, [Monthly Review Press, c1970] 137 p. DS119.7.E4

Contents.--Nationalism and class struggles in the Arab World, by Ahmad El Kodsky.--Palestine and the Jews, by Eli Lobel.

In the first essay, considers problems of Arab unity and identity and questions whether there can be a single united Arab nation. El Kodsky also reviews components of the Arab World in terms of geography, culture, and history and suggests that the unity of Arab states is "something forced upon the states concerned by the permanent aggression of Israeli colonialism." In the second essay the existence of Palestinians and the denial of their rights by Israeli oppressors are discussed.

1614
Gleditsch, Nils P. INTERACTION PATTERNS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Cooperation and conflict, no. 1, 1971: 15-30. DL55.C66, 1971

This paper examines the post World War II trends in interaction patterns between Israel and the Arab countries. Types of interaction examined include diplomatic patterns, membership in international organizations, trade and scheduled flights. The current pattern is compared with policy statements from both sides about primary and secondary boycotts and with ideal 'models' of boycott and non-boycott interaction patterns. Finally, an attempt is made to single out specific countries which might serve as intermediaries in terms of their location in the interaction network. (Abstract supplied)

1615
Görner, Gunter. [THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC GUARANTEES PEACEFUL WEST BERLIN TRANSIT] DDR gewährleistet friedlichen West-berlin-Transit. Berlin, Staatsverl. d. DDR, 1969. 107 p. (Blickpunkt Weltpolitik) JX4084.B38G6
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--pt. 1. West Berlin--an independent political unit within the territory of the German Democratic Republic: West Berlin's position in international law. West Germany's efforts at annexation threaten the peace and security of Europe. West German demands contradict international law.--pt. 2. The legal bases of traffic of

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persons, goods and communications from and to West Berlin through the German Democratic Republic's sovereign territory: The generally recognized rules of international law for through traffic. The German Democratic Republic's rights of control over through traffic to and from West Berlin. Present legal bases of through traffic to and from West Berlin. Bonn's assaults on the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic must fail.--Future prospects.

Analysis of the political, legal, and practical problems of West Berlin's traffic to and from the German Federal Republic in the last two decades. The study was sponsored by the Institute of International Relations of the German Academy of Political Science and Law in Potsdam. Görner argues that West Germany is using an independent political entity located within the territory of the sovereign German Democratic Republic as a testing ground for its revanchist policies and for provocation against the Socialist states.

1616

Harrigan, Anthony. RED STAR OVER THE INDIAN OCEAN. National review, v. 23, Apr. 20, 1971: 421-423. illus. AP2.N3545, v. 23

Warns of the danger of ignoring the Soviet Union's naval buildup in the Indian Ocean. The appearance of this powerful fleet has failed to elicit much American or British curiosity about Soviet intentions. Harrigan suggests that one motive is psychological, an attempt to instill anxiety in small nations and damage Western prestige. A hard-headed prediction is that the U.S.S.R. is aiming to gain control of South Africa. The first step would be to take over the island of Mauritius, moving thence to Madagascar, which could be "turned into the Cuba of the Indian Ocean." The implied threat to shipping around the Cape could not be tolerated by Britain or Japan. Harrigan recommends a firm stand by Western powers, incorporating detailed surveillance of the Soviet fleet and deployment of superior naval forces.

1617

Hinton, Harold C. TEMPTATIONS AND RISKS OF ACCOMMODATION WITH PEKING. SEATO record, v. 10, Apr. 1971: 10-14. DS501.S7916, v. 10

Communist China understandably seeks to strengthen the security of its borders. Its northern frontier, which is dominated by Russia, and the eastern region, where the United States and Japan are powerful, are both high-risk areas. The southern frontier can be most profitably cultivated through subversion and support for local revolution. "Peking's ultimate goal seems to be a Maoist version of the old tributary system, in which local Communist-controlled States would more or less spontaneously seek Chinese aid, advice, and support, and accept a considerable degree of Chinese leadership." From the point of view of the other countries involved, such an alliance with Peking may prove detrimental, as the experiences of Cambodia and Indonesia demonstrate. Whether such nations could benefit by seeking merely a state of accommodation with Peking remains to be seen; the price would be high. A more desirable possible alternative would be the development of increased stability within, and increased cooperation between, the Southeast Asian states, so that a China pressured by Soviet and Japanese threats might seek sympathy from them.

1618

Hirschmann, Ira A. RED STAR OVER BETHLEHEM; RUSSIA DRIVES TO CAPTURE THE MIDDLE EAST. New York, Simon and Schuster [1971] 192 p. illus. DS119.7.H54

Contents.--Russia aims for the Middle East.--Russia arrives in the Middle East.--Russia consolidates her position.--Russia challenges the United States.

A first-hand anecdotal account by an American diplomat of long experience. Hirschmann describes his efforts at mediation to promote peace in the Middle East. He believes the Soviet Union is quietly maneuvering to secure domination of the region.

1619

Holden, David. THE PERSIAN GULF: AFTER THE BRITISH RAJ. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 721-735. illus. D410.F6, v. 49

Removal of British power and guarantees from the area of the seven Trucial Sheikhdoms probably means a lapse into rivalry, upheaval, and general instability. Territorial quarrels among the Arab states of the Gulf and between them and Iran and Iraq threaten to grow out of hand. Indigenous revolutionary movements, sometimes aided from outside and already in control of some territory, pose an undiminished danger. External factors--the lingering British presence, American commercial oil activity, Soviet probing, and the Arab-Israeli conflict--may further contribute to instability. British reversal of the decision to leave would have been counterproductive, contributing to the coming dislocations rather than preventing them. Area security arrangements are still new, with little time left to arrive at an effective setup among the squabbling Trucial states. Resolution of the area's problems in the few months before the British departure looks impossible. Their disputes and frictions and the options presenting themselves to all the local states make any long-range view uncertain. The best eventual stabilizing force may be oil, whose main customers, far from the scene, will have to be dealt with in the end by even the most fractious elements. The policy to follow now may be to let the Gulf area adjust itself.

1620

Hunter, Robert E. THE SOVIET DILEMMA IN THE MIDDLE EAST; PART II: OIL AND THE PERSIAN GULF. London,

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. 18 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 60)
U162.A3, no. 60

Examines Soviet capabilities and intentions in the Persian Gulf area. The withdrawal of British forces from East of Suez has deprived that economically and strategically vital area of the protective presence of a great power for the first time in more than 50 years. The Soviet Union, faced with the certain loss of its long-cherished self-sufficiency in petroleum, has been quick to exploit this opportunity, the Gulf area being every bit as important to it as those parts of the Middle East that have been drawn into the Arab-Israeli dispute. Having won a firm position for themselves, the Russians, for the immediate future, are likely to proceed with caution to the touchy business of resolving the many policy dilemmas their penetration into this region has created. Western powers with interests in the Gulf, mindful from their own experience of the deplorable results of precipitate action in this part of the world, should be advised to do likewise.

1621
Joshua, Wynfred. SOVIET PENETRATION INTO THE MIDDLE EAST. New York, National Strategy Information Center [c1970] 45 p.
DS63.2.R9J65
Bibliography: p. 44-45.

Sketches the strategy of Soviet penetration in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas, tracing the inroads made by Soviet diplomacy in such countries as Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Joshua shows that Moscow has penetrated in some form or another almost every key area in the Middle East. He outlines some of the problems the Russians will face there and concludes that despite Soviet influence in these Arab States there is no indication that Moscow is prepared to assume any responsibility to reduce tensions.

1622
Kiesewetter, Wolfgang. THE MIDDLE EAST--AN IMPORTANT PHASE IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLASS STRUGGLE. German foreign policy, v. 10, no. 3, 1971: 189-199. DD261.4.D353, v. 10

The imperialists are suffering setbacks in the Middle East in pursuit of goals that include the maintenance and expansion of strategic positions, control of Arab oil, overthrow of progressive Arab regimes, prevention of noncapitalistic development, and rupture of the good relations of the Arab States with the Socialist world. Instead, the progressive Arab States have integrated their political and economic systems. Anti-imperialist forces have assumed power in the Democratic Republic of Yemen and in the Sudan. The military strength of the Arab States has grown. Israel, beset by economic woes, now enjoys the support only of reactionary regimes. Vividly highlighted by the Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean, the change in force relationships has favored peace, socialism, and national liberation movements in the area. As a natural ally of the progressive Arab countries the German Democratic Republic and other Socialist states have foreign policies oriented toward maintaining a Middle Eastern peace conducive to the further development of national liberation movements, supporting Arab efforts to create a progressive social order, and assisting Arab States in resisting imperialist machinations. As the Arab struggle moves from one of national liberation to social liberation, the class struggle is intensifying with a polarization of class forces. A just peace is necessary for continued Arab progress. Peace calls for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict that eliminates the results of imperialist aggression and recognizes the legitimate interests of the Palestinians.

1623
Kirk, Donald. WIDER WAR; THE STRUGGLE FOR CAMBODIA, THAILAND, AND LAOS. New York, Praeger [1971] 305 p. DS518.8.K56

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. Introduction to conflict: The setting. Vietnam.--pt. 2. Cambodia: from peace to war: Price of peace. Crisis within. Plunge into war.--pt. 3. Thailand: uncertain ally: Foundation of stability. Simmering revolt. Shifting alliances.--pt. 4. Laos: neutrality unchallenged: Reconciliation and failure. Military escalation. Laos and the United States. --pt. 5. Conclusion--or continuation? Prospects for peace.--Notes.--Selected bibliography.--Index.

Refutes the prevalent notion that the Vietnam War is an isolated conflict and contends that it is a phase of a regional struggle. Kirk stresses the conflicts in Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos and foresees their continuing, along with the struggle in Vietnam, for some time after an American withdrawal. Although the pace of the action may slow down after withdrawal, a protracted struggle may ensue in South Vietnam as a "war within a war" between the Saigon government and the Communists. In the long run, Kirk maintains, competition for the Mekong and the buffer states of Cambodia and Laos between Thailand and North Vietnam will result in a regional conflict.

1624
Lewis, Bernard. CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Survival, v. 13, June 1971: 192-198.
U162.S9, v. 13
Extracted from Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations of the Committee on Government Operations United States Senate, pt. 4 (Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971).

The Arab-Israeli dispute, a local conflict, would resolve itself in one way or another if left alone. More critical is the potential confrontation in the Near East between the United States, the Soviet Union, and, perhaps, China. It is therefore essential for the United States to evaluate the aims of its adversaries and to plan dip-

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lomatic strategy to avoid conflict. Americans must understand Communist logic and morality if they are to deal with the Russians realistically. Moscow's Middle East policy is concerned with protecting Soviet borders and minimizing Western influence. American policy must include holding a firm line against Soviet intervention, working for a peace settlement, and protecting Western interests. Most difficult, Washington must determine who its friends are. The Soviet Union's position is "inherently unstable and precarious in the Middle East." If the United States remains firm and strong, the Russians may well allow a settlement.

1625

Lindner, Robert. [THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEAR EAST] Die Sowjetunion in Nahost. Osteuropa, v. 21, May 1971: 305-315.
DR1.08, v. 21

Asserts that the Soviet Union has no interest in a resolution of the Middle East situation, for a military decision in favor of Israel would discredit the Soviets, and a political solution would deprive them of the raison d'etre for their military presence in Egypt.

1626

Maruyama, Shizuo. [THE STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA] Der Kampf um die Vormachtstellung in Südostasien. Moderne Welt, v. 11, no. 3, 1970: 276-280.
D839.M58, v. 11

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have endeavored to preserve the status quo in Southeast Asia and thereby block the entry of Communist China into an area of traditional Chinese interests. Before China emerged as a nuclear power and during the cultural revolution, Moscow and Washington were the unchallenged arbiters of events in the Far East, settling local disputes by dint of their enormous prestige and by compromises reached with one another. By the beginning of this decade, however, these two superpowers had lost much of that prestige. Contributing factors were the arbitrary Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia and the success of Vietnamese nationalism in the face of American military might. With the decline of two-power dominance over events in Asia, China began to assume a more assertive role. The real turning point for the Soviet Union and the United States was Cambodia. The American-instigated aggression against that country turned Asian against Asian and threatened Southeast Asian aspirations for domestic unity and regional cooperation. Still seeking to maintain the status quo and counter Chinese policy aims, or at least to gain a voice in any future settlement, the Soviet Union promptly recognized the Lon Nol government and laid bare its policy of status quo for Southeast Asia. In spite of the numerous reports of Soviet penetration in Southeast Asia, the truth is that Moscow's relations with countries in that area of the world are not at all close politically, economically, or culturally.

1627

Milner, Joe W. WHY THE EAST CHOSE REVOLUTION. National review, v. 23, May 18, 1971: 530-531. illus.
AP2.N3545, v. 23

The situation of East and West Pakistan can be compared to what might happen if Mississippi and California were declared a separate nation for American Negroes. For Pakistan the 1947 partition from India produced a massive and bloody exchange of populations. Feuding with India has continued off and on since then, and any unity that East and West Pakistan have enjoyed has been the effect of common enemies. Ultimately the two will split apart, for the Pakistanis are naturally an aggressive and uncompromising people who are unable to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner.

1628

Nedoma, Jan G. [SHADOWBOXING ABOUT A PSEUDO-PROBLEM?] Shattenboxen um ein Scheinproblem? Monat, v. 23, Feb. 1971: 19-25.
AP30.M56, v. 23

Discusses the legal problem of the validity of the 1938 Munich agreements as a barrier to normalization of present German-Czech relations. Nedoma points out that Novotny's insistence on West German denial of validity ab initio was very probably due to his desire to establish grounds for a quarrel with Germany. In this way he would make common cause with the other Soviet satellites and at the same time provide a theme suitable for continued Bonn-Prague dialog. While there are two possible schools of thought in international law on this problem, Great Britain, out of respect for the sanctity of treaties, has refused to agree that the concessions were always invalid. West Germany's reluctance stems from its wish to protect the Sudetendeutsch from the accusation of wartime treason against the Czech state. Nedoma suggests another "judgment of Solomon" like that of the Prague-Budapest treaty of 1947, which denied the validity of the initial act while recognizing the validity of acts committed under it.

1629

O'Ballance, Edgar. THE WAR IN THE YEMEN. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1971. 218 p. illus.
DS247.Y4802 1971

Traces the course of the civil war in the Yemen, which began in 1962 with the overthrow of the Royalist government by the Republicans. O'Ballance records the jockeying for power within the two warring factions and covers the various interventions in the fighting, including the short-lived United Nations Yemen Observation Mission of 1963-1964, Saudi Arabian assistance to the Royalists, and United Arab Republic assistance to the Republicans. He sees the present situation as stalemated, with both sides left in control of their respective halves of the country and each unable to move decisively against the other.

1630
Oppermann, Thomas. [GERMAN UNITY AND EUROPEAN PEACE; PROSPECTS AFTER THE MOSCOW TREATY] Deutsche Einheit und europäische Friedensordnung; Perspektiven nach dem Moskauer Vertrag. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Feb. 10, 1971: 83-90.
D839.E86, v. 26

Use of the phrases "non-foreign" or "special relationship" to denote the relation of the two Germanys to each other does not obscure the reality that East Germany goes its own way. In theory this should not mean that the hope of German reunification, the "German option," has been abandoned, since one sovereign state can choose to merge with another. It is possible to question, however, how deeply rooted the present clamor for unification is and how long it will persist. What West Germans wish for their brothers is reasonable, if not identical, socioeconomic conditions and external security, and these can be attained in ways other than unification. Many considerations argue potently against unification and for acceptance of the status quo as a foundation on which to build. The present balance between the pluralistic democracies and the Socialist states, in which a German state participates in each camp, would be destroyed. The hoped-for convergence of political systems is best promoted by a recognized and independent East German state. The British relation with Australia shows that the bond of brotherhood between the two Germanys does not depend on political frontiers. A unified Germany would be feared by its neighbors and, by pledging itself to one bloc, would lose its influence with the other. It is in the common German interest to accept the conditions of the division into two states and use them to create a new intra-German consciousness.

1631
Possony, Stefan T. THE ANTAGONISM BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA. Politische Studien, no. 196, Mar./Apr. 1971: 169-182. H35.P66, v. 22

Evaluates war between the Soviet Union and China as "not yet inevitable but [as] becoming highly probable." Possony's opinion is that the Soviet Union intends to acquire Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tsinghai, and possibly Kansu and Ninghsia. He points to the historical record to demonstrate the irreconcilable antagonism between the Soviet and Chinese states and between the Communist parties of these states. He finds inevitable areas of conflict in the third world, the international Communist movement, and the border confrontation. The Maoist desire to partition the Soviet Union confronts the Soviet desire to partition China. Since both sides can be satisfied only by victory, the present pattern of events may culminate in war if permitted to continue unchanged.

1632
Roth, Günter. [PLAY OF FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA] Das Kräftespiel in Südostasien. Wehrkunde, v. 20, May 1971: 256-259. U3.W396, v. 20

The power struggle between the Soviet Union and China was temporarily resolved with the resumption of diplomatic relations in November 1970. As price for settlement of the Ussuri River dispute, the U.S.S.R. had to acknowledge Chinese primacy in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile China, with time on its side, has cleverly refrained from direct intervention in the Indochina conflict, preferring to let guerrilla tactics erode the American will to continue fighting. China, which urgently needs the rice and lebensraum Southeast Asia can provide for China's burgeoning population, will not make any direct move into the area until the American withdrawal has been completed. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong do not regard the South Vietnamese forces as a formidable obstacle to the realization of their designs, for Vietnamization is only a palliative invented by the Americans to disguise the defeat brought on by their failure to recognize the true nature of guerrilla warfare and adopt the appropriate countermeasures. American withdrawal, however, is not in the interests of the Soviets, who fear that American disengagement will free resources to develop broader programs for stabilizing the differences between East and West and that it will solidify Chinese primacy in the area. The United States and the Soviet Union have both lost in the play of forces in Southeast Asia. The only chance for the United States to give the turn of events in Indochina a positive twist is by endorsing a federated Communist Indochina under Hanoi's leadership and by signing an assistance pact to guarantee the new federation independence from China to the north.

1633
Roth, Karl H. [INVASION TARGET: GDR. FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE NEW OSTPOLITIK. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE] Invasionsziel DDR. Vom Kalten Krieg zur neuen Ostpolitik. Psychologische Kampfführung. (Unter Mitarb. von) Nicolaus Neumann und Hajo Leib. Hamburg, Konkret-Buchverlag [1971] 279 p. (Konkret extra, Bd. 7)
UA710.R66
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--An affair from the start, by Nicolaus Neumann.--The "Research Advisory Council" on questions of Germany's reunification, by Karl Heinz Roth.--The "Task Force Against Inhumanity": fifth column of the cold war, by Karl Heinz Roth.--The "psychological warfare" of the Bundeswehr, by Hajo Leib.--Inward-directed diversion, by Karl Heinz Roth.--Old wine in new containers, by Karl Heinz Roth.

Alleges that West Germany has been planning to take over the German Democratic Republic, restore capitalistic practices there, and replace East German officials. "Secret papers" are offered as documentation of this contention. Three organizations have served as the chief tools of this plot, the authors maintain. They are the "Research Advisory Council" as the responsible planning body, the "Task Force Against Inhumanity" as the organ for sabotage and recruitment of agents, and the Bundeswehr as the plot's propaganda unit. The new

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Ostpolitik has not altered the goals of this plot, merely postponed their implementation.

1634
Schlegel, Dietrich. [EQUILIBRIUM OF TENSIONS IN THE BALKANS] Spannungsausgleich auf dem Balkan. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Mar. 1971: 140-153.
D839.A885, v. 22

The Balkan countries have begun to show a historically unprecedented ability to reconcile differences and coordinate common interests. The Rumanians took the initiative in the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1969, with no expressed disapproval as yet from the Soviets, who usually look uneasily on anything to which Albania assents, as it did in this case. Most significant in Albania's recent feverish activity in mending its diplomatic fences has been the normalization of relations with the Tito regime, previously so bitterly condemned. With the Brezhnev doctrine darkening their horizon, Albania and Yugoslavia are prepared to overlook differences in ideology and dogma. Yugoslavia and Rumania have apparently long since reached the same kind of informal understanding. Now Turkey and, oddly enough, the Greece of the colonels are being admitted to this circle, despite their membership in the competing power bloc. Only the Yugoslav-Bulgarian controversy over Macedonia remains as an obstacle to understanding. The final form this new set of relations may take, perhaps as a series of nonaggression pacts, is not certain, but the world will clearly profit from this equalization of tensions in the Balkans.

1635
Schroeder, Richard C. INDIAN OCEAN POLICY. [Washington, Congressional Quarterly, 1971] 189-206 p. (Editorial research reports, Mar. 10, 1971)
H35.E35, 1971, v. 1
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Considers the U.S. assessment of Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean and posits the outcry that would be raised if the United States were to adopt an aggressive stance in opposition to the Soviet presence. Schroeder also reviews British influence and withdrawal and surveys the history and progress of the Indian Ocean nations. He concludes that the United States will probably avoid large-scale troop commitments, but would supply arms and equipment to nations threatened by communism. Thus, the United States and the Soviet Union might become involved in an expensive and technical arms race involving satellites, submarines, missile launchers, and aircraft.

1636
[SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA AS TENSION AREAS OF CONFRONTATION] Süd- und Südostasien als Spannungszonen der Konfrontation. China-Analysen, v. 10, May 1971: 5-7. DS701.C356, v. 10

The recent outbreaks of violence in Ceylon and Pakistan are manifestations of the tensions gripping the subcontinent and that band of states extending from West Pakistan to South Vietnam and marking the boundary between the Communist superpowers and the independent Third World states. With the announced British intention to withdraw from Asia and the unfolding American disengagement in Vietnam, the entire area has become a power vacuum that both China and the Soviet Union are struggling to fill, each at the expense of the other. In the process China has even subordinated ideology to the practicalities of international politics. The best opportunity to prevent one of the two Communist superpowers from obtaining hegemony over this area is to maintain an adequate military presence in the Indian Ocean, to support existing governments, especially those with multiparty systems, and to cultivate better relations with India. Initial steps in this direction have been British aid to Ceylon's leftist government and British-American restraint in the situation in East Pakistan. With the advent of better relations between China and the United States, it would be absurd for the West to abandon this area of the world to one of the Communist superpowers.

1637
Tatu, Michel. THE GREAT CHINESE PUZZLE. Réalités, no. 248, July 1971: 15-17, 78. illus.
AP4.R2164, 1971

Despite the Soviet Union's military superiority over Communist China, Peking represents a much greater nuisance for Moscow today than in the past. The schism between Moscow and Peking "has rapidly deteriorated into a confrontation between peoples, which is something more real and lasting." Within the Soviet Union the almost unanimous distrust and dislike of the Chinese have provided a common ground for opposition forces. The reasons for the deep-rooted and fearful hostility on all levels of Soviet society center around the territorial disputes, competition for the leadership of the Communist world, a complete difference of social and cultural outlooks, and, to a lesser degree, racialism. Whether the Russians will allow the Chinese nuclear potential to grow or whether they will launch a preemptive nuclear attack remains to be seen. The coming decade will tell whether the two giants can learn to live peacefully with each other.

1638
Tetzlaff, Rainer. [CONFRONTATION POLICIES IN SOUTH-EAST AFRICA] Konfrontationspolitik in Süd-Ost-Afrika. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Apr. 1971: 218-232.
D839.A885, v. 22

Between Lake Victoria and the Cape of Good Hope, economic, military, and political developments are occurring that will ultimately force a confrontation between black and white Africa and involve the Great Powers. The transnational and international patterns of the South African subcontinent are determined by the geopolitical situation of the 16 nations, their mineral and other raw-material resources, and the racial demographic structure. The interplay of these factors can be seen

in the situation now developing, in which Portugal joins South Africa's "outward looking policy," while Zambia supplies the liberation movement. At the same time Zambia's economic lifeline exists at Portuguese pleasure. Kaunda of Zambia has introduced the Chinese into Africa to break this dependence. The confrontation will not become the "second Vietnam" threatened, as long as white Africa has unquestioned military supremacy. To counter this military inferiority, radical black Africa has resorted to diplomatic démarches. Kaunda's speeches at Lusaka and the United Nations and his visits with Brandt and Nixon have had little obvious effect. The dam at Cabora Bassa, now in construction, will promote the possibilities of military confrontation. The European powers already have shown their awareness of its potential. Along with the Arab oil states, an industrialized Africa cannot be denied an important role on the international stage.

1639
Theberge, James D. THE DOORSTEP CHALLENGE. Navy, v. 14, Mar. 1971: 17-23. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

Warns of the opportunities that exist in the Caribbean area for the Soviet Union to exploit its growing naval power to undermine U.S. interests and pose a direct threat to U.S. security. Theberge calls attention to the strategic significance of this area to the United States, surveys Soviet naval activity there in recent years, speculates on Soviet intentions, looks briefly at the political opportunities presented to the Soviet Union by friendly indigenous revolutionary movements, and assesses the prospects for further Soviet successes. In this last respect, the U.S.S.R. already has won a toehold in the region in Cuba, thereby making good its challenge to the Monroe Doctrine. The United States must take resolute action soon, for the balance of forces grows ever more unfavorable and the situation more difficult.

1640
Tolley, Kemp. THE BEAR THAT SWIMS LIKE A FISH. In U.S. Naval Institute. Proceedings, v. 97, June 1971: 41-45. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

In 1944 the Soviet Union set out to surpass Anglo-American strength in the Middle East in order to expand its own interests and at the same time threaten control of Europe's oil. Accordingly friendship was extended to the Arabs, and the Soviets voiced anti-Zionist sentiments as they led the Americans "down the primrose path toward the double-double-cross." When Britain finally turned the Palestine problem over to the United Nations, it was the vote of Russia and its satellites that insured statehood. The United States was saddled with support of Israel, while the Arabs would be forced to lean on Soviet aid as long as the Jewish threat was real. As the British withdrew, the Soviets were virtually sucked into the Indian Ocean area, where they now move unchallenged. Control of the Suez Canal will also enable the Soviets to assist India in common defense against the Chinese threat.

1641
Ton That Thien. UNDERSTANDING THE WAR IN VIETNAM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH. India quarterly, v. 26, July/Sept. 1970: 225-238.
D410.I44, v. 26

The complexity of the Vietnam War originates in its tripartite nature as a war of all Vietnamese (in different ways) against the foreigner, a war between Communist and non-Communist Vietnamese, and a war between the superpower blocs. For the Vietnamese the three wars are linked by the one common feature of nationalism, an emotion that has kept the Vietnamese free throughout history despite the harsh realities of their geopolitical situation. Even the passive resignation that so annoys the Americans is an effective expression of this nationalism. Vietnamese nationalism can be psychologically exploited only by a Vietnamese government working for Vietnamese goals: the nationalist quest for dignity, the peasant hunger for land, and the general wish for a new order to replace the Confucian and colonial society. The Communists will irrevocably lose their strategic reserve in the nationalists and the peasants when the yearning for dignity of the one and the land hunger of the other are satisfied. These psychological measures can be successfully undertaken by a government whose integrity and nationalism are unimpeachable in Vietnamese eyes.

1642
Waldman, Eric. DANGERS INHERENT IN A PAX SOVIETICA. Central Europe journal, v. 19, June 1971: 231-238.
DB200.7.S74, v. 19

Inveighs against the détente policy of the German Federal Republic in general and against the Treaty of Moscow in particular on the grounds that they provide the Soviet Union with the means for destroying the democratic process in the Federal Republic and for undermining NATO. The treaty recognizes the realities of Eastern Europe, but not those of the West, especially those of West Berlin, nor does it repeal the rights of intervention granted by the United Nations Charter to the World War II victors.

1643
THE WAR FOR ASIA. Economist, v. 239, Apr. 17, 1971: 17-18.
HG11.E2, v. 239

The Western powers should not leave southern Asia to a two-sided competition between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The status of this part of the world as the cockpit of Great Power rivalries stems from Great Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez and from the "rich field" the area presents for making political converts. The stakes are high enough that it is possible that Moscow and Peking "may yet find themselves fighting in a proxy war with each other through their

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respective friends on their southern flank." In view of the fact that five out of the dozen countries in southern Asia belong to the British Commonwealth and in view of the genuine electoral processes that take place in India, Singapore, Ceylon, and still, if only just barely, in South Vietnam and Malaysia, the liberal democracies of the West have a common interest in keeping alive the multiparty system of government in Asia. This would entail maintaining friendly relations with India and having enough military strength to aid the free countries in the region threatened by internal subversion.

1644

Wettig, Gerhard. [BERLIN AS A PROBLEM IN DÉTENTE. THE MOST SENSITIVE BOUNDARY SECTOR BETWEEN EAST AND WEST] Das Entspannungsproblem Berlin. Die empfindlichste Nahtstelle von Ost und West. Osteuropa, v. 21, Jan. 1971: 1-22.
DR1.08, v. 21

Reviews the historic development and present status of the Berlin problem and its implications for European détente. Wettig comments on the place of the Berlin problem in the contexts of the general Bonn-Moscow rapprochement, the four-power ambassadorial negotiations, the Bonn-Moscow renunciation-of-force agreement, and post-agreement negotiations. He suggests four hypotheses as possibly explaining Moscow's behavior. He concludes that Soviet insistence on the so-called "independent" status of West Berlin does not necessarily deny its right to existence and rejects as unfounded East Germany's claim to sovereignty over the access routes. Although the Soviet Union is not bound by treaty to obtain the assent of East Germany to any Berlin decision, he concedes that practical politics make this assent necessary.

1645

Wettig, Gerhard. [REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE BERLIN QUESTION] Betrachtungen zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Berlin-Frage. Köln, [Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien] 1970. 29 p. (Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 61/1970) HX15.G468, 1970, no. 61

Explores the Berlin problem in terms of the Moscow Treaty and considers ways in which a settlement could be effected. According to Wettig, current Soviet reference to West Berlin as an "independent political unit" does not necessarily exclude the possibility of the city maintaining close ties with West Germany. As to Western access rights, he holds that they antedate the existence of the German Democratic Republic and can be legally regarded as an obligation on its sovereignty. A settlement on these legal grounds, Wettig admits, presupposes the good intentions of the Soviet Union and the solution of many political problems.

1646

Whetten, Lawrence L. THE PROBLEM OF BERLIN. World today, v. 27, May 1971: 222-227.
D410.W63, v. 27

The German Federal Republic's growing economic and political stature increases the urgency, but complicates the problem, of resolving the Berlin issue. The gravity of the situation is further compounded by the changing strategic balance between the superpowers. Bargaining positions remain unchanged, the Soviet Union viewing its authority in the city as indispensable to its influence over both Germanys, and the United States equally concerned that any derogation of its rights would undermine its free world leadership and commitment to self-determination. For the two Germanys, of course, the status of the city has special symbolic and legal implications. The Brandt government has given the Berlin problem a central place in its Ostpolitik; its acceptance of the status quo in the Moscow and Warsaw treaties was conditional upon Soviet and East German acceptance of the existing situation in Berlin. The Soviet position has hardened, however, despite Western offers to make substantial concessions, and it is now manifest that no purely administrative agreement can reconcile Soviet demands concerning the status of the city with Western access rights. A workable agreement must encompass West Berlin's right of self-determination, a U.S. presence in the city as well as some degree of Soviet authority, checks on East German harassment, and a modification of the city's current function as a Western outpost. The best solution would involve, first, a four-power agreement on the general outlines of a final settlement that would "allow both the super-Powers and the two Germanies to retain their respective claims in Berlin, while ensuring a high degree of security and stability for West Berlin." This would be followed by discussions between the two Germanys to iron out details. But, as always where divergent viewpoints must be reconciled, the real difficulty comes with implementation. Then only the greatest good will on all sides can assure a successful result.

1647

Zador, Heinrich. [WHITHER THE NEAR EAST?] Naher Osten--wohin? Wehrkunde, v. 20, May 1971: 249-251. U3.W396, v. 20

Although the Egyptians threaten renewed war against Israel even without their other Arab allies, if necessary, and although the Israelis continue to display intransigence on the matter of secure boundaries, the Arab-Israeli conflict is in a larger sense a conflict of interests between the Americans and the Soviets, in which each superpower seeks to avoid a direct confrontation as long as possible. The Soviets regard this conflict as an opportunity for increased political pressure on the Americans in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Berlin negotiations. The Soviet advantages are twofold. First the Soviet relationship with the Arabs in general, and Egypt in particular, is one of protector, spokesman, and supplier. The United States does not have exactly

that type of relationship with Israel. Besides, the United States has economic interests in the Arab world that it does not wish to jeopardize. Secondly, the Soviet Union regards the Mediterranean as its strategic front yard, analogous to the American view of the Caribbean. Therefore, according to Soviet reasoning, the United States will not risk a confrontation because of events in the Mediterranean, and, in an extreme case Washington might even renounce its policy objectives in the area.

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II. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR

1648
ARMED STRUGGLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Peking review, v. 14, May 28, 1971: 10-11.
DS701.P42, v. 14

The people of several Southeast Asian countries are vigorously engaged in armed revolutionary struggle. Fighting has been observed in Burma, Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The people's forces support and encourage each other in their efforts to resist the "encirclement and suppression" operations of the enemy. Together they will seize political power through military action. "Holding aloft the red banner of armed struggle, the people of the Southeast Asian countries will definitely surmount all difficulties on their road of advance, defeat U.S. imperialism and the reactionaries of their own countries and seize victory in the revolution."

1649
Deitchman, Seymour J. LIMITED WAR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, July 1971: 3-16. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Draws lessons concerning limited war from a survey of limited conflicts, beginning with the struggle between Dutch colonial forces and indigenous elements in Indonesia in 1945-47 and ending with the recent clash between Jordan and Syria in 1970. Deitchman offers a definition and typology of limited war and describes its causes, geographical and temporal distribution, and typical pattern of development in the postwar world. He analyzes its strategic and political implications, its part in the cold war, and its impact on domestic politics in the democracies, along with some more specific problems raised by the waging of this kind of war, such as the possible use of nuclear weapons and the dynamics of escalation and termination. Typically, a limited war finds the Western powers on the defensive against Communist encroachments in a kind of chess game, in which small, Third World powers are the pieces, and the major powers, the players.

1650
Gann, Lewis H. GUERRILLAS IN HISTORY. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press [1971] 99 p. (Hoover Institution studies, 28)
U240.G35

Bibliography: p. 94-99.
"The present monograph is a revised and widely expanded version of a short paper entitled 'Guerrillas and Insurgency,' published in March 1966 in the Military Review."
Z6723.U35

Contents.--Partisan warfare in the preindustrial age.--Partisan warfare, the industrial revolution, and the heyday of imperialism.--Partisan warfare in the first third of the twentieth century.--Partisan warfare since the start of the second world war.--The place of partisan warfare in history.--A selected bibliography.

Surveys guerrilla and irregular warfare from ancient times to the present. In order to place the role of guerrillas in perspective, Gann, in his final chapter, offers generalizations on the efficacy of partisan forces, pointing out that they operate best under certain conditions and are limited in many ways. "'Revolutionary wars' fought by guerrilla actions still remain only one of many forms of human conflict," he concludes.

1651
[JUST AND UNJUST WARS] Gerechte und ungerechte Kriege. [Autorenkollektiv: Günter Rau et al.] Berlin, Deutscher Militärverlag, 1970. 156 p. (Serie Politik und Landesverteidigung)
U21.2.G47
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Marxism-Leninism on the justice and injustice of wars.--Types of wars.--Just wars in our time.--Wars of the imperialist bourgeoisie.--On the character of a possible war in Europe.--Peace, European security, and Socialist national defense.

Expounds by principle and example the Communist theory of just and unjust wars, the differentiation between which, according to Lenin, must be made to keep theory pure and practice right. Just wars are wars waged in defense of the Socialist fatherland, national wars of liberation and defense, popular revolts, and revolutionary civil wars. Unjust wars, waged by the imperialist bourgeoisie, include aggressions against Socialist states, colonial and neocolonial wars, conflicts between the imperialist powers, and counter-revolutionary actions. The joint authors, holding a surprise attack against the Socialist camp in Europe possible, explore the character that war might take: general nuclear war, limited nuclear war, nonnuclear war, or covert action. If the need arises, the authors conclude, the Warsaw Pact countries can successfully meet any of these challenges.

444-663 O - 71 - 4

1652
Kende, Istvan. TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF LOCAL WARS. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1971: 5-22.
AS9.J6, 1971

The article deals in a quantitative manner with local wars in the period since the Second World War. The wars are discussed both regionally and on a global level, and are classified according to a number of characteristics. The main conclusion is that the Third World is increasingly becoming the scene of local war, and that our historical period is the period of coexistence of peaceful coexistence and local wars. A main characteristic of present-day wars is that they are to an ever greater extent being fought out in a single country: a complete reversal of the situation before 1945. Of the wars, most were anti-regime wars with foreign participation. This type of war is constantly on the increase, with the U.S. playing an ever greater interventionist role. Since 1963 no political war has been fought without overt foreign participation. The end of Second World War did not mean an end to war, the casualties in the post-war period probably approximating the 1939-45 figures, and the number of territories involved in war being steadily on the increase, after the initial drop in 1945. (Abstract supplied)

1653
Tripathi, K. S. AN ANATOMY OF LIMITED WAR. In United Service Institution of India. Journal, v. 100, July/Sept. 1970: 271-279.
U1.U5, v. 100

The actual use of nuclear weapons is highly unlikely in modern warfare, but limited wars, localized and deliberately restricted conflicts, will still be fought. The U.S. engagement in Vietnam demonstrates two generalizations about limited wars: first, they are nerve-wracking, drawn-out affairs, with clear-cut victory impossible; second, airpower in a limited war is not as effective as strategists expected. Because of dissatisfaction with limited war, various strategies combining nuclear threat and bargaining opportunity have been suggested. The use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited disputes has also been discussed. Some strategists recommend advertising such weapons as deterrents, while others think of them as just improved and powerful weapons. Once nuclear weapons are introduced into combat the drift toward escalation is probably irreversible. To bypass nuclear engagement, governments resort to such indirect tactics as propaganda, U.N. pressure, diplomacy, and subversion.

1654
Turney-High, Harry H. PRIMITIVE WAR, ITS PRACTICE AND CONCEPTS. 2d ed. Columbia, Univ. of South Carolina Press [1971] 288 p.
GN497.T87 1971
Bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword, by David C. Rapoport.--pt. 1. The practice of primitive war. The form and function of weapons. The theory of war and the military horizon. Formations. Discipline and command. The functional desiderata. Intelligence, surprise and countersurprise. Battle plans.--pt. 2. The concepts of primitive war. The socio-psychological motives. The economic motive. Military values. Certain military attitudes. War and the organization of society.--Afterword. The survival and revival of primitive war.--Bibliography.--Index.

Analyzes the tools, tactics, and organizational forms used by primitive societies in warfare, and the motives and values attached by such societies to its conduct. Approaching his subject from a sociological and anthropological viewpoint, Turney-High believes that "organization and tactics are the major foci of a discussion of war" and it follows that not weaponry but superior organization, a function of the whole society, determines the successful military force. In his afterword, the author discusses the place of primitive war in the present. He finds that, by itself, any guerrilla force will lose to a modern conventional army, and he notes that guerrillas, terrorists, and violent protesters utilize aspects of primitive warfare but are not, in their values and goals, primitive warriors.

1655
Wallace, Michael D. POWER, STATUS, AND INTERNATIONAL WAR. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1971: 23-35. illus.
AS9.J6, 1971

This study examines the effect of status inconsistency or rank disequilibrium on the genesis of international war 1820-1964. Status inconsistency is measured as the difference between national rankings on achieved and ascribed status dimensions, using power capability as an indicator of achieved status, and attributed diplomatic importance as an indicator of ascribed status. The amount of status inconsistency in the international system as a whole was significantly associated with the amount of international war begun 10 to 15 years later. When shorter time segments were used, the association was more pronounced but varied with the indicator of power capability used to measure achieved status and the time lag employed. Most striking of all was the joint effect of the several indicators of status inconsistency as calculated by stepwise regression analysis; values of R^2 between . 377 and . 708 were obtained using a 15 year time lag. These results appear to represent a partial verification of Galtung's hypothesis concerning the effect of status inconsistency on the international system. However, further research is needed to ensure that the relationship is not spurious and to identify the intervening variables. (Abstract supplied)

1656
Weizsäcker, Carl F., Freiherr von. [WAR: ITS RESULTS AND AVOIDANCE] Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung. München, C. Hanser, 1971. 698 p. illus.
UF767.W37
Includes bibliographies.

XUM

Contents.--Introduction, by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker.--Analysis of a security policy by investigation of its critical parameters (methodology of the study, structure, and results), by Horst Afheldt.--Mathematical analysis of the effects of nuclear weapon detonations in the German Federal Republic, by Philipp Sonntag.--The economic destructions of an atomic war in the Federal Republic and their consequences, by Utz-Peter Reich.--Defense and deterrence in Europe, by Horst Afheldt and Hellmuth Roth.--Stability and deterrence by means of strategic nuclear weapons--a systems analysis, by Horst Afheldt and Philipp Sonntag.--Tendencies in the development of security policy in Europe, and more comprehensive stimuli to ensuring peace, by Horst Afheldt.--The destruction of agricultural potential and the survival chances of the population--a simulation model, by Erwin Rahner.--Potable water supply, by Utz-Peter Reich.--Electric power supply, by Utz-Peter Reich.--Thermal radiation and the danger of refinery explosions, by Utz-Peter Reich.--Biological effects of a nuclear war on the German Federal Republic, by Alexander Pfau.--Considerations on the danger of contamination in nuclear war, by Klaus Rajewski.--Genetic damage, by Hans A. Künkel.--Results of a nuclear explosion in the North Sea, by Utz-Peter Reich.--The influence of clouds and atmosphere on the thermal radiation of an atomic explosion, by Utz-Peter Reich.

Materials prepared in response to criticism made in 1961 that the then-new civil defense regulations postulated only one kind of future war without accounting for possible permutations and combinations of kinds and qualities of weapons, targets, and defense measures. The possibility of a massive civil-defense construction program was excluded from the assumptions of these materials because of its prohibitive costs. The level of exposition was so selected that general articles are followed by articles designed for the interested nonspecialist as well as the specialist reader, and then by detailed articles prepared for the specialist. The group of specialist articles is written in the same increasing order of specialization. Weizsäcker explains that the framework of a limited conventional damage report was abandoned when the necessity of knowing the opposing strategies was realized. The whole field of military technical weapons employment is described through formal variation of specified parameters and supplemented by an evaluation of the economic and public health postwar conditions. The study reports that the employment of mere fractions of the nuclear forces now available to either great power is sufficient to annihilate the Federal Republic. Because of the complexity of modern society and its technical and organizational requirements, West Germany would cease to be a productive industrial society with the destruction of only 20-25 percent of its population and 50 percent of its industrial facilities. There is now, and there can be in the future, no hope for successful defense in a limited war in Germany, an all-out war in Germany, or in a superpower war in which Germany is only one of the theaters of conflict. Hence the only possible conclusion from the facts is that "since we do not have adequate prospects of enduring a war or even of surviving it, we are compelled to avoid it."

1657

[WHAT IMPELS THE REVOLUTIONARIES? MOTIVE, ACTIONS, AIMS] Was treibt die Revolutionäre? Motive, Aktionen, Ziele. Mit Beiträgen von Boris Goldenberg [und andere] Freiburg, Barcelona, London [und andere] Herder [1969] 116 p. (Weltgespräch)
HM281.W35

Selected papers of a colloquium sponsored by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Weltgespräch Apr. 25-27 1969 in Freiburg.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--The Cuban revolution and Latin America, by Boris Goldenberg.--Backgrounds and motivations of the student rebellion, by Hans-Peter Hempel.--Revolution and conformism in Herbert Marcuse: Science and philosophy. Historical consideration of left and right. Marcuse's theory of history. The calculated revolution. Mistaken characteristics in the terms technics and revolution. The "great rejection." The notion of rejection, by Franz Vonessen.--Is a theology of revolution at all possible? by Gonsalv Mainberger.

Articles exploring the nature and goals of today's revolutionary movements and the many events evoking the catchword "revolution." The introductory remarks urge that serious attention be given those movements that break with the past and that may lead to a world community.

1658

Wolf, Eric R. PEASANT WARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. New York, Harper & Row [1969] 328 p. maps.
D445.W8 1969

Bibliography: p. [303]-317.

Anthropological studies of the Mexican, Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Algerian, and Cuban revolutions. Wolf finds that all six revolutions were precipitated by the diffusion of North Atlantic capitalism, which is based on the idea that land, labor, and wealth are commodities, into societies where land rights and utilization were communal, tribal, or ancestral. The responses of these societies have varied, but several common features may be noted. Paradoxically, it has been middle peasants, striving to retain tradition despite a groundswell of poor peasants and landless laborers, that have provided the driving force of peasant revolutions. The Marxist contention that outside leadership is necessary to give unity to peasant revolutionary movements appears to be borne out by the tendency of peasant movements to confine themselves to local or regional goals. This does not mean that peasant revolutions are the work of "outside agitators"; rather, peasant revolutions are local manifestations of great social dislocations whose cumulative effect will be

a transformation of society and the peasantry itself.

1659
Zavilov, I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WAR. Survival, v. 13, Mar. 1971: 90-93.
U162.89, v. 13
Reprinted "slightly shortened" from Krasnaia Zvezda, Oct. 30, 1970.
Slav Rm

Analyzes the nature of war and how nuclear weapons have altered it. Zavilov lists several such changes, including the extension of the military zone, the alteration of the relationship between grand strategy, strategy, and tactics, the increase in importance of the surprise factor, and the extension of the ability to aim wide and deep strikes simultaneously at the enemy. Although nuclear and conventional warfare differ, they are not mutually exclusive. The problem is how to combine into one plan the "separate yet simultaneous use of nuclear and conventional weapons." Several principles are suggested, including "deeply penetrating simultaneous actions against the enemy's tactical and operational formations" and "initiative in the taking of bold action." It is essential that commanders and troops become aware of the changed nature of the military art and the resultant new demands.

MODERN WEAPONRY AND RELATED TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1660
[B-1, THE NEW SUPERSONIC BOMBER FOR THE USAF] B-1 der neue Überschallbomber für die USAF. Soldat und Technik, v. 14, May 1971: 252-253. illus.
U3.S58, v. 14

Sketches the purpose, characteristics, and potential armament of the B-1 supersonic bomber, which is designed to replace the B-52. This new aircraft will be built by North American Rockwell and will be able to fly at more than twice the speed of sound at high altitudes. Capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear payloads, the B-1 will have a greater cargo capacity than the B-52, even considering its lower maximum weight at takeoff. The principal mission of the B-1 will be to overcome enemy air defenses through low-level flight.

1661
Basiuk, Victor. PERILS OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY. Foreign policy, no. 2, spring 1971: 51-68.
N&CPR

Rapid technological change brings disproportionately large returns to those nations that take the lead in research and development. It also generates enormous social pressures, however, and societies that fail to control it will pay the price in "extensive social dislocation, widespread personal insecurity, and a serious weakening, if not collapse, of governmental authority and capability for defense." The impact of the new technologies, manifest in trends toward a reduced determinism of resource location, further integration of the "global geotechnical system," greater versatility in the projection of national power, ever greater economies of scale, and an enlarged contribution of civilian technology to national power, is just beginning to be felt in the domestic politics and trans-Atlantic relations of Western Europe, which, owing to poor international coordination, the dispersal of resources and duplication of effort, and inadequacies in institutional and technological superstructures, is losing ground technologically, as both innovator and user. Should this drift be allowed to continue, Europe well may be reduced to the status of an underdeveloped country. Progress is dependent upon prompt action by the United States. At the moment, U.S. policy lacks direction; it is being permitted to drift in the direction of bilateral cooperation. What Europe needs, however, is a policy that will encourage large-scale functional cooperation within the continent as a whole.

1662
Basiuk, Victor. TECHNOLOGY AND WORLD POWER. [New York, Foreign Policy Association] 1970. 63 p. illus. (Headline series, no. 200)
T20.B35
Bibliography: p. 62-68.
"Based on research sponsored by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under contract with the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, and by the Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, Columbia University."

Contents.--Technological trends and prospects.--The United States in a technological future.--The Soviet Union in a technological future.--Western Europe and some technological futures.--Technology and world power.--Glossary.

Assesses the effects of technological change on the world balance of power. Basiuk compares the technological strengths and weaknesses of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe and projects their future development. He distinguishes three levels of technological impact on national power: strategic nuclear, subnuclear military, and nonmilitary. The major powers are already stalemated at the strategic nuclear level, and a similar stalemate may be developing at the subnuclear level. Technological change will thus have its greatest impact on the balance of world power in the area of nonmilitary technology.

1663
Bidwell, Shelford. THE USE OF SMALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WAR ON LAND. Army quarterly, v. 101, Apr. 1971: 295-306. U1.A85, v. 101

XUM

"Compressed from a chapter in a forthcoming study on the connection between science and warfare."

The movement, deployment, and command of troops in ground warfare preclude the advantageous use of small tactical nuclear weapons. Whereas troops move and fight in linear and dispersed fashion, nuclear bursts are circular, and the destructive radius falls off rapidly. Increasing the megatonnage does not correspondingly increase the radius of effectiveness. Military orders are traditionally issued through the chain of command. This delegation of responsibility, an incentive for individual initiative, is obviously not feasible in the case of nuclear weapons. Although tactical nuclear weapons can be used effectively against rear-echelon installations, these targets are often located in civilian-populated areas where the use of these weapons may be neither desirable nor authorized. When all factors are weighed, small tactical nuclear weapons are probably only of use against single, difficult targets.

1664
Bondarenko, V. [THE CURRENT MILITARY REVOLUTION AND THE FIGHTING ABILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES] Die militärische Revolution der Gegenwart und die Kampffähigkeit der Streitkräfte. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, Jan./Feb. 1971: 24-28. U3.034, v. 9

Shortened translation from the periodical Kommunist vooruzhennyk sil.

While the economy of a state creates the conditions for changes within the military establishment, science shapes the theoretical base of this revolution. The mission of both the economic and scientific sectors is to serve the political organs; they in turn direct the military. In addition to these external forces acting upon the military establishment, internal forces prompt change and direction. This triad of forces, the continuing interaction of weapons, delivery systems, and command, helps to explain the current military revolution and divides it into its logical phases. The catalyst for the revolution was the development of nuclear weapons (phase 1), which required the development of new means of deployment (phase 2). These developments in turn demanded new concepts in command (phase 3). The progression from nuclear weapon to rocket to computer is evident. The last has had a profound impact on the military establishment, not only altering the command functions but also providing the means for further development of weapons systems. The radical change in command functions has, however, not relieved man of his social responsibility in war, for he will always remain the dominant factor in man-technology relationships, however much his functions change. Although the revolutionary development in the Soviet Armed Forces began with the nuclear weapon, the fact that future conflicts may be waged with conventional means does not contradict the progression pattern, for the new concepts of command that would be employed in any conflict came about as a result of rocket technology, itself a consequence of the nuclear weapon. The current revolution in the Soviet Armed Forces offers new opportunities for the attainment of political objectives.

1665
Brown, Neville. RECONNAISSANCE FROM SPACE. World today, v. 27, Feb. 1971: 68-76. D410.W63, v. 27

Though strategic arms limitation and cost-benefit analysis have greatly deflated exaggerated claims about the military potentialities of space, there are still good reasons for predicting that the new space technology will have a profound impact on world politics. This certainly will be true of space reconnaissance. Israel's resentful and anxious reaction to America's seeming disingenuousness about Egyptian cease-fire violations in 1970 is but one example of how this new capability can complicate the control of local crisis. At the strategic level, space surveillance of Communist China's maturing missile force makes a U.S. or Soviet preemptive strike more feasible, which in turn raises the probability that China will launch an anticipatory blow of its own. In addition the U.S. space monopoly among Western powers has important implications for those who continue to favor a European contribution to strategic deterrence. The advantages of space reconnaissance with special relevance for arms control are synoptic coverage, processing speed, and independence of arbitrary human assessment. But there are also important limitations: proposals to use satellites in an early-warning system or in the detection of Polaris-type submarines have not borne fruit; monitoring from space, as a substitute for on-site inspections, has not proved feasible in the case of multiple-warhead missiles or mobile land-based systems. The greatest problems, however, arise from the impact of space surveillance on national autonomy, especially where "closed societies" are concerned. For U.S. officials, this poses a dilemma: releasing only selected information on one of these societies provokes charges of news manipulation; yet to tell all risks generating the most apalling international tensions. Space reconnaissance is still in its infancy. Improved capabilities will bring economic as well as military dividends but exacerbate many of the difficulties.

1666
THE FRENCH AEROSPACE INDUSTRY. Interavia, v. 26, May 1971: 513-521. illus. TL500.I55, v. 26

Looks at the French aerospace industry, both civilian and military, with summaries of design, test, and production capability, civil, military, and space budgets, and a review of exports and activities. Progress reports on individual planes and missiles, including the Concorde supersonic transport, are presented.

1667

Gravel, Mike, and Gilbert Gude. U.S. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING: CANNIKIN AS A CASE IN POINT. A report prepared under the auspices of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law. Extension of remarks of the Hon. William Proxmire, of Wisconsin, in the Senate of the United States, July 19, 1971. Congressional record, 92d Congress, 1st session, v. 117: S-11368-S11372.
J11.R5, v. 117
"Footnotes": p. S11371-S11372.

As with most complex issues there are many facets to the question of continued underground nuclear testing. The authors have chosen to organize their remarks around the weapon system, environmental and foreign policy aspects of the issue. For manageability of the topic and immediacy of the issue the proposed Atomic Energy Commission 5-megaton Cannikin test planned for Fall of 1971 at Amchitka, Alaska has been chosen as the instant case. This massive test was examined against the backdrop of the three considerations mentioned above. On all three counts: (1) mission and weapon system usefulness, (2) environmental costs and dangers, and (3) induced reactions in foreign affairs, the presumed benefits of the AEC underground nuclear test planned for the Fall in Alaska are far outweighed by the risks. It is the conclusion of the authors that the test should be cancelled. (Abstract supplied)

1668

Karner, Wolfgang. [BASIC NOTIONS AND BASIC CONCEPTS OF GAME THEORY: A SURVEY] Grundbegriffe und Grundkonzepte der Spieltheorie: Ein Überblick. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 11, no. 1, 1971: 23-37. illus.
DB47.043, v. 11
Bibliography: p. 35-37.

General discussion of game theories and mathematical models and their applicability to the social sciences. The degree of use of these methods for prognostication varies from one discipline to another. In the fields of political science and international relations, they have not yet found general acceptance. Although mathematical models cannot reflect the total reality of a situation, Karner cites the usefulness of developing special theories for limited goals.

1669

Kelso, Jack R., and J. Choromokos. OPERATION PRAIRIE FLAT. Military engineer, v. 63, Jan./Feb. 1971: 16-18. illus.
TA1.P85, v. 63

Describes Operation Prairie Flat, a nonnuclear high-explosive field experiment. Tests were conducted "by the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) at the Canadian Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) at Ralston, Alberta, Canada, under the auspices of The Technical Co-operation Program (TTCP) in which the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia jointly participate." A 500-ton TNT sphere tangent to, and resting on, the ground surface defined the explosive charge. Four areas of measurement were of interest: air-blast phenomena, underground responses, biomedical exposures, and documentary photography. A verbal description of results, without data, is included. Most aspects of the program achieved their objectives, and the results "will be correlated with other high-explosive and nuclear information to extend and improve the knowledge of the effects of nuclear weapons on military weapons systems and civilian structures."

1670

THE KING OF WAR DETHRONED BUT NOT EXILED. Economist, v. 239, June 12, 1971: 32, 35. illus.
HG11.E2, v. 239

Describes several new antitank weapons and asks whether NATO should invest in them to offset anticipated troop cuts. Tanks will still be needed to protect lighter vehicles and to mount counterattacks. Since antitank weapons can supplement their operation, however, it should be possible to cut the number of tank regiments without reducing defense capability.

1671

MacLeod, Roy M., and E. Kay Andrews. SCIENTIFIC ADVICE IN THE WAR AT SEA, 1915-1917: THE BOARD OF INVENTION AND RESEARCH. Journal of contemporary history, v. 6, no. 2, 1971: 3-40.
D410.J66, v. 6

A historical investigation of scientific-military relations and the critical problem of putting the best scientific and technical advice at the disposal of the military services. The genesis and operation of the Board of Invention and Research during World War I have bequeathed the historian materials for constructing "a unique case study of the obstacles to the introduction of scientific advice to the services in general, and to the Royal Navy in particular." The board laid the foundations for much of Great Britain's defense research and development between the wars, but many of the lessons that had been learned were soon forgotten and had to be mastered all over again in the early years of World War II.

1672

Menaul, S. W. B. THE USE OF AIR POWER IN VIETNAM. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, June 1971: 5-15. illus.
U1.R8, v. 116

Suggests the utility to NATO planners of studying the American air experience in Vietnam "since some lessons can be learnt and new tactics evolved which could be useful in any future conflict." Air transportation, close-support and strike operations, types of air support, reconnaissance and interdiction, and strategic bombing in Vietnam are

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described, and their roles are evaluated. Menaul points to the great impetus given to aeronautical research and development and the mass of data accumulated in the field. Since NATO planners must use technology to compensate for manpower inferiority, he emphasizes in conclusion NATO's need for air superiority, the provision of close-support operations, increasing mobility of land forces, and excellent communications.

1673

Patterson, Andrew. MINING: A NAVAL STRATEGY. Naval War College review, v. 23, May 1971: 52-66. illus. N&CPR

Evolutionary history of the use of mines as a naval strategy, which points out that it goes back as far as the American Revolution although its employment then was not very successful. Patterson also shows that as a general rule mining activities are directed against men and ships rather than cargo, and they are rarely employed to prevent shipping of specific materials. In fact, the political and psychological threat of a mined harbor is probably greater than the real danger. A suspected mine is "hidden, unknown, uncalculated, and unassessed." Patterson describes some of the unique characteristics of mines--they are versatile, they are invisible, and they wait. Not enough strategists, however, understand or appreciate the value of a mine campaign, and it continues to be rejected for a variety of reasons.

1674

Prina, L. Edgar. THE MOST HUNTED SUBMARINE. Navy, v. 14, May 1971: 20-23. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

Comments on the significance of the deployment in March 1971 of the first of 31 fleet ballistic missile submarines that the United States is refitting to handle the Poseidon missile system. Each submarine will carry 16 Poseidon missiles, which have a 2,500-nautical-mile range when equipped with a standard configuration of 10 independently targetable thermonuclear warheads. There is no practicable defense against this weapons system.

1675

Pugwash Symposium, 10th, Racine, Wis., 1970. IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES ON THE ARMS RACE; [proceedings] B. T. Feld [and others] editors. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press [1971] xvii, 379 p. illus. (A Pugwash monograph)
UA10.P84 1970

"MIT 164."
Includes bibliographical references.

Series of discussions by scientists and scholars at the 10th Pugwash Symposium on the positive and negative effects of technological innovations on the arms race. Among the topics under discussion are ballistic missile guidance, high-energy density plasmas and pure fusion triggers, performance of ABM systems, ocean technology, and safeguards of nuclear materials. Summaries are appended to each discussion.

1676

Stauder, William. SMALLER AFTERSHOCKS OF THE BENHAM NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 61, Apr. 1971: 417-428.
QE531.S3, v. 61

The examination of the BENHAM aftershocks is extended to 162 earthquakes approximately an order of magnitude smaller than those previously studied. The spatial distribution of these smaller events is similar to that found for larger events examined by Hamilton and Healy (1969). Focal mechanisms are also similar to those of the larger aftershocks: dip-slip along northeasterly trending zones and generally strike-slip along a north-south trending zone west of the shot-point. About one third of the mechanism solutions are ambiguous, capable of either interpretation. Amplitude data are successfully used to resolve the ambiguity in about one half of these cases by selecting the solution which gives a notably lesser value of the variance, $\Sigma(A_i, \text{obs} - kA_i, \text{calc})^2/N$ of the amplitude residuals. The value of k is related to the magnitude of the shocks. A b value of 1.09 indicates that aftershocks of the explosion follow a recurrence rate normal for regional earthquakes or aftershock sequences. (Abstract supplied)

1677

Stoiko, Michael. SOVIET ROCKETRY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston [1970] 272 p. illus.
TL781.8.R9S85

Bibliography: p. 263-264.

Contents.--Preface.--The legend and the record.--Tsiolkovsky's legacy.--Interplanetary communications.--GIRD and G.D.L.--The men of GIRD.--Prelude to Sputnik.--Sputnik.--Genealogy.--Earth satellites.--Lunar and planetary probes.--The cosmonauts.--The flights and the walk.--Baikonur.--A decade of accomplishments.--A projection of Soviet space activities.--Epilogue: Perspectives.--Appendices.--Bibliography.--Index.

Traces the story of Russian and Soviet rocketry from Czarist days to the present, and projects Soviet space activities throughout the rest of this century. Stoiko points out the correlation between Soviet space programs and military activities. He describes launching sites and details satellite and rocket characteristics while offering a running comparison with the American counterparts.

1678

[THE STRATEGIC WEAPONS POTENTIAL] Das strategische Waffenpotential. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 15, Apr. 1971: 176-177. illus.
U3.W38, v. 15

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By the end of 1970 the Soviet Union had 1,290 operational ICBM's; the United States had 1,050. In the overall nuclear inventory the Soviet Union has surpassed the United States not only in quantity but also in megatonnage. The current Soviet nuclear buildup calls for rapid development of an offensive capability that stresses destruction potential, a sufficient number of short- and long-range rockets to assure tactical superiority, and a missile defense system against ICBM's and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Further, the Soviets are said to have developed and successfully tested an anti-observation-satellite space vehicle, which may have already "burned up" an American spy satellite by means of some sort of ray weapon. The United States has developed a new type of observation satellite (Project 647) that will increase the warning time to 30 minutes in the event of an enemy attack. In response to an American request to include offensive nuclear weapons in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Soviet Union has allegedly indicated its willingness on the condition that the United States remove its bomber fleet from Western Europe and the Mediterranean. The United States has found this condition unacceptable. In the meantime the Americans are continuing their Minuteman III program. By 1975 there will be 500 Minuteman II and 500 Minuteman III missiles operational, the latter accommodating multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.

1679

[THE THREAT FROM THE SS-9] Die Bedrohung durch SS-9. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 15, Apr. 1971: 175.
U3.W38, v. 15

Despite the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the high cost of SS-9 production ($30 million apiece vs. $1.5 million for Minuteman), the Soviet Union is vigorously pushing its SS-9 program. The threat from the SS-9 lies in its greater payload, its multiple-warhead capability, and its adaptability as a fractional orbital bombardment system. The 240 SS-9 missiles now operational and the planned production of 50 more each year, together with the annual production of 100 SS-11 missiles and six nuclear-armed submarines, represent so great a strategic potential that the United States can no longer afford to postpone decisions on the scope of its Safeguard system or on reducing the vulnerability of its offensive-missile silos to electromagnetic impulses triggered by near-ground detonations of nuclear warheads.

1680

Toksöz, M. Nafi, and Harold H. Kehrer. UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS: TECTONIC UTILITY AND DANGERS. Science, v. 173, July 16, 1971: 230-233.
Q1.S35, v. 173

The tectonic strain energy released by several underground nuclear explosions has been calculated through an analysis of seismic surface waves. The proportionally great amount of energy released in certain events suggests the possible uses for as well as the hazards of underground testing. (Abstract supplied)

1681

USAF'S WEAPON SYSTEMS. Air Force and space digest, v. 54, May 1971: 146-163, 165. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 54

A gallery of U.S. Air Force weapons, presenting summaries and photographs of major weapon systems. Categories include launch vehicles, missiles, bombers, fighters, attack and observation planes, cargo planes, trainers, helicopters, and utility and experimental aircraft.

1682

Ulsamer, Edgar. THE ACCENT IS ON FLYING. Air Force magazine, v. 54, June 1971: 26-35. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 54

Predictions about Air Force activity in the future stress a return to flying. "After a decade dominated by space and missiles, the pendulum is swinging back to aeronautics." Now funding and implementation of three major weapon systems currently projected must be obtained. One major weapon sought is the F-15, an air-superiority fighter that could also function in the interceptor role. Another is the B-1 strategic bomber, currently in the development stage. The A-X program involves the development of a close-air-support aircraft. In this case the Air Force model may have to compete for support with aircraft touted by the other services. Weapons such as guided drones and remotely piloted vehicles may arouse future interest.

1683

Van Pelt, James C. TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING: APPROACHES, TECHNIQUES, AND THEORY. Perspectives in defense management, Jan. 1971: 47-56.
N&CPR

Discusses the nature of forecasting and distinguishes between two approaches, the exploratory and the normative. The exploratory reaches out to see what is possible based on what is known today, while the normative picks an attainable goal and works backwards to find the steps for reaching it. On a more specific level Van Pelt describes forecasting techniques in five categories: intuitive methods (including an explanation of the Delphi technique), trend extrapolation, trend correlation, analogy, and dynamic predictive models. He concludes that technological forecasting is a tool that can "aid rational decisionmaking in establishing objectives, in developing plans to achieve these objectives, and in allocating resources for implementing these plans."

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1684
Weller, Jac. ISRAELI ARMS PRODUCTION. Ordnance, v. 55, May/June 1971: 540-544. illus.
UF1.067, v. 55

The Israeli arms and munitions industry is noteworthy for a nation so small and its international trade in weapons is profitable. Out of 30 factories, only one could be called major, but Israel's arms industry has purposely retained flexibility to supply any needed weapon quickly, from small arms to medium artillery. Before independence, the Israelis had to obtain almost all of their weapons abroad. The need for a dependable supply of dependable weapons was realized immediately after the 1948 war, and this recognition resulted in the development of the Uzi, a superlative submachine gun. The Israelis also produce parts for guns not of their own make and have developed a rifle that takes M16 ammunition. Facilities are intentionally kept unspecialized for versatility in production on a crash basis. Highly sophisticated modern production techniques are also avoided, because of their high cost and ineconomies of scale. The Israelis modify purchased or captured equipment, such as tanks and aircraft, to suit their own needs.

1685
Whidden, Wynn V. THE CASE FOR THE CARRIER. In United States Naval Institute. Proceedings, v. 97, July 1971: 24-33. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

Presents the Navy case for funding the CVAN-70 carrier in the next few years and for continuing the general program of aircraft carrier construction. Whidden points to the U.S. carrier forces as providing the margin of difference between the Soviet and American navies and demonstrates how the new policy of strategic mobility reemphasizes the importance of seapower to the United States. He concludes that failure to continue the carrier construction program will increase problems of obsolescence and total force capability and will have long-range national security implications.

1686
WHY ABM? POLICY ISSUES IN THE MISSILE DEFENSE CONTROVERSY. Edited by Johan J. Holst and William Schneider, Jr., with contributions from Frank E. Armbruster [and others] A collection of papers by staff and fellow members of Hudson Institute. New York, Pergamon Press [1969] 321 p.
UG633.W47
Bibliographical footnotes. Bibliography: p. 295-302.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Background and context.--pt. 2. Alternative BMD deployments and rationales.--pt. 3. Interactions with other policy areas: Missile defense: the Soviet Union and the arms race, by Johan J. Holst. Missile defense and non-proliferation: friends or enemies? by Michael E. Sherman.--pt. 4. Some other perspectives: Strategic arms control and stability: a retrospective look, by Johan J. Holst.--Bibliography.

Essays on various aspects of the problem of defending the United States against ballistic missile attack. Part I looks at past, present, and future approaches to missile defense, at the technology of the Safeguard system, and at the strategic alternatives and their implications. It introduces the reader to the terminology of missile defense and identifies significant questions and conceptual issues. In part II specific deployment configurations--Safeguard and two major alternatives, systems to protect population only or strategic forces only--are proposed and defended. Part III examines the impact of ABM deployment on the U.S.-Soviet arms race, the political and military situation in Europe, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, while part IV explores the implications of missile defense for arms control and strategic stability and the involutions of the debate over the Safeguard system in the United States.

1687
Wilcke, Johannes. [THE UNDERWATER EXPLOSION: OCCURRENCES--EFFECT--PROBLEMS] Die Unterwasser-Explosion: Vorgänge--Auswirkung--Probleme. Soldat und Technik, v. 14, Feb. 1971: 74-77. illus.
U3.S58, v. 14

Technical discussion of the effects of underwater explosions set off by torpedoes, antisubmarine missiles, depth charges, and anchored and seabed mines. The effects of these explosions are intensified by the water. Physical principles governing this intensification are subject to numerous other factors, however. Because of the intensification, increasing the charge does not correspondingly increase the destructive radius. Thus nuclear charges are not feasible, although the possibility of their use has long been the subject of debate in the United States. Mathematical and theoretical studies such as this one, the article concludes, need to be supplemented by extensive practical testing.

DEFENSE POLICIES AND MILITARY STRATEGIES OF NATIONS AND ALLIANCES

1688
Allen, Gary. MAKING PLANS: FOR A DICTATORSHIP IN AMERICA. American opinion, v. 14, Apr. 1971: 1-5, 7-9, 11-13, 15-17, 19-20.
AP2.04732, v. 14

Reveals the influence of planners in "think tanks," who develop new programs and propagandize to win public support. Operating on both the right and left, the "Insiders" have control and dictatorship as their goal. On the left stands

the Institute for Policy Studies, which manipulates radicals and revolutionaries. Seemingly its opposite are the RAND corporation, which deals with secret military and cold war strategy, and the unorthodox Hudson Institute. These groups are not actually as divergent as they might appear, since all contribute to the "Establishment's" drive for total government. Allen concludes that "what is needed is for Pavlovian 'Liberals' and Pavlovian conservatives to quit barking at each other and sink their teeth into the Insiders who are ringing the bell."

1689
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. WHAT PACE WITHDRAWAL? THE MCGOVERN-HATFIELD AMENDMENT. Washington [1970] 36 p. (Its Analyses, 91st Congress, 2d session, no. 10)
JX1573.A6

Cover title.
Includes bibliographical references.

Discusses the McGovern-Hatfield amendment of May 1971, which proposes forcing withdrawal of all American military personnel from Vietnam by the middle of 1972 by withholding appropriations after December 31, 1971. Arguments for and against the amendment, together with an analysis of the Cooper-Church amendment and the Cambodian incursion, are presented.

1690
Angenfort, Jupp. [FORMATION OF RIGHTIST CARTELS: RELATIONSHIPS TO THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX] Herausbildung des Rechtskartells: die Beziehungen zum militär-industriellen Komplex. Marxistische Blätter, v. 9, Mar./Apr. 1971: 32-38.
HX6.M32, v. 9

Details the acceleration of the coalescence of rightist and nationalist groups under the aegis of the Christian Social Union party (CSU) and its leader Franz Josef Strauss following the signing of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, Strauss' growing influence on the Christian Democratic Union party (CDU) and the leadership role of executives in the armament industries. Indicting Strauss' policies that support the Atlantic Alliance and close ties with the United States, the article calls on all democratic forces in the German Federal Republic to close ranks against Strauss and his "henchmen."

1691
Ashworth, George W. STATE OF THE NAVY. Navy, v. 14, May 1971: 8-15, 36. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

An assessment of the present state of the U.S. Navy, based largely on a posture statement submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), together with extracts from that statement. In his assessment, the CNO expresses great confidence in the Navy's nuclear deterrent forces but complains that sea control forces have been allowed to develop serious deficiencies, with the result that they now constitute a "high risk" element in the nation's defense structure. He details these deficiencies and indicates that the United States is failing to keep pace with the rapid naval buildup being carried out by the Soviet Union. The Navy's problem is that it must try to modernize its own aging fleet and offset the growing Soviet naval capability at a time when general inflation, soaring personnel costs, and demands for defense economies are generating tight financial restrictions.

1692
Baumann, Gerhard. [SECURITY; GERMAN PEACE POLICY IN THE ALLIANCE] Sicherheit; deutsche Friedenspolitik im Bündnis. Darmstadt, Fundus Verlag [1970] 560 p.
JX1952.B38
Bibliography: p. 535-543.

Contents.--Introduction, by Wilhelm Meyer-Detring.--Between the millstones of world politics.--Same duties, same rights?--Phoenix in ashes.--Revolving around détente and money.--The porous atomic umbrella.--Global obligations: the United States of America.--Withdrawal from Europe: Great Britain.--National or continental: France.--Setting an all-Germany course.--"Struggle against imperialism."--In tomorrow's light.--Epilogue.--Annex.

Traces the relationship of the German Federal Republic to NATO, with emphasis on security as the most essential element of peace. Baumann sees the effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance not in an identification of national interests but rather in an accommodation of the different interests of the member states. A more-than-symbolic American military presence in Europe is necessary, Baumann concludes, even if that entails greater defense efforts by the other members, for none of the European members can afford to renounce the security afforded by NATO.

1693
Beaton, Leonard. THE HEART OF THE MATTER. Spectator, v. 226, May 15, 1971: 659. illus.
AP4.S7, v. 226

A constant theme in British Common Market negotiations is the concept of an Anglo-French nuclear deterrent. It is a notion dear to the hearts of the Europeanists, who see it as a means of reconciling Britain and France. The ideas of the European Defense Community in the 1950's and the multilateral nuclear force in the 1960's illustrate the fondness of the European movement for defense schemes. Whereas before the force de frappe, the Europeanists considered British and French nuclear armaments impractical, illusory, and expensive, De Gaulle argued that a nation's leader, as the only figure capable of deciding the ultimate fate of his people, must control the basic strategic weapons of international power. This logic convinced proponents of Europe that an Anglo-French

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nuclear arrangement was the essential means of ending the split between Britain and France. While this proposal has not been brought into the Common Market negotiations, Mr. Heath plainly considers it part of Britain's committed participation in Europe. He has not elaborated on what such a deterrent would mean. Exchange of technical information certainly enters into it, but this by itself would not bring about anything resembling such a partnership. Mr. Heath's concept is not limited just to mutual consultation and planning. He possibly wants Anglo-French production and development, but past ventures by the two in the aircraft field have not gone smoothly. Further, the British have traditionally obtained delivery systems from the Americans, while the French insist on complete control over all phases of nuclear weaponry. The one nuclear issue that would be most likely to intrude into the Common Market negotiations is the joint Anglo-Dutch-German project of uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge, which the French opposed. All this does not satisfy Mr. Heath's requirements for a joint deterrent. "These words in their plain connotation would appear to imply a force which would probably be jointly developed and manufactured and would be jointly operated." But essentially the British have little to offer, and the possibilities of a nuclear arrangement are limited. Nuclear arrangements have great myth-making potential, however, and this one seems destined to be a mainstay of the future myth of Britain and the Common Market.

1694
Beaumont, Roger A. MILITARY CREATIVITY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, May 1971: 3-8. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Applies some recent findings in behavioral research to an analysis of the dynamics of creativity and innovation in military organizations. The sources of creativity and its frustration are identified, some specific difficulties faced by the creative individual in a military environment are examined, and some recommendations as to how the military might better manage "the dialogue of harmony and invention," the real core of the problem of innovation, are advanced. Failure to innovate, together with material imbalances, are the two major causes of defeat in war; this realization should be an adequate incentive for military men at all levels of command to keep their minds open to new possibilities.

1695
Beecher, William. CHANGING THE GUARD IN KOREA. Army, v. 21, Jan. 1971: 18-23. illus. U1.A893, v. 21

Comments on plans for continued defense of South Korea. Although word of a proposed withdrawal of American troops caused considerable consternation among South Koreans, the United States had no intention of jeopardizing South Korean security. Troops will be cut back to save maintenance costs, but their withdrawal is to be supplemented by modern equipment--bulldozers, tanks, patrol boats, and jets--that will offset any risk. The United States will continue to demonstrate its commitment to the defense of South Korea.

1696
Blackmar, Charles E. THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF: ANOTHER VIEW. American Bar Association journal, v. 57, Apr. 1971: 335-339. illus. LL

President Johnson and President Nixon both made significant decisions about American fighting in Vietnam and Cambodia. Each assumed the initiative, telling, rather than asking, Congress what to do. Some analysts have concluded that when a state of war exists, the President as Commander in Chief has unrestricted authority over the operation of the military, but this interpretation ignores the nature of popular government. Others assert that the true control lies with Congress; the President is designated commander so that a civilian will head the military and no rival leader can emerge. His actions, however, are subject to the approval of Congress, since that body has the right to declare war. While Congress has usually followed Presidential wishes, there is nothing in the law that denies Congress the right to forbid a particular military operation. Congress should be able to instruct a President to end a conflict and return the troops. Although the President as Commander in Chief may direct operations, he does not have "exclusive power to determine the extent and duration of operations."

1697
Bottome, Edgar M. THE MISSILE GAP: A STUDY OF THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL POLICY. Rutherford, Fairleigh Dickinson University Press [1971] 265 p. UA23.B728
Bibliography: p. 241-262.

Examines "the complex and often contradictory factors which led to a popular belief in the United States that the Soviet Union possessed a commanding superiority over the United States in intercontinental ballistic missiles"--the so-called "missile gap"--from 1958-61. Bottome goes beyond the debates to demonstrate that the origins of this illusion were deeply rooted in American political and military decisionmaking procedures and in the underlying assumptions of policy formulation in Washington and Moscow. The study is divided into three basic sections: a survey of background information on U.S. defense policies from 1945 to 1956; a narration of the events that eventually destroyed the missile gap myth; and the author's analysis of the subject matter. Appended are a glossary containing relevant terms and acronyms, a comparison of U.S. and Soviet weapons systems from 1949 to 1966, and total U.S. military expenditures from 1950 to 1964.

1698
Bourne, Lord. THE PLACE OF BRITISH DEFENCE. Contemporary review, v. 218, Mar. 1971: 113-118.
AP4.C7, v. 218

Appraises Great Britain's defense posture in terms of its overseas commitments in Southeast Asia and Europe and focuses on how best to strengthen British forces to meet obligations in the defense of sea communications, the Atlantic Alliance, the protection of British interests, and the maintenance of a nuclear strike force. Bourne advocates that British forces remain in Southeast Asia to ensure the peace and stability of its allies in the region. He concludes that Great Britain must maintain a modern military posture that will entitle it to participate in top level discussions, or otherwise the nation will be ignored by its allies and enemies alike.

1699
Brenner, Michael J. STRATEGIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE POLITICS OF INERTIA: PARADOXES OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. World politics, v. 23, July 1971: 635-664. D839.W57, v. 23
"An earlier version of this article was presented . . . at the American Political Science Association Convention in Los Angeles, in September 1970."

Serious proposals concerning an Anglo-French nuclear force might well be considered in terms of some theoretical propositions on the role and nature of secondary nuclear powers. The theoretical goals of independent deployment, applied to Europe, are to back up the existing NATO deterrent; to create a national defense apart from NATO; to symbolize independence in foreign policy; to realize nationhood and self-esteem; and to maximize options in all circumstances. In light of British subordination to American defense policy, the main reason for Great Britain's retention of nuclear weapons seems to be its self-image as a nation. This could be a barrier to cooperation with France, which decided to obtain nuclear arms for much the same reason. Both now tend to view their nuclear roles as supplementary to NATO's. A joint nuclear force to reinforce the existing system in the event of a reduced American commitment, for example, would not have so radical an effect as would each building a credible independent force. The likeliest concerns motivating cooperation would be the possibility of American retrenchment and a widening technology gap with the superpowers, closing off strategic options. Cooperation to increase the sense of nationhood is paradoxical, for this route does not enhance national pride. An expansive diplomacy, fueled by the desire for greater international influence, might be a motive for cooperation, but such aspirations are now limited in both countries. A major deterrent would require massive financial obligations from each of the partners, a development likely to encounter stiff resistance in their welfare-state oriented domestic politics. The past history of Anglo-French cooperation in technology points out the enormous difficulties this facet of a major strategic effort would run into. The inevitable resistance and competition of interested bureaucracies in each government will also tend to work against an effective policy of substantial cooperation. Such international endeavors need to produce immediate tangible benefits, something they rarely do, in order to avoid increasing domestic opposition. Strong, capable leadership in a favorable climate of public opinion would be necessary for a major undertaking, and these prerequisites are lacking today. Taking all of this into account, some sort of minor cooperation is possible, but strategically viable integration is most improbable.

1700
Brezina, Dennis W. THE BLUEWATER STRATEGY. Navy, v. 14, May 1971: 24-28. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

States the case for a "blue water" or sea-based strategy of nuclear deterrence. The United States no longer can afford to maintain a strategic mix of forces on the triad principle or to follow the philosophy of infinite deterrence; a choice among competing strategic weapons systems--manned bombers, land- and sea-based missiles, and ABM--must be made. The advantages of a sea-based system are overwhelming: it is the most secure, the least provocative, and, in fact, the most stabilizing, of all the strategic alternatives. The difficulty, however, is that logic in cases of this kind is not enough, and though the sea-based strategy is winning widespread support among hawks and doves alike, powerful vested interests continue to resist every suggestion that would reduce the present strategic role of the Army and Air Force.

1701
Brodie, Bernard. STRATEGY AND NATIONAL INTERESTS; REFLECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE. New York, National Strategy Information Center [c1971] 38 p. (Strategy papers no. 7)
UA23.B7833
Bibliography: p. 37-38.

Investigates some of the major assumptions underlying current U.S. strategic policies. Brodie notes that the determinants of strategic policy continually change and that, in view of these changes, the Nation's vital interests must be continually reevaluated. He concludes with some suggestions for modifying currently accepted strategic doctrine.

1702
Broekmeijer, M. W. NATO AND THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, June/July 1971: 22-24. illus. UA646.F5, v. 16

The West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement and the Russian proposal for a European security conference represent a Soviet attempt to

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undermine NATO. Moscow's idea of a European settlement is the complete subjugation of the East European countries within the Soviet commonwealth and the isolation and neutralization of Western Europe. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent announcement of the Brezhnev doctrine should be a warning to the West that the Soviet Union's political goals of domination and repression have not changed and that NATO must continue to be strong in the face of the so-called détente.

1703
Brown, George S. REALISTIC DETERRENCE. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, June 15, 1971: 514-516. PN6121.V52, v. 37

Address "delivered to the Washington Chapter, American Ordnance Association, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., April 12, 1971."

It is difficult to explain why so many Americans seem unconcerned about matters of defense and national security. Perhaps it is because the military services and defense industries have done their jobs so well they have made the threat seem minimal. That feeling of safety might delude well-meaning people into believing that defense funds could be better spent for social improvement. The Air Force and her sister services know, however, that the way to peace depends on a concept of realistic deterrence, which requires the United States to maintain enough physical strength to deter any potential aggressor. It is also vital that the American people demonstrate their will and determination to maintain that strength and use it in case of attack.

1704
Brühl, Reinhard. [MILITARY POLICY FOR PEACE AND SOCIALISM. ON THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SED] Militärpolitik für Frieden und Sozialismus. Zum 25. Jahrestag der SED. Zeitschrift für Militärgeschichte, v. 10, no. 3, 1971: 261-279. D25.Z4, v. 10

The fighting strength and the combat readiness of the National Peoples Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic increased during the 1960's, and the NVA is now making a substantial contribution to Socialist military superiority over the forces of imperialism and to the maintenance of peace in Europe. Credit for this development belongs to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and the government leadership, for they created the conditions for this military revolution and inspired the NVA in accepting its role as an ideological challenge. In East Germany military policy is considered a component of overall state policy and is subordinate to it. That policy is oriented toward further developing the defense capabilities of the Socialist state, strengthening the defense consciousness of its citizens and the unity between soldier and citizen, continuously enhancing the NVA's combat readiness, and further integrating its staffs into the Socialist defense community. Although the Socialist states have attained military superiority, the imperialists--chiefly the German Federal Republic and its primary ally, the United States--have become more aggressive. To meet this danger, the Democratic Republic has intensified its efforts to solidify the unity existing between the military and civilian segments of its society and between the armed brotherhood of Socialist states.

1705
Canby, S. L., and B. P. Klotz. THE BUDGET COST OF A VOLUNTEER MILITARY. Santa Monica, Calif., Rand, 1970. 97 p. illus. ([Rand Corporation. Research memorandum, RM-6184-PR])
Q180.A1R36 no. 6184

"Research is supported by the United States Air Force under Project Rand--Contract no. F44620-67-C-0045."

Bibliography: p. 97.

Contents.--Preface.--Summary.--Introduction.--Projecting manpower requirements.--Projecting the supply of volunteers.--Bonuses and the correct pay variable.--The cost of voluntarism.--Conclusions.--Appendixes.

Argues that "a volunteer military with the combat effectiveness of a 2.65-million man draft-induced force may be attained in peacetime for an additional budget cost of $2.1 to $2.5 billion in the long-run." The authors consider such factors as increased retention rates, reduced training activities, enlistment bonuses, the rapid growth in youth population since 1964, and retirement costs. They estimate the short-run transitional costs to be $750 million to $1.2 billion per year if the draft is used to phase in voluntarism.

1706
Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. THE DANGERS OF A NUCLEAR EUROPE. New statesman, v. 81, Apr. 16, 1971: 520-521. AP4.N64, v. 81

A European nuclear force has no military, economic, or political merit, and it would be too high a price for Great Britain to pay to enter the European Economic Community (EEC). Such a force would have to depend upon a countercity strategy designed to trigger off an American strategic response, even though this type of "catalytic deterrent" was dismissed some 15 years ago as a figment of Gaullist imagination. The problem of multilateral control and decisionmaking involved in a European nuclear force is well remembered by "those who sat through the comic opera of the Multilateral force." Although many strategists claim that Europe could pose a credible threat to the Soviet Union by building a force similar in scale to those of the superpowers, the cost of simply maintaining such a deterrent would amount to about a third of what the 10 countries involved now spend on their defense budgets combined. France is more interested in acquiring information about thermonuclear technology than in sharing control of its

nuclear weapons, while the West German Government contends that a united nuclear force would sabotage any intelligent dialog with the Soviet Union. Western Europe, which must be prepared to protect itself against an enemy attack, currently depends upon a military security system that contains an effective defense and a credible deterrent. A European nuclear force would provide neither.

1707

Clancy, Thomas H. SHOWDOWN ON THE VOLUNTEER ARMY. America, v. 124, June 26, 1971: 647-648. illus.
BX801.A5, v. 124

Examines some of the arguments for and against a volunteer army and expresses the author's doubts about its desirability. Clancy offers three arguments: a volunteer army will be a "class army," composed disproportionately of the poor and the black; it will be too expensive; and it will not work, that is, a sufficient number of volunteers probably cannot be attracted. Even if the bulk of the needed troops can be obtained, the supply of officers will be short, and critical positions, such as medical personnel, will remain vacant.

1708

Cohen, Stephen P. THE INDIAN ARMY; ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971. 216 p.
UA842.C6

Includes bibliographical references.

Describes the development of the British Indian Army and its impact on the social and political life of the subcontinent. Cohen notes that the greatest legacy of the army has been to limit its role in civic-action programs and emphasize professionalism over politics. He contends that the Chinese invasion, Nehru's death, and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War partly helped to change the role of the military into a symbol of unity and integration.

1709

Commager, Henry Steele. THE MISUSE OF POWER. New republic, v. 164, Apr. 17, 1971: 17-21.
AP2.N624, v. 164

Twenty years of executive incursions on congressional warmaking powers threaten not only the constitutional principle of separation of powers but the very ability of men to fix effective limits to government. "The unlimited power of the Executive in foreign relations is no longer justified as an emergency power, but asserted to be a normal and almost routine exercise of executive authority." The Executive has justified the frequent use of the immense standing army that has been under its command since World War II by inventing terminology that appears to overcome legal restraints and by extensive use of executive agreements. The attempts of earlier presidents to bypass Congress are at best questionable, and there is no basis for the contention that recent unilateral military interventions by the Executive were necessitated by a lack of time to assemble a congressional quorum. Several steps can be taken to mitigate the dangers of executive misuse of foreign policy powers. Congress can limit the use of the Armed Forces in the absence of congressional action, establish a permanent committee to provide a quorum in the event of a genuine emergency, consult with the Executive on all executive agreements, and exercise its control over military appropriations.

1710

CZECHOSLOVAKIA INTERVENTION AND IMPACT, by I. William Zartman. New York, New York University Press, 1970. 127 p. (Studies in peaceful change)
DB215.6.C89 1970

Five rev. papers of a conference organized by the Center for International Studies at New York University in Dec. 1968.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Political change in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet intervention, by Jan Triska.--The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: the aftermath of the Czechoslovak invasion, by Vernon V. Aspaturian.--U.S. policy and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, by William E. Griffith.--NATO after Czechoslovakia, by Andrew J. Pierre.--Military intervention by the Great Powers: the rules of the game, by Andrew M. Scott.--The norms of intervention, edited by I. William Zartman.--Index.

Papers presented at a conference on "The Impact of the Czechoslovak Events on Current International Relations." A final chapter was distilled from the discussion among speakers and other participants. The book reflects the attempts of scholars to explain the unexpected Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, to explore the effect of U.S. policies, and, eventually, to formulate realistic predictions about future Soviet behavior in similar circumstances.

1711

Daly, Robert W. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITIES--1970. In United States Naval Institute. Proceedings, v. 97, May 1971: 285-292. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

Article compiled from 1970 Soviet publications, principally Krasnaia Zvezda and Morskoi Sbornik.
Slav Rm

Discusses Soviet naval activities of the past year, including Operation "Okean," the largest Soviet naval exercise to date, and the progress in air antisubmarine capabilities. Biographies of senior naval officers and tables listing the main Soviet naval commands and their leaders in the fleets are presented.

1712

Donahoe, Bernard, and Marshall Smelser. THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO RAISE ARMIES: THE CONSTITU-

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TIONAL AND RATIFYING CONVENTIONS, 1787-1788. Review of politics, v. 33, Apr. 1971: 202-211.
JA1.R4, v. 33

Discusses issues raised in the dispute between Federalists and anti-Federalists over the power of Congress to raise and support armies. Both sides in the debate accepted the principle of civilian control over the military, and both seem to have regarded a standing army as potentially dangerous. The Federalists, however, who considered the possession of coercive instruments necessary to the survival of the strong central government they were striving to create, thought of the Army as an integral part of a scheme that would preserve the nice balance "between freedom and responsibility, authority and anarchy." The anti-Federalists, who opposed the creation of a strong central authority, naturally resisted efforts to equip that authority with a military force. Pacifism played little or no part in their thinking.

1713
Gard, Robert G. THE MILITARY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 698-710.
D410.F6, v. 49

One of the problems besetting the military is the little publicized continuing effort to adjust the professional military tradition to the needs and changes of modern society and the world. The Korean War and the advent of the nuclear age have done away with the old setup of small, insular, professional armed services. Contemporary requirements of the postwar world have meant ever-increasing civilian involvement in, and direction of, matters once the exclusive domain of the uniformed leaders. The services needed to accept attainment of goals other than "victory" as fulfillment of their mission. Military policy has had to blend with diplomatic, economic, political, and other approaches thus requiring greater specialization and different skills than previously needed. The military was beginning to adjust to an integrated policy of national security when direct involvement in Vietnam began. The task now confronting the military is to provide for the country's defense while accommodating new social factors. The services must maintain proper defense forces, learn to understand their limitations, and fully incorporate new skills and their practitioners into their frameworks. Doing away with outmoded procedures and customs does not mean that necessary discipline should be sacrificed. For the good of the services, meaningful peacetime activities and a more attractive environment must be found for personnel, to keep morale intact and retain needed professionals. The public must in turn recognize the difference between involvement in policy and control of policy, according the military its proper role. The position of morality and individual conscience in the military must be examined. An all-volunteer force will make it easier to retain the old military ethic but will isolate the services from the mainstream of modern society. A continued force of draftees, however, will find it harder to maintain necessary standards. While the military will find itself more involved in the solution of domestic problems, it should not become too deeply engaged. Under no circumstances should the military compete with civilian organs. The services should seek to map their own course toward institutional improvement and reform, but American society must pave the way.

1714
Gelb, Leslie H., and Morton H. Halperin. WHY WEST EUROPE NEEDS 300,000 G.I.'S. Atlantic community quarterly, v. 9, spring 1971: 56-60.
D839.A85, v. 9
"Reprinted . . . from the Sunday Outlook, Washington Post."

This is not a proper time to withdraw U.S. forces from Europe. For one thing, the financial benefits of such a move would be small, perhaps even nonexistent. For another, global political and military priorities would be violated. Even if the desirability of a lower profile abroad is conceded, Europe is one of only two areas in the world (the other is Japan) of intrinsic strategic value to the United States, and it should be the last to undergo the effects of overseas retrenchment. By contrast the benefits of maintaining U.S. forces at present levels would be substantial. U.S. security is closely bound up with developments in Germany, and thus the highest priority should be given "to maintaining the conditions under which German political leaders compete for power without promising to change the status quo by force or by dangerous concessions to the Soviet Union, or promising to turn the European community into an anti-American alliance." One such condition is confidence in the U.S. deterrent. Troop withdrawals at this time would jeopardize Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, West German ratification of the nonproliferation treaty, and German support for U.S. participation in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. A trade war might be precipitated as well. The importance of maintaining a conventional balance of forces in Europe must also be remembered. In a few years, when West Germany's relations in the East have improved, the nonproliferation treaty has been ratified, agreements on Berlin and on strategic arms limitations have been worked out, and a European security conference has been called, U.S. forces can be reduced with far less risk than today. Mutual and balanced force reductions could be negotiated, or both sides could reduce their forces unilaterally. Meanwhile, however, the watchwords must be patience and due caution.

1715
Gilmore, Kenneth O. SOVIET SUBMARINES: NEW CHALLENGE FROM CUBA. Reader's digest, v. 98, May 1971: 63-67. illus.
AP2.R255, v. 98

Without fanfare the Soviet Union recently set about building a submarine base in Cuba's Cienfuegos Bay. The United States expressed alarm over this action, but fears were partly allayed when a secret "understanding" was worked out with Soviet officials. The essence of the agreement was that the United States would consider the presence in Cuba of a sophisticated submarine tender to be a violation of the 1962 agreements. At the same time the United States renewed its pledge not to invade Cuba. Although the tender apparently returned home and no submarines have been observed, Soviet intentions are not predictable. The implications of this new Russian intrusion into the Western hemisphere are being studied by U.S. experts.

1716

Glick, Edward B. SOLDIERS, SCHOLARS, AND SOCIETY; THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY. Pacific Palisades, Calif., Goodyear Pub. Co. [c1971] 144 p. U21.5.G56

Discusses the situation of the American military in today's world. Glick is particularly interested in military education and its relationship to academia. He also examines social problems within the military, presenting data about the frustrations of the black soldier. Finally he looks at the involved relationship between the military-industrial complex and the Congress, with suggestions for reducing some of the confusion.

1717

Gozze-Gučetić, Vuko. [THE YUGOSLAV CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL MILITARY DEFENSE IN THE 1969 LAW] Jugoslaviens Konzeption der allgemeinen Volksverteidigung im Gesetz von 1969. Osteuropa, v. 21, Jan. 1971: 23-40. DR1.08, v. 21

Depicts the 1969 act as a further effort to translate into practice the underlying concept of Yugoslav defense that safeguarding the national existence is the duty of the whole society, of every individual as well as every social, economic, and political unit. On the assumption that a society's defense policy is a function of the factors prevailing within it, Gozze-Gučetić discusses the 1969 law in the framework of the nature of modern war and the Yugoslav social and political system, foreign policy, and geopolitical situation. He emphasizes that the 1969 law requires total defense and forbids capitulation or the possibility of occupation. The law describes the units constituting the national Armed Forces and deals with territorial defense, the legal status of the defenders, planning for war, the rights and duties of social units and workers' enterprises, civil defense, and financial planning.

1718

Gray, Colin S. THE RISE AND FALL OF ACADEMIC STRATEGY. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, June 1971: 54-57. illus. U1.R8, v. 116

Argues that the American academic strategic theorist has been diverted from his scholarly duty of advancing theory by the pleasures of educating the decisionmakers. Ordinarily the academic strategic theorist comes from the disciplines of economics, mathematics, and statistics, or from one of the more quantitative social sciences, which do not foster political sensitivity. These students of strategy have been most successful in the area of nuclear strategy but are far less convincing in the analysis of conventional military power of the sort encountered in Vietnam. Gray outlines the major areas of concern to the academic strategist from the pioneer RAND study distinguishing between first- and second-strike capabilities to the present concentration on the superpower arms race. He thinks the decline in the volume and quality of strategic thought since the 1960's stems from the leading theorists' having left the field or having become overcommitted to the administration. This close identification with the Government inhibits scholarly criticism and revision.

1719

Griffith, William E. [THE CONFLICT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES: CONFRONTATION AND DÉTENTE] Das Konfliktsverhältnis zwischen der Sowjetunion und den Vereinigten Staaten: Konfrontation und Entspannung. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Mar. 25, 1971: 195-204. D839.E86, v. 26

Includes bibliographical references.

Part of a comprehensive study prepared by the author for the Research Project on Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The conflict relationship between the two superpowers has become more sharply drawn as well as more intense and complicated because of the necessity to avoid a nuclear confrontation, the continuing competition not only in arms but for political influence abroad, and the improvement of the Soviet Union's position in the political and military fields and the superiority of the United States and the West in the economic and technological areas. It must be remembered that Russia has traditionally used its massive military power to offset its technical backwardness and its foreign policy as an instrument for expansion. Although both powers are subject to internal problems, it is doubtful whether these will deter the Soviet leadership from its expansionist goals. On the other hand, popular dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War along with such domestic ills as race tensions, drug abuse, and crime have inclined the United States to reduce its foreign commitments. The United States has several alternatives to meet this situation. On the military side, it should negotiate at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks on the basis of approximate parity while leaving no doubt about its nuclear capability and its resolve; it should introduce a sea-based multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle system if Moscow does not accept on-site inspections; and it should strengthen its fleet and not accept mari-

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time parity with the Soviet Union. In its foreign relations the United States should give priority to its chief allies, Western Europe and Japan, and beware of one-way détentes, which have in the past served as a guise for Soviet expansion.

1720

Halloran, Richard. A BALANCE OF PRIORITIES--DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN JAPAN. Navy, v. 14, Apr. 1971: 10-16. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

Examines current trends in Japanese defense policy. Japan has the technical and industrial capacity to put together a military machine inferior only to those of the United States or the Soviet Union, and it could acquire nuclear weapons in 6 months under a crash program. However, the Japanese Government appears to be planning for only moderate expansion of its defense force in the years ahead. Japan intends to become the world's leading economic, not military, power. Nevertheless, signs that point in a different direction, such as greater public acceptance of the Armed Forces, growing demands for a place in the international sun, and unwillingness to ratify the nonproliferation treaty, bear close watching, and a new invasion of South Korea, the transfer of control over Taiwan to Peking, or the appearance of a serious threat to the Straits of Malacca would greatly accelerate Japan's military buildup.

1721

Harrigan, Anthony. AMERICA'S DETERIORATING DEFENSE POSTURE. Modern age, v. 15, spring 1971: 155-162.
AP2.M628, v. 15

The United States is no longer the world's leading military power, although in some respects it retains technological superiority. In general military capacity the Soviet Union is rapidly pulling ahead of the United States, but the public and many legislators seem unconcerned. The United States is also failing to keep up in the areas of bombers and missile-firing submarines and in aircraft and missile defense. Deterioration in the American situation is correlated with the current cutback of research and development activities and the lack of support for the design of new weapons. The American Navy needs to be updated and expanded, for the Soviet Union is deploying a sleek fleet into the Indian Ocean, where it is virtually unopposed. The American people must understand the need for strong national security forces and must approve the necessary expense.

1722

Hinterhoff, Eugene. [SPAIN AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE] Spanien und die Verteidigung Europas. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Mar. 1971: 130-135.
U3.W396, v. 20

Presented to the 8th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Feb. 20-21, 1971.

The admission of Spain to NATO membership would immediately provide the source of additional manpower that NATO urgently needs and apparently cannot find. It would dramatically alter the balance of power in Europe and reinforce the Western position in a European security conference. The reluctance of the North Atlantic countries to exploit these advantages has a historical parallel in the Western failure to cooperate with Czechoslovakia and Poland in 1938 and 1939. Spain's geographic position largely neutralizes the Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean. The ultimate political consequences of this contribution to détente and security prove the error of those who consider "a Spanish alliance an absolute catastrophe from the political point of view." France and the United States have both recognized Spain's legitimate place in world affairs. American repudiation of the Goodpaster understanding now threatens to abort Spain's turn toward the West and toward NATO.

1723

Kalb, Marvin L., and Elie Abel. ROOTS OF INVOLVEMENT; THE U.S. IN ASIA 1784-1971. New York, Norton [1971] 336 p. DS557.A63K315 1971

Contents.--The reluctant imperialists.--The rise to world power.--The burdens of the mighty.--In for a penny, in for a pound.--There is no evil that lasts 100 years.--"Let us continue."--Exit Robert McNamara.--Who poisoned the well?--Winching down the war.--In the wake of the clipper ship.

Traces the process by which the United States has become increasingly entangled in Southeast Asia. The authors note such common theories and assumptions of bipartisan foreign policy as the containment of communism and the domino theory. They also point out how rhetoric, adequately repeated, tends to become policy, which then inspires new rhetoric.

1724

Könitz, Barbara. [THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE MILITARY IN THE EASTERN BLOC] Der Einfluss der kommunistischen Partei auf das Militär im Ostblock. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 10, no. 6, 1970: 359-379.
DB47.043, v. 10
Bibliography: p. 378-379.

Stresses the historic inseparability of war and politics within the context of Communist goals. The political education of the Soviet soldier is geared to his playing a part in achieving these goals. After exploring a number of definitions of militarism, the author accepts the concept of Communist militarism, in that Soviet society and policy, in their entirety, are marshaled for the accomplishment of Communist aims. Könitz is wary of drawing false conclusions from the Sino-Soviet split (since the strategic ideological aims of the two Communist powers are identical) and describes coexistence as merely an extension of the class

struggle. She concludes that as long as doctrinaire communism denies the right of self-determination and differences of opinion, the character of the armies of the Communist bloc must be regarded as offensive, even in the absence of an acute threat.

1725

Kolkowicz, Roman. STRATEGIC PARITY AND BEYOND: SOVIET PERSPECTIVES. World politics, v. 23, Apr. 1971: 431-451. D839.W57, v. 23

An appraisal of the factors that have shaped Soviet strategic doctrines and policies in the last few decades and seem likely to continue their influence into the future. These determining factors are the political and strategic styles and preferences of several key Soviet leaders, the interaction between Soviet military doctrines and capabilities and those of the United States, and the concepts of the United States as adversary held by Soviet elites. Kolkowicz establishes the existence of a 5-year time lag before the Soviet Union came into phase militarily with the United States in adopting the flexible-response doctrine, achieving strategic parity, and giving a global configuration to its strategic and conventional capabilities. This kind of progressive strategic convergence has been dictated by the momentum of technology and economic constraints. In analyzing the "adversary assessments" of various Soviet strategic schools, Kolkowicz rejects the usual division into traditionalist and radical. He points instead to broad categories of conservatives and moderates and gives examples of this coexistence. The compromise of these conflicting positions explains Soviet participation in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks while at the same time Moscow implements a new grand design oriented toward the South and East. Although the evolution of Soviet strategy and foreign policies reflects the tensions within the political system, in a broader sense it also reflects the inability of political leadership to control military technology for political purposes. The asymmetry between politics and military technology is such that the ability of the superpowers to maintain basic interests while ensuring survival is now seriously threatened.

1726

Ladnorg, Uwe. [USAFE: BACKBONE OF THE AIR DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE] USAFE: Rückgrat der Luftverteidigung Westeuropas. Flug Revue, May 1971: 48-51. illus. TL503.C524, 1971

Reviews the history of the United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE) and defines its air defense, attack, reconnaissance, and transport missions within the overall NATO framework, to which it will be subordinated in the event of war. Specialized units discussed include the Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron, the Automatic Forward Air Controllers, and the Special Operations Squadron. The table of organization of USAFE and of the 3d, 16th, and 17th U.S. Air Forces is outlined. Ladnorg concludes with comments on the dual-basing concept, USAFE's NATO commitment, the modernization program now underway, and the Tactical Control System.

1727

Laird, Melvin R. [interview] U.S. STRATEGY BEYOND VIETNAM. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, May 17, 1971: 27-30, 33-35. illus. JK1.U65, v. 70

Responds to questions on various aspects of U.S. defense policy--the Vietnam War and Congressional and public opposition to it; Soviet foreign and military policy; the strategic situation in the Mediterranean area; the U.S. strategy of "realistic deterrence"; the defense budget; arms control discussions; the draft and efforts to create an all-volunteer Army; and relations with Communist China. Major goals of the Nixon administration are to complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia, to counter the momentum of the Soviet strategic arms buildup, and to convince Congress to vote the funds needed to implement the Nixon doctrine and the strategy of realistic deterrence.

1728

Lasch, Robert. HOW WE GOT WHERE WE ARE. Progressive, v. 35, July 1971: 14-19. AP2.P8655, v. 35

Places the responsibility for the cold war on the Truman doctrine and the policy of containment of communism. Only months after he took office, President Truman began to reverse the Roosevelt policy toward Russia, a decision based on his assumption that the Soviets were equivalent to the Nazis. "The Truman Doctrine, though decked out in economic aid to make it palatable, was essentially a policy of unilateral military intervention in another nation's internal affairs and inevitably involved a high degree of political dictation." Anticommunism was established as a dominant American attitude and a presupposition of U.S. foreign policy. The American intervention in Vietnam is a descendant of the Truman doctrine.

1729

Latile, André. [WHERE IS JAPAN GOING?] Où va le Japon? Revue de défense nationale, v. 27, May 1971: 740-757. illus. D410.R45, v. 27

Discusses Japan's future role in Asia, emphasizing its relations with Communist China, the United States, and the Soviet Union and the effect its growing economic and military might will have on these nations' efforts to maintain a balance of power in the Pacific area. Latile looks ahead at Japan's economic growth and defense policies and programs for the coming decade, noting that

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Tokyo's primary defense objectives are the retrocession by the United States of Okinawa and the liquidation of all American military bases on the islands. He concludes that China, the United States, and the Soviet Union will continue to be considered the Big Three despite the fact that Japan has the third largest gross national product in the world because, aside from their possession of strategic weapons, these powers represent systems of thought or ideologies that pretend to maintain world order.

1730
Leavitt, William. ISRAEL'S AIR FORCE--IN A CLASS BY ITSELF. Air Force magazine, v. 54, June 1971: 36-42. illus. UG633.A65, v. 54

As a relatively small force with an enormous job, the Israel Air Force (IAF) is quite remarkable. Its normal state is a near-war situation, with much of the population it defends clustered in vulnerable cities. Its problems are further complicated by the Russian deployment in Egypt of an elaborate Soviet-manned air defense system. To this show of force the Israelis respond with a firm refusal to be intimidated. Much of the confidence expressed by the IAF is derived from its program of pilot selection and training. Also basic to the IAF's confidence are "flexibility in operations and doctrine, and an organization geared to highly centralized and rapid command and control." Israel's goal is military and technological self-sufficiency, and the nation is making progress along that road.

1731
Luckham, A. R. A COMPARATIVE TYPOLOGY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS. Government and opposition, v. 6, winter 1971: 5-35. JA8.G6, v. 6
"Slightly amended version of a paper presented to the Working Group on Armed Forces and Society at Varna, Bulgaria, September, 1970."

Develops a typology of civil-military relations that, in contrast to some other general frameworks that have been proposed, gives due weight to both the civil and military sides of the interaction process. The typology is constructed along three dimensions--the strength of civil institutions; the strength of military institutions, together with the coercive, political, and organizational resources available to them; and the nature of the boundaries that separate the military establishment from its sociopolitical environment. These three dimensions, which may be thought of as summary variables for more complex relations, provide the means with which to construct models of a variety of behavior patterns of military organizations, thereby avoiding a too-narrow theoretical focus on intervention alone.

1732
MccGwire, Michael. THE BACKGROUND TO SOVIET NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS. World today, v. 27, Mar. 1971: 93-103. D410.W63, v. 27

Traces the growth of Soviet naval strength since World War II. Greatly expanded material capabilities have enabled the Soviet Navy to move beyond its traditional coastal defense role, which kept it subordinated to the land and air forces, to the prosecution of a new "forward strategy," the aim of which is to counter the strategic threat posed by the aircraft carrier and missile-firing submarine. This new strategy poses a real threat to Western interests, but alarmist statements redound only to the advantage of the Soviet Union. It is important, therefore, to keep in mind that the Western powers still outstrip the Soviet challenger in naval construction and technological innovation by a wide margin, and that, from the beginning, "Soviet naval policy has been conceived in response to the greatly superior maritime capability of the West."

1733
Marmion, Harry A. THE CASE AGAINST A VOLUNTEER ARMY. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1971. 107 p. UB323.M28 1971
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--The current Selective Service System.--Are there alternatives to the draft?--The volunteer Army: antecedents and prospects.--A class Army.--Involuntary servitude.--Where will the officer corps come from?--Implications for a democratic society.--The volunteer Army and the military-industrial complex.--Appendices.--Index.

Contends that an all-volunteer U.S. Army would attract a disproportionately high number of blacks and poor whites, encourage irresponsible citizenship, lead to the formation of an elitist officer corps, undermine democratic traditions, and reinforce the military-industrial complex. Marmion favors a National Service system that would offer a choice between military and civilian service.

1734
Martin, L. W. BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY: THE LONG RECESSIONAL. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969. 22 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 61) U162.A3, no. 61

Traces the evolution of postwar British defense policy. British political leaders have been slow to recognize painful postwar realities, in particular, Britain's reduced status as a world power and the accelerating pace of the technological revolution. The result has been a long and futile effort to maintain the British position in both Europe and Asia without paying the necessary price. On the military management side, adjustments have at last been made, with the result that "Britain is on the way to creating a compact and efficient military establishment designed for a fairly well-designed task." In contrast, political decisionmaking, by which the overall size of the British effort is determined, remains crudely inefficient. This is unfortunate indeed, for with the improvement in Britain's economic situation

opportunities could soon arise for bold British initiatives.

1735
Meyer, John C. THE TIME DIMENSION OF MILITARY FORCES. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, June 15, 1971: 518-521. PN6121.V52, v. 37
Address "delivered to National Security Forum, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, May 14, 1971."

If a weapon cannot be available when needed, it is of little value. The United States possesses a triad of striking forces--bomber, submarine launcher, and missile--with great deterrent power. An enemy would have to spread his defenses thin in the face of three strategic forces, and his offensive potential would be diluted. In addition he would find it almost impossible to time a simultaneous attack on all three arms, so he would fear retaliation from the third arm. The problem for the United States now is to determine future steps for maintaining its deterrent strength. Development of advanced surveillance systems is important, as are new reentry vehicles, improved penetration aids, and a new bomber. If the United States delays these developments to save money, it may find itself without sufficient deterrent forces at a time when it needs them.

1736
Morgenthau, Hans J. ALLIANCES AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. Perspectives in defense management, Jan. 1971: 11-19. N&CPR
"From a transcript of [the author'] presentation to the [U.S. Industrial] College [of the Armed Forces] on 5 January 1970."

A nation becomes powerful by increasing its military might; it adds to its power by forming alliances with other nations. Since alliances are often unreliable or subject to change, a nation should periodically reassess its treaties to consider which are viable and in the national interest and which should be quietly dismissed. The United States in the 1950's seemed to be collecting alliances in the manner of a hobbyist collecting stamps, and those agreements should now be seriously reviewed. The NATO alliance is an essential one, but the number of American troops it keeps in Germany is larger than necessary, in order to act as a trip-wire and deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. On the other hand the American presence has been an important factor in restraining West Germany and preventing it from following an independent foreign policy that might have led it closer to the Soviet Union. The other primary U.S. alliance is with Japan, since the best U.S. line of defense in Asia is the island chain from Japan to the Philippines. Japan can also be an important economic and political ally.

1737
Morse, John. [AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY AND NATO] Die amerikanische Verteidigungspolitik und die NATO. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Mar. 1971: 119-122. U3.W396, v. 20
Presented to the 8th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Feb. 20-21, 1971.

The Nixon doctrine purposes a middle course between isolationism and policing the world. The advent of the era of negotiation rather than confrontation does not end American readiness to maintain and enhance its contribution to NATO. At the same time, the American Government is determined to seek ways of converting hopes of détente into the reality of a just and lasting peace. Washington, convinced of the necessity of maintaining NATO's flexibility of response, accepts the conclusions of the European Defense Improvement Program on the future lines of development of NATO forces. The viability of NATO is proved by its contributions volunteered to lighten the American burden. The period of negotiation into which the world now enters can be characterized by two approaches: that of mutual balanced force reductions or of a European security conference. The American Government doubts that the Soviets have shown sufficient interest in creating the prerequisites for such a conference to justify its convocation. Certainly the United States does not wish to participate in a conference called to legitimatize the Brezhnev doctrine.

1738
Moulton, J. L. THE DEFENSE OF NORTHWEST EUROPE AND THE NORTH SEA. In United States Naval Institute. Proceedings, v. 97, May 1971: 80-97. illus. V1.U8, v. 97

NATO must reduce its reliance on nuclear response and increase its conventional forces to ensure a credible defense of Europe against an enemy attack. A survey of NATO's defenses in Europe, especially in the northwest, reveals that the alliance's military position is untenable on the North German Plain and on the vital sea lanes in the North Sea. A buildup of conventional forces will provide security, which will enable the alliance to pursue détente, mutual force reductions, and political and cultural exchanges. Without security too much attention to these issues becomes irrational and escapist.

1739
Muraise, Éric. [PACIFIC 1980] Pacifique 80. Revue militaire générale; general military review, May 1971: 603-623. U2.R48, 1971
Includes summaries in English and German.

Estimates the Asian political, economic, and military situation expected by 1980, emphasizing the potential for a Sino-Japanese rivalry arising from their future economic and military growth. Before 1980 Japan could acquire nuclear missiles having a range of 5,000 miles. Muraise contends that the situation in this region is growing more tense because Western and Eastern rules of strategic deterrence are very different.

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1740

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Information Service. ASPECTS OF NATO; THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS. Brussels, NATO Information Service [1969] 54 p.
UA646.3.A56 1969
"Contains extracts from the book 'NATO--Facts and Figures' published in the spring of 1969."
UA646.3.A559

History of NATO's first 20 years, including analyses and descriptions of the Berlin question, the problem of Germany, disarmament, the French withdrawal, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

1741

Oide, Satoshi. WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE AND THE 4TH DEFENSE BUILDUP PROGRAM. Japan Socialist review, no. 223, Mar. 15, 1971: 12-24.
HX9.J3, 1971

Criticizes the defense white paper "Significance of Defense in Modern Society," published by the Japanese Self-Defense Agency. In line with the Japanese Socialists' desire for peace through total disarmament, the author points to flaws in the white paper's arguments and contends that its primary purpose is to win public support for strong Self-Defense Forces. He challenges the argument that military might or threat is an effective deterrent of war. He is also critical of Japan's involvement with the United States. In his view the Japanese Government should concern itself with lightening the "burden of defensive-oriented defense spending" while improving relations with China.

1742

Palmer, Joseph. GREAT BRITAIN'S NAVY: THE NOT QUITE SETTING SUN. Navy, v. 14, Apr. 1971: 17-21. illus.
VA49.N28, v. 14

Examines current trends in British naval policy. Palmer argues that Great Britain is still capable of playing an important global role in world politics, and he welcomes indications from the Conservative government that it intends to maintain a British presence East of Suez. At the same time, he decries the extent to which British naval strength, particularly the fleet air arm, has been allowed to decline. If Britain is to have an effective defense policy, it may have to increase military spending as a proportion of gross national product, but at least so far the Tories seem as little inclined as their predecessors to make the necessary economic sacrifices.

1743

Powell, Ralph L., and Helena F. Powell. CHINA'S MILITARY: A GROWING POLITICAL FORCE. Air Force magazine, v. 54, June 1971: 43-47. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 54

Marked growth in Chinese military strength suggests that the military may come to dominate the Communist Party, although traditionally this has not been desired. Communist China's unified armed forces, known as the People's Liberation Army (PLA), have acquired new international respect with the development of nuclear weapons. Sources of the military's new political power can be seen in retrospect. Mao Tse-tung ordered the PLA to take part in the Cultural Revolution to advance his goals and keep order. Thus, as he proceeded to reorganize the party, the military already had a good foothold. In practice regional headquarters of the PLA became the regional bodies of government; "the military also penetrated deeply into the battered and thoroughly purged central government." A Communist military dictatorship, which seems most likely to emerge if Mao dies before he can construct an effective civil party, will not necessarily take on a more aggressive stance, as long as the United States maintains a strong nuclear deterrent.

1744

Price, Robert M. A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO MILITARY RULE IN NEW STATES: REFERENCE-GROUP THEORY AND THE GHANAIAN CASE. World politics, v. 23, Apr. 1971: 399-430.
D839.W57, v. 23

Asserts that the theory holding that the military are capable of playing a modernizing role in the underdeveloped states is frequently contradicted in actual practice. The contradiction occurs because of an overreliance on the formal-organization model of the military, which assumes certain characteristics to be innate in modern military organizations and, by extension, in the modern military profession. S. P. Huntington has explained that the role of the military in the modernization process depends on the degree of political participation permitted by the society. Price offers the reference-group analytical approach as being able to "differentiate the military from other organizations and social groups within a society, as does the formal organizational model, and, at the same time, differentiate among military organizations in different societies, something both Huntington and the formal organizational model fail to do." The empirical case illustrating use of the reference-group theory is that of military rule in the West African state of Ghana.

1745

THE QUESTION OF AN ALL-VOLUNTEER U.S. ARMED FORCE. Congressional digest, v. 50, May 1971: 130-160.
JK1.C65, v. 50

A comprehensive review of the proposal to replace the draft with an all-volunteer Army, outlining the history of the draft and noting that difficulty in recruiting fighting men is as old as the Nation. The operation of present draft methods and the classification system are described, along with current volunteer programs, most of

which seem to involve officer training. Facts and figures about U.S. military manpower are included. President Nixon's two-part proposal, a 2-year extension of the present draft to maintain security, coupled with increased incentives to make voluntary enlistment tempting, is described and followed by a summary of congressional action to date. In the final section statements of Congressmen and others are balanced pro and con. Supporters expect eventual economy, a stabilized military force, and higher morale. Opponents call the proposal unworkable and fear that civilian control would be gradually undermined.

1746

Raven, Wolfram von. [DETERRENCE AND DÉTENTE: NATO BETWEEN WISH AND REALITY] Abschreckung und Entspannung: die NATO zwischen Wunsch und Wirklichkeit. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, Mar./Apr. 1971: 84-89.
U3.034, v. 9

NATO has always been regarded by its members as not only a military tool but also a political instrument designed to restrain the ambitions of the Soviet Union and provide a political climate of peace in which to negotiate measures of cooperation that could lead to the eventual but gradual dissolution of the military alliance system. This view is as valid now as it was 10 years ago. The last decade began with almost perfect international security, thanks to the balance afforded by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Recently, however, the American position has been eroded, and, concomitantly, NATO cohesiveness has begun to disintegrate. On the other hand the Soviets countered the liberalizing tendencies in their bloc by suppressing them with force and extended their global image by creating a powerful maritime establishment, by accelerating their production of nuclear weapons, and by strengthening their garrisons in Eastern Europe. These steps were a clear-cut challenge to the global status quo and the position of the United States. The latter, in turn, offered to enter into arms limitation talks with its adversary. Should the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) result in agreements, however, the accords reached would be short-lived, and the arms race would continue. Since the Soviet Union has superiority in many important categories of the nuclear inventory, the United States has little real bargaining power at SALT. While NATO has been striving for some time for a mutual balanced force reduction, there is real danger for the West in a one-for-one reduction of forces. The Soviet Union has more divisions in Eastern Europe and more firepower on a man-to-man basis than do the NATO forces in Western Europe, not to mention the Soviet Union's shorter lines of supply vis-a-vis those of the United States. NATO now sees détente as realistically possible only through a reasonable balance of military forces and the holding of a European security conference as a constructive step and these only after the Berlin problem has been solved and progress has been made in the talks between the two Germanys and in those for limiting strategic potential.

1747

Rogers, William P. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE WAR POWERS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, June 7, 1971: 721-733.
JX232.A33, v. 64

Statement made by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 14, 1971, in which he outlines administration views on "the constitutional authority to commit forces to armed combat and related questions." Rogers opposes legislation pending before the committee that would codify the respective powers of President and Congress. As an alternative, the administration is "prepared to explore with [Congress] ways of helping Congress reinforce its own information capability on issues involving war and peace," and affirms the need for effective consultation between the two branches and for the exercise by Congress, without further legislation or constitutional amendment, of "the powers which it has under the Constitution in the war powers area." At the same time, however, there is "the need to act speedily, and sometimes without prior publicity, in crisis situations," and "to find better institutional methods to keep these requirements from becoming an obstacle to Congress' exercising its full and proper role." There is also "the clear need to preserve the President's ability to act in emergencies in accordance with his constitutional responsibilities."

1748

Rohrer, Daniel M., Mark G. Arnold, and Roger L. Conner. BY WEIGHT OF ARMS; AMERICA'S OVERSEAS MILITARY POLICY. Skokie, Ill., National Textbook Co. [1969] 153 p. E840.R57
Bibliography: p. 125-148.

Analyzes U.S. military interventions in Guatemala, Lebanon, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam. The authors question the anti-Communist basis of postwar U.S. foreign policy and find that military intervention has not been effective in deterring Communist expansion. They conclude that the failure of U.S. intervention in Vietnam will reduce the likelihood of future interventions except in cases involving a clear and immediate threat to U.S. security.

1749

Schneider, Fernand-Thiébaut. [OUR UNCERTAIN SECURITY] Notre incertaine sécurité. Revue militaire suisse, v. 116, Apr. 1971: 159-168.
U2.R5, v. 116

Traces the evolution of the Communist and Atlantic blocs in Europe and compares their military forces. Schneider contends that the East is apparently militarily superior to the West despite the Chinese Communist threat. He concludes that European security continues to be threatened as long as the hardliners in the Kremlin are tempted "to stake their shirts" on a new "coup de Prague."

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1750
Scoville, Herbert. THE LATEST RED SCARE. New republic, v. 164, May 15, 1971: 16-19.
AP2.N624, v. 164

The spring campaign for increased appropriations for strategic weapons began with warnings about new Soviet missile construction and deployments from Sen. Henry Jackson. At the same time fears of a missile gap have been renewed. Yet calm analysis does not substantiate these fears. Soviet launcher construction is less than anticipated, and the U.S. missile buildup continues, so America is favored in any extant missile gap. It seems inconceivable that the Soviet Union could deploy a true multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle system very soon, when it has not even started testing such vehicles. The controversy, however, points up potential risks and shows the consequences of failing to negotiate seriously. "Arms limitation is still much the best but most neglected way of protecting US security and avoiding the panicky over-response which seems always to be the trademark of an unrestricted arms race, and of the annual military budget debate."

1751
Seamans, Robert C. PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY. Air Force and space digest, v. 54, May 1971: 40-43. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 54

Addresses the problem of civilian control of national security forces and concludes that public concern is essential. Seamans points out four requirements that he feels must be met to insure public management. First, the public must be the ultimate judge of purposes and priorities of national policy. Society will work through its political mechanisms to express its decisions. Second, there must be "basic public understanding" of weapons decisions. The public must not be deceived by such "smoke screens" as the "overkill" argument. It must grasp the theory of force as a deterrent and appreciate implications of the Soviet Union's growing first-strike capability. Third, there must be checks and controls on the implementation of new development programs. Lastly, qualified leaders and managers must continue to be drawn to the military and defense establishment. Public support and encouragement will help.

1752
Sekino, Hideo. JAPAN AND HER MARITIME DEFENSE. In United States Naval Institute. Proceedings, v. 97, May 1971: 98-121. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

Evaluates Japan's military capabilities, focusing on its Maritime Self-Defense Force; analyzes Soviet naval capabilities within the context of the growing power rivalries in Asia and the Pacific; and proposes increases in Japanese defense forces, especially those involving antisubmarine warfare. Sekino concludes that despite its small strength, discipline and morale are excellent in the Maritime Self-Defense Force, "thanks to the enormous assistance and sympathetic guidance of the U.S. Navy and the strong traditions of the imperial Japanese Navy."

1753
Tammen, Ronald L. NEW STRATEGY, NEW THREATS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, May 1971: 42-44.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

Examines arguments advanced by the administration to justify its $80.2 billion budget request for fiscal year 1972. Tammen is critical of the strategy of "realistic deterrence," which is being touted by officials as a new departure in strategic doctrine but which seems more like "new labeling for old material." Regretably, much of the administration's case for defense spending continues to rest on worst-case analysis, an approach that "can lead to a misreading of intentions, and with that, unnecessary provocation." But rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, the Congress seems "prepared to deal responsibly with the new budget," and there is considerable support from diverse sources for a general ceiling on defense spending.

1754
Taylor, George. WESTERN DEFENCE: A VULNERABLE BRITAIN. In "We will bury you"; studies in left-wing subversion today. Ed. by Brian Crozier. [London] Tom Stacey Ltd. [c1970] p. 143-151.
HX518.S8C76

NATO's armed forces have never been up to full strength. The massive infusion of Communist troops into western Eastern Europe brought by the suppression of the Czechs has given the Russians an increased conventional advantage. Due to the cuts in the British defense establishment, a Soviet invasion of Western Europe would quickly drain Great Britain of effective forces, leaving the country vulnerable to a Russian air and sea attack. British conventional forces have been reduced because of the myth of strategic nuclear deterrence. Yet no British Government is likely to approve the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional war, and the same holds true for the United States. To provide for the effective conventional defense of the British home islands, a capable citizen defense force, much like the Swiss militia, is needed.

1755
Thomson, George M. THE OFFICIAL OPPOSITION VIEW OF BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, June 1971: 16-21. illus.
U1.R8, v. 116

Affirms the correctness of the Labour Party position that a withdrawal from East of Suez was necessary to bring defense expenditures into line with England's relative economic strength. As proof, Thomson points to the successor govern-

ment's conversion to this position. By accepting the necessity of a long-term ceiling in the defense budget, the Conservatives show their awareness of the national economic limitation on defense. Interparty agreement also exists on the desirability of reinforcing NATO. The issues remaining to be debated are the proper reaction to the advent of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean, the sale of arms to South Africa, the battalion group in Singapore, the aircraft-carrier force, territorial and regimental amalgamations, and pay increases for the services. Thomson warns that any new commitment in these areas must be made with one eye on the budgetary repercussions. The dominating question remains the military balance between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance. While the European NATO members wish the success of the SALT talks, they must express their concern at developments that affect them. The European members must cooperate in finding ways of easing Washington's financial burden.

1756
U.S. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel. THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF MILITARY POWER; SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT TO REPORT OF BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL. [Washington, 1970] 35 p. UA23.3.A419, suppl.

An addendum to the earlier report of the panel (cited as item number 267 in vol. 7, no. 1, of this bibliography) by some panel members who are deeply concerned about "disquieting trends" whose continuation, they feel, will almost surely see the United States reduced to the status of a second-rate power. In general these trends involve steadily mounting Soviet weapons strength and naval superiority, reflecting an obvious Soviet intent to achieve first-strike capability. In contrast the U.S. public displays indifference and even hostility to military matters and security needs. The result may be a grave undermining of national defense that could allow communism to extend its influence into the United States and the free world. The American people must demand and support a national strategic policy designed to regain and retain a clear nuclear superiority. "Weakness of the U.S.--of its military capability and its will--could be the gravest threat to the peace of the world."

1757
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. THE SOVIET THREAT. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 9911-9944 p.
UA770.U58
"[Includes a] presentation by chairman L. Mendel Rivers."
"H.A.S.C. no. 91-70."

Text of a speech by Rep. L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, delivered to the House Sept. 28, 1970, together with brief remarks by several other Congressmen. Rivers contends that the Soviet Union is waxing stronger every day while the United States grows progressively weaker. He concludes that the United States is already in second place as a military power and that its very survival as a free nation is threatened. As he sees it, the Soviet objective in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is merely to confine the United States to a permanently inferior position in strategic weapons.

1758
U.S. General Accounting Office. ACQUISITION OF MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS; report to the Congress [on the] Dept. of Defense, by the Comptroller General of the United States. [Washington, 1971] 84 p.
UC263.A5169 1971

Evaluates the efficiency of the management and decisionmaking processes applied in the acquisition of major weapon systems by the U.S. Department of Defense. This is part of a long-term program to provide data for continuing congressional appraisal and to provide the Department of Defense with an independent assessment of the weapons acquisition process. Among the problem areas cited by the report are the identification of a new weapon's mission, the definition of performance characteristics and assessment of technical risks, and the consistent use of cost-effectiveness studies. A schedule of program cost data as of June 30, 1970, arranged by acquisition phase and military service, and a letter from John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to C. M. Bailey, director of the Defense Division of the General Accounting Office are appended.

1759
U.S. Industrial College of the Armed Forces. NATIONAL SECURITY SEMINAR: PRESENTATION OUTLINES. Washington, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 1971. 347 p. illus. UA23.A34

Outlines distributed to participants in the National Security Seminar. Presentations covered a wide range of military and civilian problems with political, geographical, social and economic implications. Current foreign policy issues are presented, as are the U.S. positions on communism and national security.

1760
THE VIETNAM WAR, ITS CONDUCT AND HIGHER DIRECTION, by Cornelius D. Sullivan [and others] Washington, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University [1968] 119 p. illus.
DS557.A63V5
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--U.S. military aims and purposes, by Cornelius D. Sullivan.--Land operations in South Vietnam, by George Fielding Eliot.--Naval operations supporting the commitment, by Gordon G. Gayle.--Air war against the north, by Cornelius D. Sullivan.--Pacification program, by William R. Corson.--Winter-spring offensive, by Cornelius D. Sullivan.--Higher direction of the war, by George Fielding Eliot and Cornelius D. Sullivan.

XUM

Surveys the progress of the war in Vietnam to 1968, with primary concentration on the military strategy and activities involved. The authors do not doubt that United States involvement in Vietnam was part of a "legitimate U.S. policy of containment of communism." Although they defend the rightness of the American presence in Vietnam, they do find cause to question many military and strategic decisions, particularly those made by civilians. They point out the folly of trying to fight a limited war when the Vietcong has no intention of restricting its military objectives. Three of the four authors are or have been career officers in the Armed Forces.

1761

Wariavwalla, Bharat. SOVIET ABM AND US-USSR STRATEGIC DEBATE. In Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Journal, v. 3, Oct. 1970: 157-177. UA840.I55, v. 3
Bibliographical footnotes.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks might be facilitated if each side had a clearer view of the other's understanding of the concepts of defense and deterrence. Currently the Soviets, with their ABM system, are prepared for defense--fighting off an assault--while the United States, with its interest in multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, advocates deterrence--making everyone "afraid to assault you." These differences have historical roots. The Soviet "traditionalists" visualized a protracted war, refused to depend on a single weapons system, and anticipated destruction of civilian and military populations. The United States conceived of hostage populations lying open to destruction by massive retaliation. Although the "modernists" under Khrushchev advocated intense missile firing power that would quickly settle a war, the "traditionalist" view is more popular today and is reflected in the Soviet deployment of ABM's. In short, the two superpowers do not understand each other's viewpoints. To the Soviets the deployment of ABM's is a tactic to defend its cities and industrial centers. To the Americans the Russian ABM reflects a desire to shift the strategic superiority to the Red side; they feel this projected shift must be thwarted with more force.

1762

Weigand, Jörg. [THE IDEAL SOLDIER IN THE COMMUNIST CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY] Der ideale Soldat in der rotchinesischen Volksbefreiungsarmee. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Mar. 1971: 141-144. U3.W396, v. 20
Presented to the 8th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Feb. 20-21, 1971.

The Party and the Peoples Liberation Army rule China in combination, but as "the school of the nation," the Army's influence permeates all areas of Chinese life. Mao countered the historical Chinese dislike of the military by the exhortations to fraternity of the "San-Fan" and "Wu-Fan" campaigns. The Maoist ideal of soldier-peasant relationships is laid down in the "Five Articles to be Read and Reread," and reinforced by the "Eight Points for Consideration," the "Three Main Rules of Discipline," the "Three and Eight Ways of Working," and the "Four First." Examples of individuals and units honored by special designations for having displayed friendly attitudes in their relations with the civilian population are frequent in the press. The insistence on Army initiative in those relationships is so strong that Peking seems more concerned with the peasant than the soldier, although of course military morale benefits from the atmosphere of popular approval.

1763

Wesson, Robert G. THE MILITARY IN SOVIET SOCIETY. Russian review, v. 30, Apr. 1971: 139-145. DK1.R82, v. 30

Describes the patriotic propaganda and paramilitary activities designed to inculcate the military ethos into Soviet society. Wesson suggests that the mystique of the armed services is being used to ward off the threat of liberalization, maintain the existing order, and compensate for economic difficulties. Since the military is also the single most important agent of Russification, its influence will increase as the Soviet Union becomes a traditional authoritarian society.

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

1764

ACADEMY SQUIRMS A LITTLE IN SUDDEN SPOTLIGHT, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 231, May 7, 1971: 6-8. Q1.N2, v. 231

Reports on proceedings of the 1971 annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences. In contrast to past performances, several controversial issues were raised, including a dispute over the academy's acceptance of secret research projects, almost all of which are related directly to national defense. Defenders of the current academy policy with respect to secret research claim that "for the academy with its tradition of giving advice in wartime to refuse work that contributes to the defence of the country would be an abnegation of citizenship." Dissenters argue, however, that there is a contradiction between the academy's acceptance of this kind of work, to which the general membership is denied access, and the long-standing principle that all members of the organization are responsible for research carried out in the academy's name. The membership as a whole chose once more "to duck the issue," but the academy president did promise to keep members better informed about reports being produced by the academy's operating arm, the National Research Council. He also promised that classified reports

would be opened for inspection by members with an appropriate clearance and a need to know.

1765

Ashby, Eric. SCIENCE AND ANTISCIENCE. Nature (London) v. 230, Apr. 2, 1971: 283-286.
Q1.N2, v. 230

From the inaugural Bernal Lecture delivered at the Royal Society on Mar. 4, 1971, to be "published in full in the B series of Proceedings of the Royal Society."

The growing public distrust of science and consequent demands that it be brought under rigid public control have raised the question of whether it is one of the social functions of science to determine its own and community goals. In basic research the goal of inquiry is, or at least ought to be, determined by the inner logic of the scientific discipline. In mission-oriented science, however, this is not the case: not only is the choice of extrinsic or social goals beyond the competence of scientific methodology, but it may even be said that training in science, with its inevitable bias toward abstraction and simplification, is a positive handicap in dealing with this kind of problem. How, then, is government to determine social goals for science in a rational way when politicians have no grasp of science and scientists no grasp of politics? A partial answer may be supplied by the universities, whose responsibility it becomes to produce men capable of bridging the gap between science and politics, whether the issue at hand be nuclear defense or sewage disposal. Interesting suggestions for the reorganization of university curricula and the educational use of government laboratories have been advanced. More respect for the job of interpreting science to the generalist is another prime need. Finally scientists themselves must begin to give more thought to the matter of higher education, particularly to the task of teaching their discipline to those whose work will lie outside it.

1766

Bloch, H. Spencer. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT OF NORMAL PEOPLE DURING A YEAR'S TOUR IN VIETNAM. Psychiatric quarterly, v. 44, Oct. 1970: 613-626.
RC321.N52, v. 44

A study of the response of normal persons to the experience of life in a war zone. The study is based on casual observations made during a tour of duty in South Vietnam and on clinical work with psychiatric casualties carried out during the same period. Life in a war zone raises "powerful affectual issues of separation and abandonment, fears of death and disfigurement, and the experience of frustration in the continuum of the person's earlier adaptative experience." A study of those who have lived through this experience without psychic derangement yields valuable insights into the psychopathology of stress.

1767

Bowen, V. T., K. M. Wong, and V. E. Noshkin. PLUTONIUM-239 IN AND OVER THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. Journal of marine research, v. 29, Jan. 15, 1971: 1-10.
GC1.J6, v. 29

Plutonium-239 has been found in over-ocean aerosols in about the same ratio to Strontium-90 as that reported over land. In seawater, Pu-239:Sr-90 ratios are shown to be less than half of those in over-ocean aerosols, confirming geochemical separation of these nuclides in the ocean. It is suggested that the sedimentation of Pu-239 may be more involved with biological processes than has been found for Ce-144 or Pm-147. (Abstract supplied)

1768

Burck, Gilbert. FAMINE YEARS FOR THE ARMS MAKERS. Fortune, v. 83, May 1971: 162-167, 242, 244, 247-248. illus.
HF5001.F7, v. 83

The exhilarating business of fabricating advanced weaponry and space vehicles has come to earth with a thud. In fiscal 1972 total Pentagon procurement will be down 20 percent from its 1968 level. Space outlays will be down 38 percent. The weapons depression may be a long-term development rather than a cyclical dip. For one thing, antiwar attitudes have grown. For another, many Americans are appalled at highly publicized disclosures of cost overruns on oversophisticated equipment of dubious utility. A basic reason for runaway military budgets is that important Pentagon decisions are not subject to outside review and discussion. A partial reform is already under way. But even a complete rationalization of the weapons-buying process will not alter the defense industry's basic prospects. Some contractors will be forced out of an overcrowded business, while others will survive only by expanding heavily into nondefense work, such as surface transportation, sewage treatment, or community development. (Abstract supplied)

1769

CONFLICTING PHILOSOPHIES OVER 2,4,5-T, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 231, June 25, 1971: 483-485.
Q1.N2, v. 231

Reports the results of an investigation carried out under the auspices of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to determine whether Government restrictions on use of the herbicide 2,4,5-T ought to be lifted. This chemical first caught public attention as a defoliant in Southeast Asia, and data collected from the war zone were among the most important the Agency's study committee had to weigh. A majority of the committee favored lifting the ban entirely, but also suggested a continuation of surveillance and research and the adoption of regulations concerning residues, impurities, and labeling. A minority, however, argued for the retention of all restrictions except those

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applying to forestry work and the maintenance of rights-of-way. The principal point at issue is "whether the additional research required to establish the safety of 2,4,5-T so far as it can be proved should be carried out before or after re-exposing the public to the herbicide." The minority was also doubtful whether the hazards of dioxin, an impurity found in 2,4,5-T, have been properly assessed.

1770

Fulbright, James William. THE PENTAGON PROPAGANDA MACHINE. New York, Liveright [1970] 166 p.
UA23.F84

Contents.--The Starbird memorandum.--Information to propaganda.--The Pentagon.--The Navy: from Mahan to Moorer.--The Army way.--"Into the wild blue yonder."--Twisted images.--Sound off.--Dangers of the military sell.--Index.

Criticizes the propagandistic quality and excessive costs of Department of Defense public relations programs. Fulbright contends that the various programs operated by the Pentagon both reflect and promote a rising tide of militarism in the United States that threatens the Nation's basic democratic traditions and values.

1771

Gara, Larry. WAR RESISTANCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE. [Wallingford, Pa.] Pendle Hill [1970] 23 p. (Pendle Hill pamphlet 171)
UB342.U5G35
Bibliography: p. 22-23.

War resistance has a long history in the United States, from emigration to Canada to avoid service in the colonial militia to the present resistance to the Vietnam War. Quakers have long practiced various forms of opposition to war, as have Mennonites, Brethren, Jehovah's Witnesses, and minority groups within the major religious sects. Henry David Thoreau was only the best known of many selective conscientious objectors to the Mexican War, and socialists, anarchists, and other nonreligious objectors have widely followed his lead. Statesmen from Daniel Webster to Champ Clark have attacked conscription as a threat to basic American values. Present war-resistance movements differ from their predecessors primarily by virtue of the balance of terror that threatens all human life and the advent of mass communications media.

1772

Häckel, Erwin. MILITARY MANPOWER AND POLITICAL PURPOSE. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970. 31 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 72)
U162.A3, no. 72

Surveys the manpower policies of military services of West European and North American nations to ascertain their problems, advantages, trends, and implications. Häckel identifies three types of services in terms of their manpower inputs: all-volunteer or regular, typified by Great Britain and Canada; all-conscript or citizen, typified by Sweden and Switzerland; and mixed, a combination of the two, ranging from the United States, with a high proportion of volunteers, to Italy, with a high proportion of conscripts. He notes that in recruitment and maintenance of ranks regular forces, which are short of manpower, must emphasize quality, and citizen forces, with greater turnover, aim for quantity. (Mixed forces, in this and other attributes, take on elements of the other two systems.) The constant influx of new personnel in conscript forces causes a greater proportion of time and effort to be spent in training activities than in regular organizations. The author suggests that European armed services are moving toward a "model . . . of a relatively small professional force, made up of volunteers on medium-term and long-term enlistments and equipped with the most advanced and powerful weapons, and a complementary and much larger force of conscripts, serving no more than a total of 12 months in several instalments of militia-style refresher courses, trained largely by its own militia training cadre and equipped with light and relatively simple weapons suitable for home-defence tasks." He also examines the economic consequences of different types of forces and the interaction of the military with their domestic settings. Häckel concludes that all-conscript forces are suitable only for defense of national territory of states neutral in foreign policy, while all-volunteer forces are the most desirable in an alliance or in foreign combat. Thus any major change in military manpower policy by a nation implies a change in strategic direction. The trend in Europe is toward national policies that will best defend the homeland itself.

1773

Haskins, James. THE WAR AND THE PROTEST: VIET NAM. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday [c1971] 143 p.
DS557.A63H34
Bibliography: p. [135]-139.

Contents.--The country of Viet Nam.--Background of the Viet Nam conflict.--The Geneva Conference and its direct results.--The protest movement against the war.--National leadership in support of and in opposition to the war.--Major leadership against the war.--Viet Nam now.--Glossary.--Index.

A history of the origins and development of the anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States, preceded by a review of the background of the war and the nature of U.S. involvement.

1774

Horowitz, Irving Louis. THE STRUGGLE IS THE MESSAGE; THE ORGANIZATION AND IDEOLOGY OF THE ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT. Berkeley [Calif.] Glendessary Press [1970] 175 p. HN90.R3H6
Bibliography: p. 169-171.

Contents.--Preface.--pt. 1. The struggle is the message: the liberal pivot: The problem of social causation. Rallies in search of strategies. The organization and ideology of the anti-war movement. The changing focus of anti-war organization. Responses by authorities to the anti-war movement. Confrontation versus representation.--pt. 2. The message is the struggle: the radical pivot: American radicalism and the revolt against authority: 1950-1960. American radicalism and the revolt against reason: 1960-1970. From teach-in to moratorium. Conclusions and conjectures. Testimony on violence.--Epilogue: 1970.--Appendix: Four tables on anti-war demonstrations.--Index.

Analyzes the relationship between the anti-Vietnam War movement and mass violence in the United States. Horowitz finds that white liberals and radicals dominate the antiwar movement, that a correlation exists between a high degree of organization and a low level of violence, that most of the violence is directed against property instead of persons and is frequently generated by law enforcement agencies, that symbols and styles rather than issues are usually the focal point of violence, that the antiwar movement's preoccupation with the issues of legitimation and alienation contrasts with that of black activists, who are more interested in integration into the mainstream of American social and economic life, and that fractionalism (the conscious fragmenting into small groups) rather than factionalism characterizes the antiwar movement.

1775

Kaplan, Morton A. DISSENT AND THE STATE IN PEACE AND WAR; AN ESSAI ON THE GROUNDS OF PUBLIC MORALITY. New York, Dunellen Co. [1970] 172 p. (University Press of Cambridge series in the social sciences) KF4770.Z9K3

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Decisions by calculation or by feeling?--Obligation, education, and dissent.--The tyranny of principles; guidelines for the polity.--Loyalty and dissent.--Perspectives on self-determination, intervention, and force.--Perspectives on bargaining with Communists and arms races.--The American role in the world.--Freedom in history and in politics.

An examination of problems raised by dissent in a democracy. Kaplan explores the sources of political obligation and legitimacy; the substance of those issues--education, the defects of capitalism, and the treatment of minorities--whose lack of resolution has led to the contemporary crisis of confidence in the democratic political process; and the structure of modern politics, with its built-in tendency to limit the range of choice and human possibility. His major concern is with the relationship of education to public morality and with the problem posed by the more extreme forms of dissent, which appear to have arisen out of a romantic refusal to consider "the real choices confronting [man]--a refusal which for that reason may itself be contrary to the requirements of political morality."

1776

Karsten, Peter, and others. ROTC, MYLAI AND THE VOLUNTEER ARMY, by Ed Berger, Larry Flatley, John Frisch, Mayda Gottlieb, Judy Haisley, Peter Karsten, Larry Pexton, and William Worrest. Foreign policy, no. 2, spring 1971: 135-160. N&CPR

Assesses the argument that dismantling the ROTC program would increase the number of officers drawn from the service academies and the ranks, both of which sources are characterized by attitudes and behavior patterns inimical to those values the critics of ROTC want to protect. The study is based on background investigations of officers involved in "alleged misconduct" in Vietnam and an attitude-behavior analysis of Naval Academy, ROTC, and non-ROTC students. Finding that "ROTC (and probably college-grad OCS officers) appear to be less belligerent and less militaristic than either non-college or service academy officers," the authors argue that although termination of the formal relationship between the academic community and the military is desirable, any reform that would discourage the college graduate from becoming an officer would be most unwise. They recommend that humanities majors, who, as a group, have attitudes most consistent with liberal values, be given more encouragement to become officers, and they suggest further that those who are dissatisfied with the present military system and wish to reform it can best do so by becoming officers and working for change from within.

1777

König, René. [ESSAYS ON MILITARY SOCIOLOGY] Beiträge zur Militärsoziologie. Hrsg. von René König unter Mitarbeit von Klaus Roghmann [u.a.] Köln, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag [1968] 360 p. (Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie. Sonderheft 12) HM5.K622

Bibliography: p. [327]-357.

Contents.--Foreword. Some remarks on the special problems of basing a military sociology, by René König.--pt. 1. General: Several points of departure for military sociology and their contribution to sociological theory, by Rolf Ziegler.--pt. 2. Military and society: The military test of a social system: the Swiss Confederacy in the 14th century, by Karl W. Deutsch and Hermann Weilenmann. Political place and control of the military, by Rudolf Wildenmann. Army and technocracy in the countries of three continents, by Anouar Abdel-Malek. Sociopolitical peculiarities and functions of the armed forces in Socialist countries, by Jerzy J. Wiatr. Recruiting models in democratic social systems, by Reinmar Cunis. Military and trade unions. Occupational problems and

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interest articulation of West German career soldiers, by Dietmar Schlösser.--pt. 3. Internal problems of military organization: "Career Management": forms of organizational accommodation to technical change in the American Armed Forces, by Kurt Lang. Rank systems in the American military, by Roger W. Little. Self-interest, primary groups and ideology: a study of combat motivation of American troops in Vietnam, by Charles C. Moskos, Jr. Leadership in the military, by Klaus Roghmann and Wolfgang Sodeur.--pt. 4. Research reports: Economic and social problems of armament and disarmament in the German Federal Republic, by Hans D. Klingemann. Enlistments of recruits in military service, by Hans Benninghaus. Determinants and consequences of informal groupings of recruits, by Alois Rosner and Hans-Dieter Weger. Styles of leadership, tensions and their elimination in military groups, by Wolfgang Sodeur. Interaction analysis as an instrument in the selection of military leaders, by Hans Koerdt.--pt. 5. Bibliography.

A collection of essays on various aspects of military sociology. The essays discuss the complex interacting relationships between the military and civilian sectors of society, the internal problems of leadership, structure, and motivation, and the various studies of military social groupings, leadership selection, and the effects of armaments on the economy.

1778
McGaffin, William, and Erwin Knoll. SCANDAL IN THE PENTAGON; A CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY. Greenwich, Conn., Fawcett Publications [1969] 192 p. (A Fawcett gold medal book, T2175)
UA23.M244

Denounces U.S. military spending. Beyond dollars Americans pay for survival the price of "the distortion of national priorities, the neglect of pressing social needs, the concentration of corporate power, the growing dependency of millions of Americans on the military-industrial complex, the erosion of liberty, [and] the intrusion of the military into areas that have been and should be under civilian control," but, ironically, the price does not include a guarantee on survival. The authors review the background of the ABM, which they term "a license to wage war without fear of retaliation." They discuss the "antique" U.S. antiaircraft network as a case of protracted and useless military spending. On the domestic side McGaffin and Knoll point to congressional porkbarrelling, Pentagon lobbying on Capitol Hill, and the "cozy relationship" between defense industries and retired military personnel. The authors conclude that although some heightened congressional awareness can be detected, there is little prospect of serious investigation or change and little hope for escape from the peril of a military-industrial complex which "points [America] toward destruction."

1779
Milward, Alan S. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE TWO WORLD WARS ON BRITAIN; prepared for the Economic History Society. [London] Macmillan [1970] 64 p. (Studies in economic history)
HC256.M56
Macmillan student editions.
Bibliography: p. 53-59.

Examines the long-term changes in Britain's economy brought on by World Wars I and II. Milward reviews the development of economic history as a discipline since World War I, particularly with reference to the economic consequences of war, and contrasts Britain's war economy during the two world wars.

1780
Moot, Robert C. DEFENSE SPENDING: MYTHS AND REALITIES. Naval War College review, v. 23, Dec. 1970: 4-10. N&CPR
"An address delivered at the Naval War College."

Attempts to debunk common misconceptions about defense spending, especially the notion that ending the Vietnam War would release vast funds for domestic needs. Moot discusses various aspects of governmental budgeting and the intricacies of figuring war costs. He notes that in terms of buying power the 1971 military budget is only 7.5 percent higher than the prewar level of 1964. Many critics do not realize that defense spending has been cut and funds have been reallocated to nondefense areas. Further reductions would only endanger national security; they would not contribute significantly to the relief of domestic problems.

1781
THE MORAL CRISIS OF THE UNITED STATES IN INDOCHINA. Presbyterian life, v. 24, June 15-July 1, 1971: 15-17. BX8901.B57, v. 24
"Report of the Standing Committee on Church and Society to the 183d General Assembly."

Resolution of the 1971 General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church declaring American policy in Indochina to be "immoral and unjust." The statement confesses U.S. responsibility for events in Indochina and urges an end to American participation in the war by the end of 1971. It opposes Vietnamization and calls for American aid for reconstruction.

1782
PSAC HICCOUGHS OVER 2,4,5-T, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 231, May 28, 1971: 210-211. Q1.N2, v. 231

Comments on a recent report by a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee on the dangers arising from domestic and military uses of the herbicide 2,4,5-T. That the report goes out of its way to affirm the usefulness of 2,4,5-T as a defoliating agent is evidence of the powerful influence exerted on the committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a regretable lapse of scientific objectivity. The report fails to grapple in a realistic way with the problem of comparing the costs and benefits of domestic use of the chemical

and has substantive deficiencies as well. In general, although this report does manage to make some useful suggestions relating to the control of chemicals and to the interpretation and dissemination of laboratory findings relative to their teratogenicity, the committee has not been very successful in extending its investigatory activities beyond matters of national defense, its more usual area of concern; it might learn some useful lessons about the tactfulness and completeness of good reporting from the National Academy of Sciences.

1783
THE REAL PROBLEM--HOW TO CUT DEFENSE BILLIONS. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, June 21, 1971: 30-32, 35-36. JK1.U65, v. 70

Examines some difficulties in the way of reducing the U.S. fiscal 1972 military budget. Inflation, rising costs of research and development and new weapon systems, and the need to replenish stockpiles depleted during the Vietnam War all contribute to the problem, but the major stumbling block is skyrocketing military and civilian payrolls. But high personnel costs are largely unavoidable, even by the expedient of manpower cutbacks, so those who are anxious to reduce defense spending are directing their attention to research and development and new weapon systems, such as the B-1 bomber, the Safeguard ABM, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, and modern warships. Since the administration fears that cuts in these areas would seriously undermine U.S. defense capabilities, a showdown between critics and defenders of the proposed budget may not be long in coming.

1784
Rice, Berkeley. WHAT PRICE LOCKHEED? New York times magazine, May 9, 1971: 24-25, 85-88, 90. illus. AP2.N6575, 1971

Reviews the events leading up to the financial crisis at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. The review is devoted largely to a reconstruction of the histories of the two projects that did most to land the company in its current difficulties--Lockheed's C-5A contract with the Air Force and the company's own L-1011 Tristar project, which was meant to get Lockheed back into commercial aviation. Knowing the disastrous economic consequences that would result from the collapse of a corporation as large as Lockheed, the Government simply cannot let the company go under. But what is to be done? The experience with Lockheed suggests that it might now be good policy to adopt the half-serious proposal of John Kenneth Galbraith that the major defense contractors be nationalized.

1785
Rohr, John A. JUST WARS AND SELECTIVE OBJECTORS. Review of politics, v. 33, Apr. 1971: 185-201. JA1.R4, v. 33

A critical review of arguments favoring the extension of the privilege of draft examption to selective as well as total conscientious objectors to war, undertaken with the aim not of refuting but strengthening the logical case for selective conscientious objection. The literature on this subject has already suffered too much from the absence of constructive criticism: too often, proponents have weakened their cases by accepting a false dichotomy between morals and politics or by focusing exclusively on the consciences of individuals to the total neglect of broader community values. Clearly, though, if lawmakers are to be persuaded to enact appropriate legislation, arguments in favor of the selective objector must rest on a clear recognition of the moral nature of political action and must be consonant with the public interest.

1786
Stackhouse, Max L. THE ETHICS OF NECROPOLIS; AN ESSAY ON THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND THE QUEST FOR A JUST PEACE. Boston, Beacon Press [c1971] 145 p. HN65.S7
Bibliography: p. [138]-145.

Contents.--Theological perspectives on war and peace.--Competing definitions of the military-industrial complex.--The social sources of the complex.--The core of the complex: its values.--The foundations of transformation.--Toward an ethic for a just peace.--Notes.

Examines the ethical foundations and institutional values of the military-industrial complex. Stackhouse questions the adequacy of criticisms of the military-industrial complex that fail to deal systematically with the core values of the complex and focus instead on the social forces that created it. He contends that the Judeo-Christian tradition not only provides a more adequate basis for understanding and criticizing the military-industrial complex but also offers a framework for constructing a society in which the just-war doctrine will become fully operative.

1787
Stanford Biology Study Group. THE DESTRUCTION OF INDOCHINA. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, May 1971: 36-40. illus. TK9145.A84, v. 27

A report from an ad hoc group of the Stanford University Biology Department on their on-the-scene study of the ecological consequences of U.S. defoliation and crop-destruction programs in Southeast Asia. The study group found evidence of widespread crop destruction, damage to agricultural and forest lands, some instances of starvation among the civilian population, genetic defects, and social disruption. They concluded that U.S. military operations have caused long-term ecological damage and "greatly reduced the ability of the land to support its people." These operations, which include besides defoliation and crop destruction extensive bombing and population reloca-

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tion, "seem clearly to fall within the definition of crimes against humanity and war crimes."

1788
Sutton, Alice, and others. EXCRETION AND RETENTION OF STABLE STRONTIUM IN CHILDREN. Nature (London) v. 230, Apr. 9, 1971: 396-397.
Q1.N2, v. 230

Reports the results of a study of the retention rates of stable strontium in children. The aim of this and similar studies has been "to compare the metabolic behavior of strontium and calcium and to estimate the accumulation of fall-out strontium-90 in the body, ingested at a constant rate over a long period." The drawbacks to giving doses of radioactive isotopes to children or to using very large or very small doses of natural strontium were avoided in these tests by the use of stable strontium enriched in strontium-84. The study found that "the excretion and retention of Sr are controlled largely by the intake and excretion of Ca," that "renal discrimination between Sr and Ca in children is about the same as the corresponding value in adults, and that the plasma concentration of Sr, which like Ca is approximately constant, is only slightly higher than in adults."

1789
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES, 1970. [Washington, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] 37 p. (Its Publication 58)
DLC

Contents.--Highlights of the data.--Charts: Military expenditures, 1964-1970. Military expenditures and GNP estimated in constant prices, indexes, 1964-1970. World military and other public expenditures, 1964 and 1968. Shares of world total in 1968. Per capita expenditures for military, education, and health, by region, 1968. Military expenditures and armed forces, by region, 1964 and 1968. Relative burden of military expenditures, 1968. Ten major military powers, 1968.--Definitions of terms.--Statistical tables: Summary trends in military expenditures and GNP, 1964-1970. Military expenditures and related data, 1968. Per capita military expenditures and related data, 1968. Military expenditures and GNP, 1964-68. Armed forces, 1964-68. Military and economic ranking of countries, 1968. Statistical notes.

Fifth annual survey of world military expenditures and related matters, covering 120 countries and including national statistics for the years 1964-68. As a result of inflation, military expenditures reached a new peak in 1970, though in constant dollar terms and as a percentage of gross national product they declined slightly. In both the developed and the developing countries expenditures moved up, with the latter group increasing its share of world outlays, as in preceding years. Since the first survey in 1964 military expenditures have increased 20 percent worldwide in real terms. More money continues to be spent for military uses than for public health or education, and, in general, there is "no evidence that a widespread shift from military to civilian uses of resources has begun."

1790
U.S. General Accounting Office. DEFENSE INDUSTRY PROFIT STUDY; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. [Washington, 1971] 5, 80 p.
UC267.U6 1971

"B-159 896."

Contents.--Digest.--Introduction.--Annual profit rates of large DOD contractors.--Annual profit data of selected defense subcontractors.--Annual profit data of smaller defense contractors.--Need to consider contractors' capital requirements in negotiating profit factors.--Contractor association comments.--Agency comments.--Conclusions and recommendation.--Schedules.--Appendix.

Endeavors to study profits earned on contracts negotiated by the U.S. Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Coast Guard. From a sampling of 146 contracts it was learned that before-taxes profits on defense work were significantly lower than on commercial work of a similar nature; that profits, when considered as a percentage of the overall capital investment used in generating the sales, come within 2.8 percent of commercial profits; and that profits, when considered as a percent of the equity capital investment of the shareholders, were about equal for both defense and commercial work. The study recommends that when price competition is absent the Office of Management and Budget should develop guidelines for determining profit objectives stressing consideration of the total amount of contractor capital required.

1791
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Foreign Affairs Division. IMPACT OF THE VIETNAM WAR. Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by the Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. 92d Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 36 p. illus. DLC
At head of title: Committee print.

Contents.--Cost of the Vietnam war.--Military casualties and losses.--Military use of herbicides.--Effects of the Vietnam war on civilians.--Effects of the Vietnam war upon the economies of the nations of Indochina.

A statistical study of the effects of the war in Vietnam on its participants and their populations. The report brings together the major quantitative data and pertinent facts available on the fiscal, human, social, economic, ecological, and other costs of the war. Intangible and indirect costs, such as psychological costs and U.S. domestic in-

flation, are not covered. Some comparison with U.S. costs in men, money, and material in other wars is made.

1792
Velvel, Lawrence R. UNDECLARED WAR AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE; THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN CRISIS. New York, Dunellen Co. [1970] xx, 405 p. (University Press of Cambridge series in the social sciences)
KF5060.V4

Sponsored by the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam.
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword, by Richard A. Falk.--pt. 1. Unconstitutional war: The nature of the constitutional crisis. The declaration of war clause: "The Congress shall have power . . . to declare war." The President's constitutional powers. History. The oughts of the matter. Did Congress authorize the Vietnam war? The delegation of powers. The advantages and wording of declarations of war.--pt. 2. Judicial abdication: The myth of judicial abdication. The doctrine of sovereign immunity. The doctrine of political questions. The doctrine of standing.--pt. 3. Civil disobedience: Civil disobedience and its limits. Jury nullification. On punishing civil disobedients.--pt. 4. Final remarks: Other possible methods for limiting the President's ability unilaterally to take America into war.

Argues that U.S. Presidents have used illegal means to prosecute the war in Vietnam and that this has brought about a serious constitutional crisis. Velvel points out that the Congress and the courts are about as much to blame as the President for the present situation, inasmuch as neither branch was willing to use the countervailing power given it by the Constitution under the system of checks and balances to prevent the President from continuing on his disastrous course in Vietnam. Had they done so, the war abroad and the crisis at home would never have arisen. To ensure that Congress and the courts meet their obligations in the future, the author recommends that several steps be taken, the most essential being a general acceptance and institutionalization, in the form of constitutional rules, of the view that the President acted unlawfully in fighting a war without a Congressional declaration and should have been restrained by the judiciary.

1793
WANTED: AN INQUIRY INTO THE WAR [editorial] New republic, v. 164, May 22, 1971: 5-6.
AP2.N624, v. 164

Advocates a long and serious inquiry into American actions and possible war crimes in Vietnam and suggests a number of questions that a board of inquiry should look into. The board, which would be appointed by a new President with the consent of Congress, would seek not to penalize but only to record and make clear the many terrible things that have happened. It should be stated that these things "were not justified because those responsible believed they were doing their duty."

1794
Weisberg, Barry, comp. ECOCIDE IN INDOCHINA: THE ECOLOGY OF WAR. San Francisco, Canfield Press [1970] 241 p. illus.
DS557.A68W43

Contents.--pt. 1. Introduction: On ecocide, by Barry Weisberg.--pt. 2. Overview: Ecocide in Indochina, by Orville Schell and Barry Weisberg. On genocide, by Jean Paul Sartre. "On withdrawal," by Peter Dale Scott. From Ecological effects of the Vietnam War, by E. W. Pfeiffer.--pt. 3. The earth below: destruction of the living landscape: "Leaf abscission?" by Ngô Vinh Long. They shall inherit the earth, by Malcolm Somerville. From Poisoning plants for peace, by Arthur H. Westing. The chemically poisonous product's effects on particular agricultural products. Starvation as a weapon, by Jean Mayer. What have we done to Vietnam? by Robert E. Cook, William Haseltine, and Arthur W. Galston.--pt. 4. The spirit within: the destruction of a culture: The children of Vietnam, by William F. Pepper. Cage for the innocents, by Orville Schell. From After Pinkville, by Noam Chomsky. The tragedy of Saigon, by Frances FitzGerald. How not to keep them down on the farm, by Don Ronk. Health and death in Vietnam, by Thomas Bodenheimer and George Roth. The circle of deception--notes on Vietnam, by Robert Jay Lifton. Automated war, by Derek Schearer. Notes from Hard Times.--pt. 5. From the other side: "Our people are a wonder," by Franz Schurmann. The National Liberation Front and the transformation of Vietnamese society, by Mark Selden. The bombing of Vietnam, by Jon M. Van Dyke. --Bibliography.

Selected articles and essays in support of the contention that the United States is guilty of ecocide, which the compiler defines as a premeditated assault by one nation against the people, culture, and biological fabric of another nation and its environs. The contributors cite the effects of herbicides, antipersonnel and fragmentation bombs, napalm, free-fire zones, saturation bombing, forced urbanization, and other weapons and practices on the ecostructure of Indochina.

1795
Weisz, Heinz L. [VICTORY IN VIETNAM?] Sieg in Vietnam? Schweizer Soldat, v. 46, no. 6, 1971: 7-8. U3.S23, v. 46

After many years of fighting in Vietnam, neither side has been able to achieve any of its war aims: attainment of national independence, destruction of the opponent's armed forces and their supporting social structure, the conquest of the other's territory, or recognition of victory through negotiation. As these aims elude the participants, the war grinds on amid a totally different set of

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circumstances than when those aims were drawn up. The war has undergone changes in leadership, organization, techniques, and geographic and political scope. The most that either side can claim is some defensive successes. In the meantime, the small-state participants have become totally dependent on the superpowers. If the United States and Communist China do not find an acceptable solution to the conflict, the war will drag on another 10 or 20 years, serving Soviet interests as a "cancerous growth on the underbelly of China" and a drain on U.S. men and resources. The lessons to be derived for small states, and for Switzerland in particular, are that new defense concepts must be explored, provisions made for protracted war, and relations with the East bloc states carefully reviewed so that Switzerland does not become an involuntary satellite of that bloc. If the fates of North and South Vietnam are compared, the "imperialists," with all their faults, have been less deceptive in their relations with the South than the "progressive forces" have been in their relations with the North.

1796

WHY ARE WE STILL IN VIETNAM? Edited by Sam Brown and Len Ackland. New York, Random House [1970] 144 p. DS557.A63W48

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Nixon's war, by Jeffrey Record.--The Nixon strategy, by George McT. Kahin.--Crisis of legitimacy, by D. Gareth Porter.--The destruction of a society, by Tran Van Dinh.--Vietnam: the human costs, by Jerry M. Tinker.--Ecocide in Vietnam, by J. B. Neilands.--The end of American innocence, by Edmund Stillman.--The war and the economy, by Robert Eisner.--A program for disengagement, by George McGovern.--Humility yes, humiliation no: the need for a new world-view by Seyom Brown.

A current examination of the reasons for American involvement in Vietnam that suggests alternative policies. Record and Kahin analyze President Nixon's policy and its implications for the future. Porter contrasts American and Vietnamese conceptions of political legitimacy. Dinh, Tinker, and Neilands assess the social and ecological costs of the war for the Vietnamese, while Stillman and Eisner focus on the social and economic costs for the Americans. Senator McGovern outlines a proposal for U.S. disengagement from Vietnam, and Brown urges a radical transformation of U.S. foreign policy to accommodate postwar changes in world politics.

1797

Wynn, Neil A. THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR ON THE AMERICAN NEGRO. Journal of contemporary history, v. 6, no. 2, 1971: 43-53. D410.J66, v. 6

Assesses the impact of World War II on the status of Negroes in American society. The classical liberal view that war as a promoter of social change is "a messy, bloody business from which no good can come" is being challenged by adherents of one or another variant of the "military participation ratio" theory, which asserts, in its original formulation, that "the extent of social welfare in any society, and the effects of war on social stratification, depend 'on the proportion of militarily utilized individuals in the total population,'" and that "the greater the military participation ratio, the more marked is the tendency to flatten the social pyramid." The participation of Negroes in the war effort did bring them opportunities to enter more fully into the mainstream of American political and social life, but it also awakened a determined opposition from some sections of the white population, which has had the consequence of slowing down, though it could not stop, the changes set in motion by the war.

III. INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

1798
Akehurst, Michael B. A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW. New York, Atherton Press, 1970. 367 p. JX1308.A43 1970b
Includes bibliographical references.

Surveys areas in international law, including the sea, the air, and outer space, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and treaties. Akehurst seeks to bridge the gap between international law and international relations by studying law within the framework of world politics.

1799
Bokor, Hanna S. NEW STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1970. 116 p. (Institute for Legal and Administrative Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Foreign Languages series, no. 7) JX4053.B6

Discusses the role of international law in promoting the independence of states, adopting new states to the international community, and serving as a yardstick to determine the degree of state independence. Bokor examines the right of self-determination in international law, asking how far previous existing rules of international law apply to new states. She analyzes the evolution of the theoretical legal status of new states into actual practice of international relations within the framework of treaty practices. She devotes particular attention to the interpretation and clarification of the concepts of independence and self-determination.

1800
Corbett, Percy E. THE GROWTH OF WORLD LAW. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971. 216 p. JX3110.C6G76
Includes bibliographical references.

Looks at "the development of legal institutions transcending the state and constituting the still weak framework of a community embracing humanity as a whole." Corbett discusses the general principles and structures that men have employed to achieve order and justice and reviews the efforts to build a system to govern the conduct of states as individual entities. He studies the 50-year drive to strengthen the international order with administrative and enforcement agencies, the gradual assimilation of national legal systems, the recent endeavors to define human rights in ways that are enforceable against their own and foreign governments.

1801
DE LEGE PACTORUM; ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT RENBERT WILSON, by Alona E. Evans [and others] Edited by David R. Deener. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1970. xiii, 274 p. JX4165.D4

Partial contents.--"Constitution-making" treaties and international courts: judicial review within the European communities, by Hans W. Baade. --Reservations to multilateral treaties, by Mohammed A. Chaudhri.--Reservations in agreements for pacific settlement of disputes, by John M. Howell.--Damnosa hereditas? The consensual basis of international law, by Ralph G. Jones.--The bilateral treaty network of non-Western states, by Claude S. Phillips.

A collection of essays by 16 authors from many universities. Each deals with some aspect of treaties and agreements, trade, international relations, and law.

1802
Gross, Leo. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: CONSIDERATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ENHANCING ITS ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER. American journal of international law, v. 65, Apr. 1971: 253-326. LL
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Examines in detail the Statute of the International Court of Justice and the Court's current status, acknowledging that the Court has not fulfilled the expectations set for it. Gross deals with many delicate problems of international law and adjudication as he considers the Court, its composition, and the law it applies. Among other issues, he discusses the role of the Court--whether as peacemaker and arbiter or strictly an interpreter of law. He also reviews at various levels the difficulty of increasing general confidence in the Court, and he makes recommendations for the Court's reform.

1803
Herman, Christopher. INTERNATIONAL LAW & INSTITUTIONS: SOME CURRENT PROBLEMS. [New York] Lutheran Church in America, Board of Social Ministry, 1970. 63 p. (Christian social responsibility) JX1977.H43
Bibliography: p. 63.
Studies in justice, peace, and freedom, 3.

Considers the theoretical development of a world legal structure and evaluates actual progress to date. Herman views the United Nations in terms of its potentials and limitations and criticizes the

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United States for its "simplistic and short-sighted" attitude toward international affairs. He concludes that there is no satisfactory alternative to international organization and international law, but, he warns, the necessary cooperation will not emerge spontaneously.

1804
Johansen, Robert C. U.S. WAR CRIMES: THE GUILT AT THE TOP. Progressive, v. 35, June 1971: 19-23. illus. AP2.P8655, v. 35

If Lt. William Calley can be considered innocent of what happened at My Lai, then the guilt must lie higher in the chain of command. Specific policies of the U.S. Government could be construed as war crimes and chargeable as such, since the applicable treaties carry the full force of law. As the decisions reached in the World War II cases indicate, repeated and consistent violations of the rules of war are the fault of those responsible for command. The motive behind an act, even if well intentioned or merely mistaken, does not justify or excuse the commission of the act itself. Officials in the hierarchy of command to the very top, who therefore may well be considered war criminals, had knowledge of past and present policy of a criminal nature.

1805
Lay, S. Houston, and Howard J. Taubenfeld. THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIVITIES OF MAN IN SPACE. Chicago, University of Chicago Press [1970] 333 p. JX5810.L39
"An American Bar Foundation study."
Bibliography: p. [301]-330.

Partial contents.--The physical setting.--Outer space activities: the political-legal setting.--The general legal regime, background, and analogies.--The legal regime, the present legal order.--The legal regime of satellite communications.--Liability and space activities.--Natural resources, pollution, and the law of activities in space.--Conclusions.

Analyzes existing international law and suggests directions in which law may be developing with regard to outer space. Expresses concern for national rights, privileges, and defense in this still-evolving area of international relations.

1806
Onuf, Nicholas G. THE PRINCIPLE OF NONINTERVENTION, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. International organization, v. 25, spring 1971: 209-227. JX1901.I55, v. 25

If, as some authors state, international law occupies a subordinate position in the structure of international politics, then why, on occasion, do states exert themselves in the formulation and resolution of legal matters? A special committee created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1963 was unable to arrive at a satisfactory exposition of principles of nonintervention in international law in a year and a half of work. In 1965, however, the General Assembly was able to adopt a resolution from the First Committee condemning intervention in a state's domestic affairs. Results in this instance were quickly forthcoming because the West saw it as a political situation subject to bargaining and compromise rather than a legal one. Meanwhile the opposing sides in the special committee have become locked into their own positions. Why? First, the negotiations may have acquired their own momentum, with the commitment to a position becoming more important than the position itself. Second, the outcome of the deliberations may have been seen as having an important effect in its own right. Lastly, a new principle or formulation may have been viewed as altering the context in which participants function in the international system. Nonintervention is an adjunct of sovereignty. Western states look on it as freedom for all to compete for influence. Non-Western states, however, relate it to freedom from this competition. The system itself is in change. Shaping its symbols can be taken as a means of aiding the discomfitures of adjustment, or of assisting or hindering the change, but the system cannot be controlled by trying to control its symbols. The West cannot halt the emergence of a new ordering, but it can assume stances from which to move gracefully into the new reality. Inflexible opposition would merely lead to a more radical onslaught. The only justification for such a course would be if the new symbols actually affected the system, rather than outlined the form it was already taking.

1807
Reel, Adolf Frank. THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA. New York, Octagon Books, 1971 [c1949] 323 p. D804.J33Y36 1971

Reprint of a 1949 first-person account of the 1945 trial and appeal of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Japanese commander of the 14th Army Group in the occupied Philippines. Reel, who was one of Yamashita's defense counsels, differentiates between Yamashita's alleged offenses and those of the Nuremberg defendants and concludes that Yamashita was convicted and executed not because his troops committed atrocities. "He was hanged because he was in command of troops who committed atrocities on the losing side." The Supreme Court opinion and dissents are appended.

1808
Sharp, Mitchell. CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 23, May 1971: 175-181. JX351.A3, v. 23
"Speech . . . to the International Law Association and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs," Montreal, March 29, 1971.

Surveys current international legal developments, focusing on the work of the United Nations, international law relating to the environment, efforts to control and limit nuclear weapons, the

law of the sea, and international humanitarian law. Sharp concludes with a discussion of the International Court of Justice, emphasizing Canada's support of the "principal judicial organ of the United Nations."

1809
Winnen, Ekkehard. [THE PRACTICE OF THE SOVIET THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERVENTION AND AGGRESSION EVIDENCED IN THE EXAMPLE OF THE 1939-40 FINLAND WAR] Die Praxis sowjetrussischen Völkerrechtstheorie zur Intervention und Aggression, dargestellt am Beispiel des Finnlandkrieges von 1939 bis 1940. 1970, 117 p.
JX4471.W5

Inaug.--Diss.
Vita.
Bibliography: p. iii-ix.

Contents.--Introduction.--Historical section.--Legal section.

Illustrates by discussing the 1939 Russo-Finnish War the meaninglessness of Soviet nonaggression pacts and the Soviet use of international law to further political and military ends. Winnen recounts the Soviet nonaggression pact with Finland, the territorial demands and subsequent negotiations, the invasion, the appeal to the League of Nations, and Soviet justification of the war. For the Soviets, it is not important who begins a war, only the "righteousness" of the cause. The Soviets exploit traditional international law, which is that existing among the capitalist states, while they maintain their own interstate code to govern relations among Socialist states.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1810
Bleicher, Samuel A. INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION AND THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE: A COMMENT ON THE ABUSE OF METHODOLOGY. International organization, v. 25, spring 1971: 298-305.
JX1901.I55, v. 25

Criticizes J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, authors of "Intergovernmental Organization and the Preservation of Peace, 1816-1964: Some Bivariate Relationships" (cited as item 815 of vol. 7, no. 2, of this bibliography) for departing from their self-imposed quantitative methodology to advance conclusions without support of, or reference to, their data.

1811
Clark, John F., Michael K. O'Leary, and Eugene R. Wittkopf. NATIONAL ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH DIMENSIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. International organization, v. 25, winter 1971: 1-25. illus. JX1901.I55, v. 25

Advances several interpretations of the relationship between general characteristics of individual nations and their support for the United Nations. Selecting eight indexes based on General Assembly voting behavior, delegation size, and financial contributions to U.N. activities, the authors isolate three factors of support (rather than just the one dimension of "supranational" support) as a result of factor analysis: a system-conforming factor (support for the present functions of the United Nations); a system-change factor (support for the expansion of the present, and the creation of new, U.N. functions); and an economic factor. These factors are further analyzed and refined as they load together for developed and less developed countries. Finally the factors are correlated with 13 selected variables to find a number of relationships, for example, that between the length of independence and the system-change factor. The authors suggest interpretations of these correlations.

1812
Derpa, Rolf M. [THE U.N. STATUTE PROHIBITING THE USE OF FORCE AND THE APPLICATION OF NONMILITARY FORCE] Das Gewaltverbot der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und die Anwendung nichtmilitärischer Gewalt. Bad Homburg, Athenäum Verlag [c1970] 149 p. (Völkerrecht und Aussenpolitik, 8)
JX4471.D46

Bibliography: p. [137]-149.

Examines Article 2Z, Statute 4, of the United Nations Charter--on the prohibition of the use of force--from the literal, systematic, teleological, historical, and practical viewpoints. Derpa concludes that the ban does not affect the use of nonmilitary force even though forms of economic and political pressure may be contrary to international law.

1813
Eichelberger, Clark M. UN: THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS. New York, Harper & Row [c1970] 178 p.
JX1977.E393 1970

Contents.--Introduction.--Peaceful settlement and collective security.--Peacekeeping, the secretaries-general.--Disarmament.--Human rights and fundamental freedoms.--The hot winds of freedom.--Standards in larger freedom.--Strengthening the United Nations.--Attitude of members.

A selective review of United Nations history to indicate some of its accomplishments and shortcomings as a peacekeeping organization. Eichelberger believes the organization has played a decisive role in preventing a third world war.

1814
Keenleyside, Hugh L. WHAT'S WRONG AT THE UNITED NATIONS. Saturday review, v. 54, June 19, 1971: 11-13, 29-30. Z1219.S25, v. 54

United Nations Secretary General U Thant, because of his activist conception of his office, has had little time to devote to his role as administrative head of the complex and diversified

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Secretariat. The organization's steadily worsening financial position is due to members' delinquency on, or refusal to contribute to, regular and special assessments, coupled with rising costs and increasing demands for services. Financial troubles are not the basic cause of the Secretariat's decline, however. The goal of a professionally-oriented international civil service has become harder to attain. The increase in membership has meant an increase in national candidates for meaningful Secretariat positions, and qualified, competent personnel are often difficult to secure from newer nations, which may field candidates for patronage purposes. Appointments to responsible positions from outside the organization staff stymie opportunities for career advancement from within the lower echelons. Some countries expect their nationals in the Secretariat to retain prime loyalty to their governments and attempt to accomplish this through appointments for a set term. Favoritism by officials toward fellow countrymen in appointment and personnel policies is also a problem. While some critics blame the Secretary General himself for the situation, others focus on deadwood and political appointees among the higher echelons. Because of the narrow interests of too many members, it is unlikely that needed reforms will result from a study being made this year for the General Assembly by an intergovernmental committee.

1815

Mayor, Jan, pseud. THE UNITED NATIONS LOOKS INWARD. Progressive, v. 35, July 1971: 31-34.
AP2.P8655, v. 35

Describes the in-depth analysis of U.N. assistance to emerging nations that was undertaken by the special team of Lester Pearson, Jan Tinbergen, Gunnar Myrdal, and Sir Robert Jackson. The specialists made recommendations for improving the coordination among aid-giving agencies and thus invigorating the United Nations as it enters the Second Development Decade. The experts agreed that "the widening gap between developed and developing countries has become the central crisis of our time." Prosperous nations continue to thrive while poor nations struggle for a toehold on progress. The analysts propose that each developed nation should contribute some proportion of its gross national product to grants to emerging countries. Some criteria are suggested for determining need by measuring comparative social and economic development levels.

1816

Newcombe, Hanna, James Wert, and Alan Newcombe. COMPARISON OF WEIGHTED VOTING FORMULAS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS. World politics, v. 23, Apr. 1971: 452-492. illus. D839.W57, v. 23

Examines 20 weighted-voting formulas, calculates the votes each would give to 171 nations and territories, and cumulates these into the voting blocs some of these nations formed in four different periods of U.N. voting. The criteria used in evaluating the formulas are balance, additivity, and future representation by population. Balance is defined as the state in which there is an approximate equality of voting strength among the main blocs. The additivity criterion is invoked to avoid national splits or combinations to gain voting strength. Only a formula allowing for population is considered to satisfy the democratic claim for equal representation. The authors conclude that a formula using a linear combination of population and energy consumption in a one-to-one ratio best satisfies these criteria.

1817

Rowe, Edward T. THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE COLD WAR. International organization, v. 25, winter 1971: 59-78.
JX1901.I55, v. 25

A quantitative study of roll-call votes in the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 1966 to examine the degree of support for the U.N. position on cold-war issues. Rowe finds that the United States was able to muster favorable decisions in the overwhelming number of instances, before, during, and after the increase in U.N. membership. The average margin of support in each regular session for the United States was considerable for the entire period but in general was reduced after 1957. Closer examination reveals that newer members were less apt to support the United States than were older members. Strongest support came from the Latin American and West European nations, while strongest opposition came from the Communist bloc. While the United States received less support from the Asian and African nations than from other groupings, it nevertheless received marked support from them, especially from the Africans. This accounted for favorable outcomes but also for the reduced margins of support. Toward the end of the period, the United States could count on continuing majorities, but with less assurance. Taken as a whole, the newer members were not highly cohesive or dominantly anti-American, but, Rowe feels, the change in overall strength may have had an effect on Washington's approach to cold-war and other issues.

1818

Stoessinger, John G., and Robert G. McKelvey. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE SUPERPOWERS; UNITED STATES-SOVIET INTERACTION AT THE UNITED NATIONS. 2d ed. New York, Random House [1970] 210 p. (Studies in political science, PS53)
JX1977.S795 1970

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--The superpowers and the constitutional evolution of the United Nations.--The superpowers and United Nations peace and security operations.--The superpowers and United Nations economic and social operations.--Conclusions.

Forecasts a real test of the sincerity of the American advocacy of the United Nations. Until recently both the United States and the Soviet Union exploited this international body to promote

their own mutually opposing foreign policies (Stoessinger presents case studies illustrating this assertion). In this rivalry the United States was generally more successful, for it involved the United Nations in activities that not only served American interests but coincided with the interests of the majority of members of the General Assembly. The proliferation of new members in the General Assembly in more recent years, especially Third World states, whose interests do not often coincide with American policy, is eroding the manipulatory and coincidental influence the United States has enjoyed and will soon test U.S. loyalty to that body. The United Nations, however, has grown in vigor because of the superpower conflict, for "in today's world, the price of relevance for the United Nations is conflict."

1819

U.S. Dept. of State. Office of Media Services. UNITED NATIONS. [Washington, For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970] 48 p. illus. (Issues in United States foreign policy, v. 5) JX1977.U5123

Dept. of State publication 8553. International organization and conference series 93.

Summarizes current information about such U.N. activities as peacekeeping operations and the promotion of social and economic development in developing countries and of human and national rights throughout the world. The issues of Chinese membership and U.S. policy toward the United Nations are presented, along with a review of the organization's structure and a list of U.N.-related intergovernmental agencies.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

1820

Fleck, James C. PEACE WATCH ON CYPRUS. America, v. 124, June 5, 1971: 587-589. illus. BX801.A5, v. 124

Reviews the past and present status of the conflict between Greeks and Turks on the island of Cyprus and reports on the job of the Canadian forces who are there as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force. Incipient civil war hangs over the island as the Greek majority cries for "Enosis" (union with Greece 500 miles away) while the Turkish minority refuses to pay taxes to the Greek government and threatens to call for invasion by Turkey if its already disproportionate legislative rights are threatened. Fleck also observes the conflict from the viewpoint of the neutral Canadians, who man outposts along the "green line" that divides the potential combatants. Near most U.N. outposts, the Turks and Greeks have each established stations of their own, and the lookouts watch each other in a general atmosphere of distrust and uncertainty. As peacekeepers, not peacemakers, the Canadian troops have no fighting capacity and would immediately withdraw if serious fighting were to break out. As it is, even a minor incident can create a situation, and small confrontations are resolved each day. On the brighter side, the United Nations has felt ready to remove some outposts and reduce the number of peacekeeping troops, actions which have led to some reduction of tensions.

1821

Forsythe, David P. UNRWA, THE PALESTINE REFUGEES, AND WORLD POLITICS: 1949-1969. International organization, v. 25, winter 1971: 26-45. JX1901.I55, v. 25

In addition to "peacekeeping" and "peacemaking," the United Nations carries on a third function of "peaceservicing," intended to supplement the other two. Peaceservicing avoids the policing and diplomatic functions, concentrating instead on ameliorating conditions whose continuation would only exacerbate the hostile situation they originated. In the Middle East the peaceservicing function is carried out by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). UNRWA was created in 1949 because peacemaking was deadlocked. It offered to the refugees direct relief of needs and economic, educational, and financial assistance. In spite of the limited nature of its powers, UNRWA came to be viewed by the Western states as the instrument of a solution of eventual resettlement, to the refugee problem, thus, in effect, an agency for peacemaking. The Arab States, however, have seen UNRWA as having neither a peacemaking nor peaceservicing function, but as filling only the limited role of relief agency pending eventual repatriation. Unfortunately, provision of the refugees' needs while having no control over guerrilla activities in the camps has made UNRWA an indirect supporter of the guerrilla movement. This works not only against peaceservicing, but against peacekeeping and peacemaking as well, for it facilitates violence by those who reject the diplomatic approach to a solution called for by the United Nations. Peaceservicing may not necessarily resolve an issue when peacemaking has proved fruitless.

1822

Gerold, Rainer. [PEACEKEEPING BY THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES (OAS)] Die Sicherung des Friedens durch die Organisation der Amerikanischen Staaten (OAS). Berlin, Duncker und Humblot [1971] 204 p. (Schriften zum Völkerrecht, Heft 14) JX1952.G44

Bibliography: p. [195]-204.

Contents.--Introduction.--Historical development.--pt. 1. Peaceful settlement of disputes.--pt. 2. The right of self-defense.--pt. 3. Collective security--measures for the maintenance of international peace and security.--pt. 4. Peacekeeping in the case of civil wars.--pt. 5. Peacekeeping actions.--pt. 6. Disarmament--the nuclear weapons proscription treaties.--Concluding comments.--Bibliography.

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Examines and contrasts the peacekeeping procedures used by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations and discusses their compatibility. Gerold finds that the two organizations have not only developed divergent sets of rules but that the relationships between the two have also changed. The importance of regional organizations and of the OAS in particular has grown as the effectiveness of the United Nations has declined. That the OAS has generally been more successful in resolving disputes than the United Nations Gerold attributes to U.S. hegemony over the Western Hemisphere and the consequent infrequent clash of superpower interests. Whether peacekeeping efforts will be successful in the future will depend on whether the United States will finally give up its unilateral interventions and refrain from using the OAS as a tool in its power politics.

1823

Perlmutter, Amos. PATRONS IN THE BABYLONIAN CAPTIVITY OF CLIENTS: UNRWA AND WORLD POLITICS. International organization, v. 25, spring 1971: 306-308. JX1901.I55, v. 25

Criticizes the article "UNRWA, the Palestine Refugees, and World Politics: 1949-1969" by David Forsythe (an abstract of which appears elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography) for failing to develop fully the paradox of UNRWA's function as a "peaceservicing" institution working against the parent body's "peacemaking" mission.

1824

Stapleton, Thomas. A NEW ROLE FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY? Australian outlook, v. 25, Apr. 1971: 3-12. DU80.A947, v. 25

Recommends that Australia, much after the manner of Canada, consider making participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations a primary mission of its Armed Forces. Australia's forward defense strategy being no longer applicable to the changed circumstances in Asia, a new role must be found for the Armed Forces. Various other types of mission--for example, civil action and nonmilitary national service--are considered and rejected, and the problems peculiar to the training and deployment of a peacekeeping force are surveyed.

OTHER PROCESSES, PLANS, AND PROPOSALS

1825

Arendt, Hannah [interview] [POLITICS--THEORY--ACTION] Politik--Theorie--Aktion. Politische Studien, v. 22, May/June 1971: 298-314. H35.P66, v. 22

Wide-ranging interview on the U.S. student movement, the Third World concept, socialism and capitalism, and the national state system. Although American students have made great positive contributions, such as broadening civil rights in the South and pointing out the immorality of the Vietnam War, some of their numbers may yet doom the university through their acts of violence. The Third World is just an illusion, Arendt maintains, reflecting the colonialist thought tendencies of the Americans and Europeans. The differences separating the various states of this Third World are far greater than their similarities. Arendt regards socialism as an extension of capitalism, for both systems are based on expropriation. The difference between the two lies in their attitudes toward political freedom. It was not Dubček's liberal economic reforms that caused the Soviet Union to intervene but rather the concomitant emergence of some political freedom. Arendt sees no hope for peace as long as national independence and national sovereignty are equated with uncontrollable and unlimited power. The traditional manner of solving interstate problems has become too costly and awesome, war being now a luxury that only smaller states can afford. As an alternative to the national-state system, Arendt suggests a system of councils operating at local levels and continued up through a parliament of councils.

1826

Blake, Robert R., and Jane S. Mouton. THE FIFTH ACHIEVEMENT. Journal of applied behavioral science, v. 6, Oct./Nov./Dec. 1970: 413-426. H1.J53, v. 6

Recognizing man's four achievements in dealing with differences among men, i.e., science, politics, hierarchy, and law, the authors foresee a fifth achievement by which men will ultimately be able to work out their differences. It will be the establishment of a problem-solving society in which its members can resolve differences through their own insight. Here presented is the Conflict Grid for use in evaluating good or bad ways for ending disputes as a vehicle for creative problem solving in the future and a basis for such a problem-solving society. (Abstract supplied)

1827

Bredow, Wilfried von. [PEACE RESEARCH IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY] Friedensforschung in der BRD. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Jan. 1971: 23-33. D839.B57, v. 16

Ascribes the popularity of peace research to the deeply felt desire of all nations to achieve more security than is possible from a balance of terror purchased by tremendous armaments expenditures. Bredow defines peace research on the basis of the writings of Karl Kaiser and suggests a research program following that proposed by the Oslo International Peace Research Institute. His enumeration of personalities and publications emphasizes the Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens-und Konfliktforschung, to which Kaiser and Dieter Senghaas belong, and distinguishes between "realists" and "Utopians," observing that while there are a few

more "realist" peace researchers, the Utopians seem to publish more. Germany has a profound obligation to concern itself with peace. "It is not only the duty but the right of the people in whose name the two most destructive world wars were unleashed."

1828
Bronowski, Jacob. THE DISESTABLISHMENT OF SCIENCE. Encounter, v. 37, July 1971: 9-16.
AP4.E44, v. 37

The scientist who is lured into the development of bombs and biological weapons by the promise of government funds is forced to choose between two incompatibles, "the morality of science, and the morality of national and government power." Scientists who genuinely support government policy should actively embrace the government and be employed by it. To retain their integrity those who opt for the morality of science must sever their work from the government and unite with the scientific community to raise an "incorruptible standard for public morality." However, the support needs of many researchers are too great to be met privately. For them the government should supply a large, single, independent grant administered by scientists for scientists. A collection of scientists thus "disestablished" could become a source of guidance for the community at large. Eventually an international fund, managed by scientists and free from any control by government, should be established. As nationalism recedes throughout the world, internationalism, inspired and directed by the creativity and skill of the scientific community, would take its place.

1829
Brown, Robert McAfee. NONVIOLENCE IN A VIOLENT WORLD. Presbyterian life, v. 24, June 1, 1971: 16-17, 26-28. BX8901.B57, v. 24

Many radicals have contended that the covert violence in society--hunger, poverty, exploitation, and injustice--justifies the use of overt violence to bring about change. Should that also be the Christian stance with respect to the tactics for bringing about needed social change? Certainly Christian history is full of examples of justified violence. From a practical point of view, however, the question is whether violent acts will actually bring about needed change or whether they will only invite repression from a powerful status quo. One should also consider the effects of violence on those who employ it, "for the ugly grip violence gets on people can increasingly undermine the most idealistic means to which it is being dedicated." While nonviolence is a complex and difficult tactic to employ for social change, it is the strategy with which the church must increasingly concern itself. Churchmen may take up a new vocation of actively seeking change through nonviolent means and revolutionary love. They would then stand ready to absorb rather than to inflict the suffering that is the price of change.

1830
Doob, Leonard W. THE IMPACT OF THE FERMEDA WORKSHOP ON THE CONFLICTS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. International journal of group tensions, v. 1, Jan./Mar. 1971: 91-101. N&CPR

Reports the results of a followup study of a workshop "to determine whether the use of a modified form of sensitivity training and of other social-psychological devices in an isolated setting over a two-week period could clarify the emotional issues involved in two serious border disputes among three African countries and would thereby facilitate progress toward a solution." The workshop produced no solutions to the border disputes, but ideas were exchanged and friendships formed that one day might yield a significant harvest. Furthermore, it is now possible to "begin to delineate the parameters of such nongovernmental, social-science-oriented interventions which seek solutions to international conflicts," and to establish guidelines for future workshops.

1831
Eckhardt, William. SYMBIOSIS BETWEEN PEACE RESEARCH AND PEACE ACTION. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1971: 67-70.
AS9.J6, 1971
Includes bibliographical references.
"Paper presented at the Workshop for Training in Nonviolent Social Change, Haverford College, September 1970."

The efforts of peace researchers and peace activists are complementary, and the two groups have common characteristics and backgrounds. Those engaged in research often find evidence that supports the contentions of the activists. For example several recent studies have concluded that the "one principal obstacle to world peace today is the military-industrial complex at the socio-economic-political level." Activists have been making the same assertion for years, which suggests that some of their current arguments might provide fruitful hypotheses for future research. Research can probe the power structure that radical activity exposes, and it can study broader implications of the continuum between violence and nonviolence. Researchers should also explore the concepts of alienation and liberation, which are very real for the poor, blacks, women, students, and others seeking useful change. Peace research should not be exclusively scientific but should also have a humanistic bent, since true peace depends on a deep respect for human values. Eventually peace research must leave the area of analysis and move into development of strategies for achieving peaceful world government.

1832
Iversen, Claus. FREEDOM AND CIVILIZATION, A WESTERN PERSPECTIVE. Journal of peace research, no. 1, 1971: 37-54. AS9.J6, 1971
Notes: p. 52-54.

This paper stems from the realization that all major world problems today--wars, exploitation,

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hunger--are results of man's actions. To free himself from these plagues, man has to see these actions as a result of conditioned behavior on either the species level or the individual level, to learn how to change himself towards a more loving person, and how to make his environment more stimulating from the point of view of love, rather than competition and war. The paper's three sections attack these problems from a sociological point of view. In the first section we develop an evolutionary perspective drawing on the work of Bronislaw Malinowsky and Wilhelm Reich. The second section is a report on an internation-simulation experiment. It is shown that behavioral differences between American and Norwegian students represent serious obstacles to the study and realization of peace. In the last section we discuss some problems encountered by a group of educators who wished to break down their internal social rank-order and move towards greater freedom and deeper loving relations. (Abstract supplied)

1833

Kneutgen, Johannes. [MAN, A BELLIGERENT ANIMAL] Der Mensch, ein kriegerisches Tier. Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz, Kohlhammer [1970] 133 p. (Urban-Taschenbücher, Bd. 806. Reihe 80)
BF575.A3K57
Bibliography: p. 122-123.

Contents.--The unsolved problem.--War among animals--war among primitive peoples.--Play and seriousness.--"Bad" social play.--Structuring of behavior.--Experiencing war.--Changes in war.--Recommendations for peace research.--Bibliography.--Notes.

Contends that aggressiveness is a characteristic of the individual, not of the group, and that aggressive conduct is the consequence not of a given frustration but rather of dammed-up aggressiveness. The problem is more acute in prosperous and consumer-oriented societies than in less affluent societies, where aggressiveness is spent in the socially accepted struggle with the environment. On the basis of successful clinical studies in reducing sexual aggressiveness, Kneutgen recommends as a serious subject of peace research the use of medicine, surgery, and pharmacology to modify highly aggressive behavior.

1834

Nardin, Terry. THEORIES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. [Clarkson, Ont., Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1971] 98 p. (Peace research reviews, v. 4, no. 2) JX1901.P395, v. 4
Bibliography: p. 88-93.

Aims to "differentiate, to clarify, and to criticize a number of basic points of view which permeate contemporary discussions of violent conflict and its management in the internal politics of the nation state." Nardin concludes that a state can be a mediator and peacekeeper in domestic conflicts as well as a participant in such conflicts.

1835

Platt, John. SCIENCE FOR SURVIVAL. Center magazine, v. 4, Mar./Apr. 1971: 63-66. illus.
N&CPR

In the next decade nuclear escalation, famine, and racial crises may reach the point of explosion unless "the full intelligence of our society" is applied toward solving these problems. Full-time interdisciplinary teams and new organizations devoted to crisis studies will be needed to combat potential crises that could destroy the world. These new task forces should begin directing their energies toward formulation of social inventions in such fields as peacekeeping mechanisms and feedback stabilization, biotechnology, game theory, and psychological and social theories. There has been science for war, nature, and intellectual pleasure. Today, world survival depends on the development and progress of the science of survival.

1836

Rabinowitch, Eugene. THE MOUNTING TIDE OF UNREASON. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, May 1971: 4-9. illus. TK9145.A84, v. 27

Man's chief distinction is his capacity for abstract thought, of which science is the supreme manifestation. The technical triumphs of World War II seemed at the time to prove the superiority of the rational-scientific mind and brought about a great upsurge of admiration for science and technology. Today, however, a new revolt against science and reason is in the making. It is clear that new ethical norms are needed to fit man for life in the new world created by modern science. Violence, which once served an evolutionary need, has lost all claim to rationality, and the same may be said of nationalism. But it is a mistake to rely on man's gentler emotions to control his violent passions. Rather the passions must be made to submit to reason; for in the final analysis the only cure for science is more science. The challenge at this stage is to effect a safe transition from a prescientific to a scientific habitat. In this task, mankind faces a genuine crisis, and "reason alone can make it a crisis of growth, not a convulsion of death."

1837

Wagner, Stanley P. THE END OF REVOLUTION: A NEW ASSESSMENT OF TODAY'S REBELLIONS. South Brunswick, A. S. Barnes [c1970] 206 p.
HT151.W29
Bibliography: p. 199-203.

Predicts that current tension and pressure for change will not continue to accelerate but will level off. The human tendency to seek order, comfort, and certainty will reassert itself and end the revolution. The evolving "urban-science civilization" will provide maintenance and stability for its population. Wagner envisions a world society organized as one great system where each individual's actions and well-being are of concern to the rest of the system.

IV. GENERAL ANALYSES OF, AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES TO, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1838

Forndran, Erhard. [PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT; THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT FOR DISARMAMENT AND COOPERATIVE CONTROL OF ARMAMENT, 1962-1968] Probleme der internationalen Abrüstung; die internationalen Bemühungen um Abrüstung und kooperative Rüstungssteuerung 1962-1968. Mit einer Einführung von Ulrich Scheuner. Frankfurt/M., A. Metzner, 1970. xxviii, 450 p. (Rüstungsbeschränkung und Sicherheit, Bd. 8) JX1974.R68, Bd. 8

Contents.--Arms limitation and nondisarmament measures as elements of disarmament policy, by Ulrich Scheuner.--Preliminary situation and discussion of new disarmament proposals (January-November 1962).--Concentration of international disarmament efforts on the test ban treaty (November 1962-August 1963).--The search for areas of common interest (August 1963-December 1964).--Further search for areas of common interest and preliminary proposals for nonproliferation of atomic weapons (December 1964-December 1965).--Halt in international efforts for a nonproliferation treaty (January-December 1966).--The nonproliferation treaty (January 1967-July 1968).--Notes.--List of sources.--Subject and person index.

Narrative history of the international campaign for disarmament and arms control beginning with the 18-power Geneva Conference of 1962 and including the discussions in and out of the United Nations, culminating in the signature of the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968. Scheuner's introduction points out that the solution of the problems of arms control and disarmament will significantly influence the whole structure of the world community.

1839

Lepper, Mary M. FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION; A CASE STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963. Columbus, Ohio, C. E. Merrill Pub. Co. [1971] 191 p. (Merrill political science series)
JX1974.7.L35

"Treaty banning nuclear weapons test in atmosphere, in outer space, and under water."; p. 139-141.
Bibliography: p. 160-183.

Examines the development of the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty, focusing on the process of engineering support for the policy within the United States. Lepper studies the amount of public awareness and apathy with respect to nuclear testing, the changes in public attitudes toward the treaty that took place between late 1962 and the summer of 1963, and the effects these changes had on policy formulation. She explores the role played by interest groups in the development of foreign policy and the activities undertaken by the President and his staff to win the support of Congress and the people for the treaty. The activities of Senate committees and the functions of public hearings in the policy formulation process are also investigated. The author concludes that the activities of the executive and legislative branches were organized to gain maximum public support for the treaty and that pressure groups were allowed to enter into the foreign policy planning process at a high level.

1840

Lomas, Charles W., and Michael Taylor, comps. THE RHETORIC OF THE BRITISH PEACE MOVEMENT. [New York, Random House, 1971] 115 p. (Issues and spokesmen series, SSP 15)
JX1963.L63

Orations and remarks by prominent British figures on the subject of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, reprinted so that students of speech and public address can study them for technique and logic. Students also meet the impassioned views of the speakers, who argued for nuclear disarmament even to the point of urging complete unilateral removal of Britain's then-current nuclear stockpile.

1841

Rhyne, Charles S. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL. In his International law; the substance, processes, procedures and institutions for world peace with justice. Washington, CLB Publishers, 1971. 595-609. UX3160.R38I5

Synopsizes conferences and agreements on disarmament, arms control, and related subjects, ranging from The Hague Conference of 1899 up to and including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the seabed arms control treaty, within the assumption that an adequate legal system can replace the security provided by arms.

GENERAL ANALYSES

1842

Barnaby, Frank. PROPHET OF A DARKLING WORLD. New scientist, v. 50, May 6, 1971: 334-336.
Q1.N52, v. 50

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Summarizes an interview with Lord Chalfont, focusing on his opinions of efforts to curtail the arms race. Chalfont believes that "military technology is out of control and that the built-in race between multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles and anti-ballistic missiles . . . will soon lead the superpowers to an automated system of nuclear retaliation which is the most unstable and dangerous situation." Despite the arms control agreements of the past decade and the genuine desires and intentions of the superpowers, an even more dangerous spiral in the arms race can be expected in view of internal political pressures against agreements and in view of Communist China's growing nuclear potential. Chalfont asserts that general and complete disarmament can be achieved only in a stable and orderly world society. He argues that a European nuclear deterrent would lack credibility, would be extremely expensive, and would hinder any real chance of détente.

1843
Clemens, Walter C. SHIFTS IN SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POSTURE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, July 1971: 28-36. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Documents a shift in Soviet arms control policy from efforts in the late 1950's and early 1960's "aimed squarely at preventing or limiting the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe, at establishing observation posts to inhibit planning for surprise attack, and at the other problems relating to the confrontation between the two armed camps in Europe" to support for "strategic arms limitations, both to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and to curb the superpower arms race." Clemens offers a point-by-point comparison of the changing Soviet arms control priorities as reflected in government memoranda between January 1964 and July 1968 and in other official documents. Behind this shift in policy lies the confidence inspired by nuclear parity with the United States and the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

1844
Dortmund. Sozialakademie. [DÉTENTE AND DISARMAMENT] Entspannung und Abrüstung. Hrsg. von Herbert Scholz. Berlin, Duncker und Humblot [1970] 286 p.
JX1963.D684

Contents.--Foreword, by Herbert Scholz.--pt. 1. Papers submitted: Détente and disarmament as contributions of the German Federal Republic to the policy of peace, by Gerhard Jahn. Proscription and renunciation of force, by Swidbert Schnippenkötter. The state of international disarmament negotiations; the position of the representative of a small, neutral country, by Axel Edelstam. Prerequisites for détente in Europe; concrete suggestions, by Johan Galtung. Basic features of a European security system, by Eberhard Menzel. Political and social problems of the American armament industry, by Friedrich Baerwald. Mass media and détente; a contribution to the study of American society in the process of transformation, by Robert Rie. Elements of education for peace, by Heinz-Joachim Heydorn. Open and closed peace systems; peace is life amid conflicts, by Friedrich Heer. The power triangle Washington/Moscow/Peking--today, by Klaus Mehnert.--pt. 2. Papers discussed among their authors.--pt. 3. Summary of the conclusions of the session, by Herbert Scholz.

Contains 10 papers submitted to the International Session of the Dortmund Social Academy, a discussion among their authors, and a distillation of the major theses. The session concluded that disarmament and the relaxation of tensions are the paramount problems confronting the world. True peace, not just the absence of war, postulates an educative reshaping of social attitudes and conditions and the initiation of some first steps toward disarmament, along with the dismantling of friend-foe relationships. An essential factor in disarmament efforts is the perception by all parties of the consequences of general nuclear war and of the savings in human resources and economic goods associated with disarmament. The establishment of a security system is primarily a political decision, not a military one; but the prevention of conflicts, in view of their frightful consequences, still seems preferable to the usual manner of solving these conflicts. The renunciation of force contained in the United Nations Charter is not a sufficient guarantee of security. While the superpowers agree that total disarmament is a distant utopian goal, they now face the dilemma that the balance created by the mutual deterrence of nuclear arms functions only as long as one nation believes its opponent possesses and will use those arms. The result is a state of nonwar that tends to solidify the status quo, perpetuate the unnatural division of Europe, and heighten tensions. As long as there is no secure basis for peace, NATO alone guarantees the protection of Western Europe. If a comprehensive program for peace and disarmament cannot be developed, a step-by-step approach is advisable. In this connection, the dissociative method of peacekeeping should be discarded in favor of the associative approach, whereby symmetrical interdependence is promoted through a multiplicity of international contacts and memberships in multinational organizations. Although more people feel that disarmament can be attained through international agreement, global peace can be truly realized only when the social and economic imbalance between the industrial states and the developing countries has been alined. New means must be found to resolve conflicts, for technology has robbed war of the possibility of victory.

1845
Huck, Susan L. M. PEACE AS WAR: DICTATOR GAMES THE ESTABLISHMENT PLAYS. American opinion, v. 14, May 1971: 21-23, 25-27, 29, 31-34.
AP2.04732, v. 14

Charges that members of the Council on Foreign Relations and others form a group of "Insiders,"

who seek to manipulate and control the populace. They "run both ends of the war-peace thing," using both defense and disarmament toward their goal of imposing collectivist planning and control on America. Names are named, and some references are cited.

1846
International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research. SIPRI YEARBOOK OF WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT: 1969/70. New York, Humanities Press [1971] 540 p. illus.
UA10.I55 1970

A synoptic view of recent trends and developments in world military expenditures, the arms race, strategic weapons limitation, the militarization of the deep ocean, and the chemical and biological weapons debate. Part one is a narrative account of these developments, part two is a special article on the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and part three gives related reference material. Summaries in French, German, Russian, and Spanish are included.

1847
Kalshoven, Frits. HUMAN RIGHTS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, AND REPRISALS. International review of the Red Cross, v. 11, Apr. 1971: 183-192.
HV560.I56, v. 11
"Delivered at the International Congress on Humanitarian Law in San Remo" September 1970.

The right of a belligerent to conduct reprisals against an enemy's populace in punishment of the enemy's violation of the international laws of war has been ambiguous historically. While the use of reprisals as sanctions can be justified, exercise of this option calls into question the human rights of the individuals bearing the actual effects of the retaliation. They are likely to be innocent of the specific illegality being punished. Further, the belligerent retaliating is resuming the attribute of unlimited sovereignty, a condition the laws of war were formulated to restrict. Recognition of these objections has led to the prohibition of some, but not all, kinds of retaliatory acts. The difficulty in securing their total abolition stems in great part from the principle of reciprocity. National reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol amount to a pledge not to use chemical and biological weapons first, freeing a belligerent from any restrictions on their use when an opponent introduces these agents into their conflict. "Similar difficulties will attend any attempt at achieving a prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons not restricted by a condition of reciprocity." The question of whether a belligerent has the right in carrying out a reprisal under the reciprocity principle to use once-prohibited weapons in a manner the rules of war deny to nonprohibited weapons (that is, against an enemy's civilian populace) must be answered in the negative. The doubtful efficacy of nuclear retaliation against civilians, measured against this action's gross and obvious inhumanity, cannot justify such a sanction as a reprisal. The uncertainty of this line of argument points to the real need for definitive clarification of the right of reprisal in international law, however. The right of reprisal in cases of civil war and unarmed domestic strife (most notably, political kidnappings) is also in need of definition.

1848
Klein, Peter. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT. German foreign policy, v. 9, no. 6, 1970: 475-486. D261.4.0352, v. 9

Outlines the areas of activity in which the United Nations has made positive contributions to arms limitation and disarmament. Klein notes as an example of the organization's respect for realities its abstention from interference in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. In contrasting East and West German disarmament policies, Klein charges West Germany with having reservations about the basic task of the United Nations, the maintenance of peace. He concludes that in the 1970's, when the balance of power shifts in favor of socialism, the United Nations must consolidate and extend the legal obligations for disarmament, vigorously combat the imperialist policy of war and violence, proclaim the social necessity of disarmament, and implement the latest disarmament resolutions of the General Assembly. He is confident that the United Nations can and will execute its duty "to the same degree as the anti-imperialist forces unite."

1849
N., J. [ARMS AND DISARMAMENT 1969-1970] Armements et désarmement 1969-1970. Revue de défense nationale, v. 27, Feb. 1971: 298-310. illus.
D410.R45, v. 27

Reviews the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament 1969-1970 (cited elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography) and examines worldwide military expenditures, arms shipments to developing countries, chemical and biological warfare, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and European security, and the demilitarization and denuclearization of the seabed. The author concludes that the Yearbook has become a valid working tool for those charged with maintaining world peace.

1850
Puchala, Donald J. ARMS AND DISARMAMENT IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. In his International politics today. New York, Dodd, Mead, 1971. p. 272-298. JX1395.P83

Summarizes the theory of nuclear deterrence and traces the history of its development. Puchala discusses the major controversies in strategic thinking, outlines the history of postwar arms control and disarmament efforts, deals with prospective arms control and disarmament issues in

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light of evolving technology, and presents arguments in the debate over the worth of arms control and disarmament. The book as a whole is intended primarily as an intermediate to graduate-level text.

1851
Ruggieri, Nicholas. ARMS CONTROL AND THE MILITARY MAN. Foreign service journal, v. 48, Feb. 1971: 18-19, 54. illus. JX1.A53, v. 48
An interview with Lt. Gen. John J. Davis.

Probes a military man's thoughts on arms control and disarmament. General Davis, in his response, rejects his former belief that arms control and the military are incompatible. Closer analysis shows that the goals of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of Defense are basically the same--"to enhance our national security and that of our allies." He also discusses some of the functions of the Agency's Weapons Control and Evaluation Bureau, which currently is involved in problems of developing adequate inspection and verification procedures. General Davis predicts that arms control progress will be slow, since agreements must benefit all parties involved.

1852
Ruggieri, Nicholas. THE MAN WHO MADE ARMS CONTROL "RESPECTABLE." Foreign service journal, v. 48, Feb. 1971: 15-17. illus.
JX1.A53, v. 48
An interview with William C. Foster, former head, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Summarizes the background of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the treaties and agreements it has negotiated. In response to questioning Foster pointed out that the United States has taken the "bits and pieces" approach to disarmament negotiations. Currently he is optimistic about the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and he believes that the two superpowers must achieve understanding about nuclear matters before multilateral negotiations will be meaningful. Foster speaks favorably of his dealings with the Russians, who, he feels, have become friendlier through the years. He believes that the Soviets realistically want arms control even though it might appear to raise ideological conflicts. The burden of possessing the superhuman power of nuclear armaments calls for the highest moral leadership.

1853
Senghaas, Dieter, comp. [ON THE PATHOLOGY OF THE ARMAMENT RACE; ARTICLES ON PEACE AND CONFLICT RESEARCH] Zur Pathologie des Rüstungswettlaufs; Beiträge zur Friedens- und Konfliktforschung. Freiburg im Breisgau, Rombach [1970] 396 p. (Sozialwissenschaft in Theorie und Praxis, Bd. 12)
UA11.S416
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by Dieter Senghaas.--pt. 1. War and peace today: On the political theory of non-peace, by Dieter Senghaas.--pt. 2. On the analysis and criticism of the policy of intimidation: Four paradoxes of nuclear strategy, by Hans J. Morgenthau. The future of the strategic armament race; options for the seventies, by George W. Rathjens. Nuclear weapons and the international power balance, by Karl W. Deutsch.--pt. 3. On the criticism of strategic research: The rationality of deterrence and ethical choice, by Philip Green. Chicken à la Kahn, by Anatol Rapoport.--pt. 4. On the psychology of the cold war: Change of attitudes and foreign policy in the cold war era, by Milton Rosenberg.--pt. 5. On the criticism of the political economy of the armament complex: Armament outlays 1966/67; a compilation of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The armament complex, social pluralism and peace, by Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden.--pt. 6. On the current American discussion on the U.S. armament complex: The new American militarism, by David M. Shoup. The armament society and the peace economy; problems of transformation, by John G. Gurley.

Articles, primarily by American scholars, on various aspects of the arms race. Senghaas argues in his introduction that the time is ripe for critical research on the military-industrial complex and the armaments race and their effect on the social and economic fabric of the United States, while admitting there are no signs that any basic changes will occur in the global strategy of the two superpowers in the coming years. What is important, however, is that discussion of the subject has become respectable and is no longer associated with the radical left. Senghaas restricts his presentation and the essays he has selected to the United States, acknowledging that the phenomena and their implications are equally valid in the Soviet Union.

1854
Studien zur Friedensforschung. [BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PEACE RESEARCH] Bibliographie zur Friedensforschung. Stuttgart, Ernst Klett [1970] 187 p. (Studien zur Friedensforschung, 6)
JX1952.S88, no. 6

Contents.--Introduction, by Gerta Scharffenorth. --On the general problem of peace.--Peace and conflict research, by Dieter and Eva Senghaas.--Theory of international relations, by Dieter Senghaas. --Strategy research and disarmament discussion, by Dieter Senghaas.--International law and peace, international organization, by Paulus A. Hausmann.--Development and peace, by Klaus Lefringhausen.--Theory of violence, nonviolence, and civilian defense, by Helge Siemers and Gerta Scharffenorth.--Psychology of war and peace, by Egbert Jahn.--Peace activities, by Hannelies Schulte.--Contributions from theology and church to the problem of peace, by Hans Jürgen Wiegand, Wolfgang Huber, and Jörg Bopp.--Scientific planning and futurology research, by Hans Bosse.

Lists 54 peace institutes, 82 serials dealing with peace research or containing articles on the problem of peace, 70 bibliographies and bibliographic aids, and 2,141 unannotated bibliographic entries arranged by subject and corresponding to the chapter headings. The introduction includes a discussion by Scharffenorth on the tasks and problems of peace research; prefaces by the authors introduce their respective chapters. The entries in the chapter on strategy research and disarmament discussion cover literature in the fields of nuclear deterrence, biological and chemical weapons, and disarmament.

1855
U.S. President (1968- Nixon). TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF ACDA TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Apr. 19, 1971: 534-536.
JX232.A33, v. 64

A letter dated March 15, 1971, transmitting to the U.S. Congress the 10th Annual Report of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (cited as item no. 1352 in vol. 7, no. 3 of this bibliography), together with the introductory chapter from the report. In his letter the President stresses that as "arms control presents both a necessary and a promising road towards a stable, secure world," it is an essential ingredient in his program to attain "a generation of peace." He notes that "for the first time, a realistic dialogue is taking place between the Soviet Union and [the United States] about the management of . . . strategic relations" and expresses the hope that "the constructive nature of the exchange will continue in Phase IV of SALT, which resumes in Vienna in March" 1971. He cites the treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the seabed as one of the major achievements of 1970 and affirms that his administration "is dedicated to finding better, safer, and cheaper alternatives for insuring [U.S.] security than the expedient of competition in weaponry."

1856
Venezia, Jean C. [NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] Stratégie nucléaire et relations internationales. Paris, A. Colin [1971] 175 p. (Collection U; série "Relations et institutions internationales") UA11.V45
Bibliography: p. 171-172.

Examines postwar international relations within the context of Soviet and American nuclear strategies, with particular reference to the economic and strategic causes of the superpower détente and the crises involving Franco-American and German-American relations. Venezia traces the growth of the nuclear duopoly, the efforts to maintain it, and aspects of the cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. He discusses the strained relations between America and its allies brought on by such factors as the independent French nuclear force, the multilateral nuclear force project, and Great Britain's Atlantic nuclear force concept. An appendix gives the text of relevant arms control treaties, including the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and the nuclear test ban treaty.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

1857
Kelly, Frank K. IS ANYBODY READY FOR PEACE? [editorial] Saturday review, v. 54, Aug. 7, 1971: 16, 30. Z1219.S25, v. 54

Faint signals transmitted by President Nixon, Pope Paul, and the ping-pong players hint that international peace might someday be a genuine challenge. It is time then to give serious thought to the problems that might be created, for some critics strongly doubt that a permanent peace is possible. From one point of view, guilty man has not yet suffered enough for his sins; from another, war is a motivating force, so peace would mean boredom and lethargy. Planning and reorganization could handle problems such as how to dispose of security forces and their planes, ships, missiles and nerve gases and replace them with a small international force big enough only to enforce international law. An international constitution would draw the framework for such law as well as for an international governing body. A Day for Listening, an idea suggested some years ago by Robert M. Hutchins and others, should be revived to encourage discussion and examination of peace models and plans for world government.

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V. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND LIMITED MEASURES

REDUCTION OF THE RISK OF WAR (COMMAND AND CONTROL OF WEAPONS, ESCALATION, ACCIDENTAL WAR, NEGOTIATION, DISENGAGEMENT, NEUTRALIZATION)

1858
Arnett, Peter. HOW WILL THE VIETNAM WAR END? War/peace report, v. 11, June/July 1971: 3-5. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

Everyone--diplomats, soldiers, academics, politicians, newsmen--must share blame for U.S. mistakes in Vietnam. From the first, Communist policy has evolved in response to American policy. U.S. motives began as idealistic, but setbacks seemed to threaten national honor, and the years of direct American involvement were treated as a solo fight against North Vietnam. Only after the shift in American policy following the Tet offensive and the onset of withdrawal was the hitherto-ignored South Vietnamese Army seen as having a role to play under Vietnamization. The fall 1971 elections in South Vietnam are unlikely to lead to an accommodation with the Communists, but neither is the Saigon regime, facing a weakened Communist opponent, likely to collapse after American troops leave. Stability is the key, and North Vietnam has the clear advantage against South Vietnam here. The South will at first prove intransigent, but unrest and weariness will eventually (probably in the late 1970's) result in Saigon making an acceptable deal with Hanoi.

1859
Brandt, Willy [interview] WHY U.S. MUST STAY IN EUROPE. U.S. news & world report, v. 70, June 14, 1971: 39-42, 47. illus.
JK1.U65, v. 70

Responses of the West German Chancellor to questions on various aspects of proposals to reduce U.S. forces in Europe--the outlook for an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on mutual and balanced troop reductions, the nature of the contribution made to European security by the U.S. presence, the significance of Berlin, the shifting of a larger share of the defense burden from American to West European shoulders, Western Europe's global role, monetary problems, the danger of American isolationism, progress in the four-power talks in Berlin, the Moscow and Warsaw treaties and West German relations with other East European capitals, the strength of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, and recent trends in U.S. relations with Communist China. Brandt argues that "it would not make sense to start a unilateral weakening of the U.S. presence--when there may, for the first time, be a serious chance to enter into negotiations about a mutual reduction of East-West forces in Europe."

1860
Caradon, Hugh M. F., baron. A ROAD FROM WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST. War/peace report, v. 11, June/July 1971: 10-11. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

Suggests that "the time has come for a peace conference" on the Middle East and proposes that it be called by a resolution of the U.N. Security Council, initiated by the nonpermanent members and utilizing the 1967 Security Council resolution as a basis for negotiations. Lord Caradon feels the conference should be held in Geneva under the chairmanship of the General Assembly president, with Israel, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Syria and a Palestinian delegation participating. He cautions that reopening the Suez Canal might stymie an eventual peace settlement.

1861
Galloway, John. THE GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION. Rutherford [N.J.] Fairleigh Dickinson University Press [1970] 578 p.
DS557.A63G37
Bibliography: p. 567-568.

Contents.--Background.--The Gulf of Tonkin, July 30-August 5, 1964.--A President responds.--Aftermath.--Was the resolution necessary?--Appendices.

A history of the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the resolution subsequently passed by Congress, together with transcripts of congressional hearings and other relevant documents. Galloway questions the official version of the incident.

1862
Griffith, William E., and Walt W. Rostow. EAST-WEST RELATIONS: IS DÉTENTE POSSIBLE? Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research [c1969] 210 p. (Rational debate seminars)
D843.G77
Includes bibliographical references.

Lectures, rebuttals, and discussion dealing with the possibilities of achieving some safe rapprochement with the Communist nations. In a guarded fashion both speakers believe détente pos-

sible though not at all certain. Griffith considers factors that might promote or retard a reduction in tensions. Rostow explores the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Both offer recommendations, predictions, and warnings.

1863
International Symposium on Inevitable War or Initiatives for Peace, Tel Aviv, 1969. TO MAKE WAR OR MAKE PEACE; PROCEEDINGS. Tel Aviv, New Outlook [1969] 285 p. DS119.7.I53 1969
"Reprinted from special issue of New outlook."

A symposium on the Arab-Israeli conflict, focusing on alternatives to present Israeli policies toward the Arabs and Arab States. Most of the participants emphasize that lasting peace is contingent on recognition of the rights of Palestinians and other Arabs.

1864
Kahin, George McT. THE FUTURE OF LAOS. New republic, v. 165, July 24 & 31, 1971: 15-16.
AP2.N624, v. 165

The war in Laos will not end before the fighting in Vietnam and Cambodia. Neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma believes that Chinese support, more than any other, is essential to securing an independent and neutral Laos. China is felt to desire this end to prevent future Vietnamese domination of the area, which is seen to be an objective of the Soviet policy of cancelling out Chinese influence. Souvanna explains that, far from displaying Chinese expansionism toward Thailand, the Chinese road building effort in northern Laos was asked for by his government to provide markets for the section's provinces. This view of the road network, which Souvanna says was authorized in part by rightist General Phoumi Nosavan, is apparently that of the Pathet Lao. For effective neutralization the United States, the Soviet Union, and China will all have to be guarantors, Souvanna believes, adding that surrounding countries need not be neutral to ensure Laos. The International Control Commission, he feels, will have to be strengthened, with an enlarged membership of five capable of acting by majority vote. Souvanna Phouma thinks that settlement of the Taiwan question is essential for meaningful Sino-American cooperation in the neutralization of his country.

1865
Luchsinger, Fred. [THE BURNING ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS] Brennpunkt der internationalen Politik. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 137, Apr. 1971: 224-226, 229-231.
U3.A43, v. 137

Words and concepts that have little absolute or generally accepted meaning are abused in the practice of international relations. Such terms as "security" or "détente" more accurately reflect wishful thinking, the fashion in words, and the psychological tricks of public relations than the realities of international life. The steps taken toward partial arms control and disarmament, acclaimed on their inception, have not changed the overall picture. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are not a limitation on arms but a contract for the future. The complexity of these negotiations is enhanced by the certainty of the appearance in the immediate future of new weapons to upset the balance. While the talks go on, the Soviets are busy attaining parity. Indeed, perhaps they talk merely to divert attention from that fact. Although negotiations cannot provide peace, there is no purpose to be served by creating a third nuclear force, as De Gaulle wished, or by convoking a European security conference. The Brezhnev doctrine makes it clear that the Soviet Union intends only to seek unilateral concessions. Fear of China will more probably induce the Soviet Union to harden its position toward the West than to soften it. If the situation in Asia is vague, it is clear in the Middle East that both Great Powers must continue the confrontation. Not all political conflicts must end in war, but it is also wrong to assume that the horrors of war will frighten men into peace.

1866
[READILY WILLING TO WITHDRAW; BONN FEARS WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW MIGHT AGREE AT BERLIN'S EXPENSE] Durchaus abzugswillig; Bonn fürchtet, Washington und Moskau könnten sich auf Kosten Berlins einigen. Spiegel, v. 25, May 24, 1971: 28.
AP30.S66, v. 25

The apparent American willingness to withdraw from the continent and the Soviet readiness to drop its insistence on a European security conference as a precondition for discussion of mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) have caused concern in Bonn that Washington and Moscow might reach détente at the expense of Berlin. The foreign minister of the German Federal Republic has therefore endeavored to convince his NATO colleagues that an MBFR accord should not precede the successful conclusion of the Berlin negotiations.

1867
Ridgway, Matthew B. INDOCHINA: DISENGAGING. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 583-592.
D410.F6, v. 49

We are told by the Government that, on the one hand, the end of the war in Vietnam is coming, but that, on the other hand, U.S. forces will be kept in South Vietnam until our prisoners are freed and the government there has a good chance to stand by itself. Yet as long as there are American forces in South Vietnam, serving in any capacity to aid the present government, they will come under attack, and the war will continue. A review of the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam shows that its stated objectives have shrunk from the grandiloquent generalizations first offered to the more limited goals which keep American forces there. However, U.S. policymakers apparently

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still believe that the Communists can be forced to give in. Vietnamization, in terms of preserving a pro-American government, now seems to be well advanced, and adroit diplomacy should be able to negotiate the release of American prisoners, with total withdrawal of all military personnel (except Embassy guards) following. America's major foreign policies should be advanced to serve only its essential national interests. Military policy should be in the service of these political goals. The Nation's Vietnam policy has violated these two axioms. The decisions of present U.S. leaders should be accepted for the next few months, and that will give the South Vietnamese Armed Forces all the time they really need to establish themselves. Then, other developments notwithstanding, America should begin a complete phaseout of its forces in Vietnam.

1868

Riekhoff, Harald von. [EUROPEAN SECURITY PROSPECTS] Europäische Sicherheitsperspektiven. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 51, June 1971: 181-190.
AP32.S47, v. 51

The military and political problems obstructing the achievement of peace and security in Europe are not continental but global, and should be approached multilaterally. The NATO and Warsaw Pact blocs are suitable organs to make these approaches, for they have a broad geographic basis and their own built-in consultation processes. A constructive dialog between these two blocs need not be an alternative to a European security conference; it could complement it. A continuing conference, embracing alined and neutral states alike, could iron out technical difficulties arising from agreements elaborated by the two blocs and then ratify them, thus legitimizing and broadening their effectiveness. The most significant measure conducive to securing peace in Europe would be an accord on mutual balanced force reduction, the initiative for which would have to come from one of the two blocs. This measure would involve such problems as the standards to be used in arriving at a balance, Soviet lack of interest as long as it appears probable that the United States may unilaterally disengage some of its forces from Europe, greater Soviet emphasis on conventional land forces in Europe as a deterrent, choosing the geographic areas to be affected, the question of "foreign" troops, and the overriding necessity of not jeopardizing the current equilibrium. The prospects of solving these problems are dim, inasmuch as even the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Berlin negotiations now in progress are not certain of any success. For long-term goals, however, concrete military measures for troop reduction and détente must be taken through a dialog between the two blocs. In this reference, a meeting of NATO and the Warsaw Pact within the framework of a security conference might be useful, provided that the structure for such talks would not abrogate the independence of the two systems nor impair their deterrent function.

1869

Steinhaus, Kurt. [THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF INDOCHINA] Der Befreiungskampf der Völker Indochinas in seiner gegenwärtigen Etappe. Marxistische Blätter, v. 8, Nov./Dec. 1970: 33-39.
HX6.M32, v. 8

The tremendous losses suffered by the United States and its puppets at the hands of indigenous liberation forces in Vietnam only goaded the imperialists into widening the war. Failing to understand the revolutionary process, the Americans sought its mainspring beyond the borders. They have been forced by these losses to abandon their bombing raids on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to take up negotiations at Paris, but they hope to continue the struggle under the newly developed strategy of Vietnamization. This strategy is not really new. It represents an American return to the ground advisory role that they practiced nearly a decade ago and that failed because the Saigon mercenaries were no match for the liberation forces. That failure led to the escalation of the war. The Nixon administration, nonetheless, still stubbornly persists in its attempt to reinstate a neocolonial system in Indochina. Only further defeats and the pressure of international protests will succeed in compelling the U.S. Government to cease its interference in the domestic affairs of the Indochinese peoples.

1870

Walton, Richard E. A PROBLEM-SOLVING WORKSHOP ON BORDER CONFLICTS IN EASTERN AFRICA. Journal of applied behavioral science, v. 6, Oct./Nov./Dec. 1970: 453-489. illus.
H1.J53, v. 6

Six participants each from Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya met on neutral turf and participated in a two-week workshop to search for solutions to the border disputes between Somalia and her two neighbors. The workshop was a social invention based on ideas and techniques generated by the behavioral sciences. This pilot venture, admittedly a mixture of successes and failures, can provide the basis for improvement and extension of the concept. In particular, we can draw implications for the composition of participant groups, duration, location, and goals in organizing future workshops; and for the techniques, groupings, and pacing utilized during the workshop. (Abstract supplied)

1871

Wörner, Manfred. [STRATEGIC BALANCE AND THE ALLIANCE] Das strategische Gleichgewicht und die Allianz. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Apr. 1971: 173-177.
U3.W396, v. 20

Presented to the 8th International Wehrkunde Meeting, Feb. 20-21, 1971.

Reprinted in Congressional Record [daily ed.] 92d Congress, 2d session, v. 117, Mar. 23, 1971.
J11.R52, v. 117

The American search for disengagement and maintenance of the status quo is in unhappy contrast with the dynamic Soviet military and political policies. The proposal for a European security conference demonstrates that the Soviets view the coexistence policy as the continuation of their campaign of aggression by other means. Soviet policy toward Germany is part of this campaign and utilizes the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement to strengthen its hegemony within Eastern Europe. The proposed European security conference should be accepted only when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are satisfactorily concluded, mutual balanced force reductions are underway, and the Soviet Union has demonstrated its willingness to discuss seriously the political causes of European tensions. The build-up of Soviet forces, both missile and naval, beyond the normal demands of national defense shows plainly the offensive nature of Soviet armament. The West should enter disarmament and arms control negotiations only if the possibility of nuclear blackmail is ended and western conventional forces are sufficient to meet nonnuclear attack. Without a satisfactory conclusion to the SALT talks, negotiations over mutual balanced force reductions have little chance of success. While the ultimate outcome of SALT is uncertain, it is clear that the objectives of the superpowers differ widely. The United States wishes to freeze the status quo, and the Soviet Union is using the talks to influence American public opinion in order to gain time to weaken the American second-strike capability. A détente policy is necessary, but it must include an insistence on reciprocity, must strengthen the European components of NATO, and must be based on the NATO concept of a European peace order.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

1872
Cornell, Alexander H. INTERNATIONAL CODEVELOPMENT AND COPRODUCTION OF WEAPONS. Naval War College review, v. 23, Dec. 1970: 64-75.
N&CPR

Because of the prohibitive costs of developing and producing modern weapons, small nations used to purchase their sophisticated weapons from the superpowers or do without. A third alternative, cooperative production and development, is now being realized. Ironically, the joint manufacture of instruments of warfare has created instances of international cooperation and management among NATO allies. NATO, because of its extant structure, has been valuable in these manufacturing efforts, although casual arrangements have sometimes sufficed. Future expansion of cooperative efforts is anticipated.

1873
Einbeck, Eberhard. [MOSCOW'S MILITARY AID TO THE THIRD WORLD] Moskaus Militärhilfe an die Dritte Welt. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, May 1971: 300-313.
D839.A885, v. 22

Through its military aid program to Third World states, the Soviet Union has ensconced itself in a series of strategically advantageous positions in key areas of the world. Top priority has been assigned since the outset to the United Arab Republic and the Mediterranean area. Other areas high on the priority list include those states on either side of the Red Sea outlet to the Indian Ocean, India itself, and Vietnam. The first phase of this arms aid (1955-65) was characterized by a circumspect projection of Soviet influence to states outside of the Eurasian land mass and the cultivation of an arms clientele and cadre. The second phase (1965 to the present), ushered in or attended by the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the Six-Day War, and the Indo-Pakistani hostilities, was characterized by a consolidation of gains and further extension of Soviet military and political influence. Should lines be drawn on a map to connect the locations of Soviet arms customers, the general outline of Soviet global strategy vis-a-vis the West and the Peoples Republic of China would emerge.

1874
Sloutzky, Nokhim M. [THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARMAMENTS TRADE (1919-1938)] La Société des Nations et le contrôle du commerce international des armes de guerre (1919-1938). [Genève] Dotation Carnegie pour la paix internationale, 1969. 155 p. (50 ans de la Société des Nations)
JX1974.S59

On cover: Le contrôle du commerce international des armes de guerre.
Bibliography: p. 151-153.

Analyzes the problems that faced the League of Nations in its efforts to control the international arms trade from 1919 to 1938. Sloutzky examines the activities of several League conventions and conferences in connection with this problem. A bibliography lists the relevant principal documents.

1875
Zwissler, Tilbert. [PROBLEMS OF MILITARY ECONOMICS AND ARMAMENT] Probleme der Wehrwirtschaft und Rüstung. Wehrkunde, v. 20, May 1971: 231-236.
U3.W396, v. 20

Presents six arguments in favor of the German Federal Republic developing its own national armaments industry. Its geographic and political position requires the establishment and continuing support of such an industry. Civilian industry will benefit from the spin-off of weapons development. Moreover, an armaments industry endows a state with a certain degree of political and economic independence. The export of armaments paves the way for the export of civilian goods, and a national armaments industry precludes the expensive purchase of arms from abroad and allows for

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the development of weapons tailored to the peculiarities of national and regional defense. Finally, a state developing and producing weapons is contributing to its own freedom and security.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1876
Barnaby, Frank. INDIA'S NUCLEAR VIEWS. New scientist, v. 49, Feb. 4, 1971: 268-269.
Q1.N52, v. 49

India charges that the nuclear powers are evading their major responsibilities with respect to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and increasing their stockpiles of nuclear weapons. New Delhi is in the vanguard of a Third World movement intent on halting this irresponsibility. Many of these developing countries look to nuclear power as a future means of supplying large amounts of cheap energy, and they fear that the NPT will hinder the development of peaceful nuclear energy. The best way to prevent India from going nuclear would be for the nuclear powers to change their cynical attitudes toward nuclear disarmament, especially toward the NPT. Other factors, such as the fate of Japan's nuclear program, the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to finance major nuclear facilities in developing countries, and the problem of the growing uranium-enrichment technology, will also influence India's decision about nuclear weapons.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

1877
Johnstone, L. Craig. ECOCIDE AND THE GENEVA PROTOCOL. Foreign affairs, v. 49, July 1971: 711-720.
D410.F6, v. 49

The military effectiveness of the tear gas and herbicides used by the United States in the Vietnam War is at best questionable. Tear gas can probably be used more effectively by guerrillas than by conventional forces, and herbicides appear to have hurt Vietnamese civilians more than the insurgents. Excluding tear gas and herbicides from the prohibitions contained in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, as President Nixon has proposed, creates serious problems of establishing clear criteria for the inclusion or exclusion of various gases. On the other hand, U.S. agreement to the inclusion of tear gas and herbicides in the ban would make world opinion on the issue virtually unanimous and thereby enhance the prospects for enforcement of the protocol. It may be true that in isolated cases the use of tear gas and herbicides has proven more humane than other methods, but the typical manner of their use violates the Nation's basic ethical standards. "In recognition of the dangerous consequences of eroding the meaning of the Protocol, and in recognition of the rapidly decreasing requirements for chemical herbicides and tear gas in South Vietnam, there is little question that the United States should now strive to obtain a unanimous interpretation of the Geneva Protocol to prohibit the use in war of all gases, bacteriological weapons and herbicides."

1878
Kanegis, Arthur. YOU CAN'T KEEP A DEADLY WEAPON DOWN. Washington monthly, v. 2, Dec. 1970: 24-27.
E838.W37, v. 2

The Pentagon has been watching with interest the development of a new technique that will make nerve gas safer for battlefield use. The nagging problem of accidental discharge will be eliminated, for the new system's basic components are two chemicals that are safe when separate but lethal when mixed. In addition the "binary weapon" has the advantage of economy since it can be fired from the 155-mm howitzers currently available in Vietnam, and no new delivery systems will be required to fire the gas shell with precision and accuracy. Binary weapons represent a major escalation in the U.S. chemical and biological warfare program, flying in the face of the President's avowed cutbacks in CBW. Clearly these weapons, along with exceptions to the category of chemical weapons made concerning "riot-control agents" and "nonlethal weapons" such as those used in Vietnam, make the highly touted U.S. renunciation of CBW less than significant. In early 1970 the Pentagon was able to declare that U.S. ratification of the 1925 Geneva Protocol would have "no effect on the present chemical warfare program." Given this situation, no international or civilian control seems able to influence the Pentagon's decision on deployment of binary nerve gas.

1879
McElheny, Victor. HERBICIDES IN VIETNAM: JUGGERNAUT OUT OF CONTROL. Technology review, v. 73, Mar. 1971: 12-13. illus.
T171.M47, v. 73

Comments on a survey sponsored by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) to evaluate the effects of American herbicide spraying in Vietnam. The report of the investigation, which was presented at the AAAS meeting in 1970, concentrated on the details of one spraying mission. Although the study team was not intended to concern itself with morality or military efficacy, these issues were active. The report showed that the Army had based its operation on old and faulty intelligence. The area covered was said to be unpopulated, but in fact 5,000 or more civilians were housed in the path of the spray planes. The Army claimed that the area produced surplus food for Communist forces but closer investigation showed that it produced only enough to provide bare subsistence for the residents. In this case,

as in many others, the spraying was directed to areas of the Central Highlands occupied by Montagnard tribes, who are now reduced from self-supporting to refugee status. During the discussion following the report's presentation, it was pointed out that if the U.S. Army cannot show that all destroyed crops had been intended for enemy consumption, then it must stand in violation of its own rules of land warfare.

1880
Meselson, Matthew S. THE HAZARD FOR MANKIND. Scientific world, v. 15, no. 1, 1971: 16-19.
Q1.S8415, v. 15
Reprinted from World Health, Oct. 1970, "slightly abbreviated." RA421.W63W6

Touches upon the nature of chemical and biological weapons and upon international efforts to control them. Meselson summarizes findings of the World Health Organization and of a U.N. study group on chemical and biological weapons. He explores the blurred distinction between lethal and incapacitating weapons and describes specific agents of each sort under the categories of microbes, nerve gases, poisoned weapons, psychochemicals, and plant killers. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 represents the most significant effort at control, but the problem of incapacitants and herbicides has rendered it difficult to interpret. Recently, chemical and biological disarmament, going beyond a ban on their use, has been discussed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

1881
MICROBIOLOGISTS CONDEMN MILITARY RESEARCH IN BIOLOGY. Scientific world, v. 15, no. 2, 1971: 21-23, 20. Q1.S8415, v. 15
"Includes material presented . . . to the Assembly of the International Association of Microbiological Societies by participants at a conference on biological warfare . . . [at] the 10th International Congress for Microbiology" in Mexico, August 7-14, 1970.

Statements, resolutions, and "appeals" issued by groups of individual scientists, national professional societies, and international gatherings in the biological sciences, condemning chemical and biological warfare and urging their prohibition. Represented are the Soviet Union, the United States, Bulgaria, the German Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, Finland, UNESCO, the World Health Organization, India, and Yugoslavia. In his introduction, Academician Málek of Czechoslovakia asserts that the solution to the moral dilemma of scientists engaged in research with possible detrimental consequences "does not lie in a panic flight from science, from its possible dangers and adventures, but in efforts to ensure that the results of science should strengthen its authority for the solution of political problems and thus to prevent the misuse of scientific research."

1882
Studien zur Friedensforschung. [CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND PEACE POLITICS] BC-Waffen und Friedenspolitik, Hrsg. von Ernst-Ulrich von Weizsäcker. Stuttgart, Klett; München, Kösel [1970] 139 p. (Studien zur Friedensforschung, Bd. 6)
JX1952.S88, Bd. 6
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Chemical and biological weapons, by Paul Gerhard Munder.--Chemical and biological weapons in international law, by Knut Ipsen.--Political considerations on the problem of chemical and biological weapons, by Ernst von Weizsäcker.--On the situation of labor as a cause of peacelessness, by Niels Thomsen.--Chemical and biological weapons and the pedagogy of peace, by Elisabeth Throm.--Chemical and biological weapons and our relationship with nature, by Gerhard Liedke.--"Justified violence," acts of violence, and nonviolence in the age of biological weapons, by Ulrich Duchrow.

A collection of reports originating in a series of seminars sponsored by the Association of German Scientists and the Evangelical Studies Community on the military, medical, legal, and, "in the widest sense," political questions of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Munder reviews the most important CBW weapons and possible means of defense. Ipsen reviews the history of efforts to control chemical and biological warfare, emphasizing current trends. Weiszäcker sees no prospect for solving the CBW problem by means currently available. The approaches he suggests call for going beyond the political executives to informed public opinion. Duchrow and Liedke speak from the point of view of concerned Christians, the latter concluding that CBW and even large-scale use of pesticides are irreconcilable with the Christian view of the creation.

1883
UNITED STATES WELCOMES SOVIET MOVE TOWARD BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS BAN. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Apr. 26, 1971: 549.
JX232.A33, v. 64

A statement to the press on March 30, 1971, welcoming the proposal at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of a draft Soviet convention to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins. The United States notes "with satisfaction that many of the ideas in the convention proposed by the United Kingdom are treated in a similar way in the Soviet draft, including the idea of a commitment to further negotiations on chemical weapons and prohibitions regarding toxins that were originally proposed by the United States." The draft "appears to be a serious document which should facilitate negotiations toward a mutually acceptable agreement on biological weapons."

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STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

1884

Brunner, Dominique. [ARE THE SALT TALKS CONDEMNED TO FAILURE?] Sind die SALT zum Scheitern verurteilt? Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 137, Feb. 1971: 77-78, 81-84.
U3.A43, v. 137

The increase in Soviet nuclear power leading to the present parity is not as disturbing as its tempo, which may presage Soviet superiority in the near future. The technological progress on both sides is of prime strategic significance; for example, a doubling of precision over target is 5 1/2 times as effective as a doubling of warhead charges. The importance of this new precision is further enhanced by the advent of the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV). The 420 SS-9's that will be available to the Soviets by 1974-75 will be able to destroy 95 percent of the Minuteman system. Another destabilizing factor is the Soviet expansion of the Galosh defense system. The situation is not yet desperate for the Americans, because what is important is not absolute superiority but the second-strike capability. To retain this capability, the conversion of the various Minutemen to MIRV and of the Polaris submarines to Poseidon and the development of short-range attack missiles (SRAM) are necessary. It is doubtful that success at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks would compensate for abandonment of MIRV construction, and it is also doubtful that any inspection over MIRV is possible. American willingness to limit defense to selected command centers indicates confidence in the second-strike capability, that is, in the MIRV-equipped Poseidon and the SRAM-equipped bomber. The long lead time required for research and development of these weapons systems requires that decisions be made now on whether to build Safeguard and develop the undersea long-range missile system. This year will see whether or not the arms race is accelerated, and "Moscow's position will be decisive."

1885

Caldwell, Lawrence T. SOVIET ATTITUDES TO SALT. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 28 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 75)
U162.A3, no. 75
"Bibliographic note": p. 25-28.

Examines the interaction of the Soviet and American political systems, the relationship between domestic and foreign policies in the Soviet Union in the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and the implication of the action-reaction cycle in both countries. The adjustment of Soviet foreign policy since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which includes, in the case of SALT, cooperating with the positive elements in capitalism, reflects a general tendency toward a modernist orientation characterized by the belief that although socialism will experience dangerous conflicts as long as capitalism exists, the historical balance of forces is in favor of the Socialist system. Caldwell contends that such an orientation is the dominant source of Soviet foreign policy and can be detected in a careful examination of Soviet policy toward SALT. He concludes that in view of this trend the United States should exercise the greatest restraint in deploying weapons systems.

1886

Chalfont, Arthur Gwynne Jones, baron. SALT: NOT QUITE A BREAKTHROUGH. New statesman, v. 81, May 28, 1971: 729. AP4.N64, v. 81

The internal economic problems of the superpowers and their desire to fulfill their disarmament obligations vis-a-vis the nonnuclear powers are partly responsible for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The talks began in an atmosphere characterized by Moscow's and Washington's realizations of the appalling implications of an upward turn in the armaments spiral. Whether they will succeed depends partly upon the implications and future course of China's growing nuclear power and the progress of the agreement to talk about ABM deployment at the next session. The SALT talks "are the most important international negotiations since 1945; any progress, however small, is a matter for cautious optimism."

1887

Gharekhan, C. R. THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. India quarterly, v. 26, July/Sept. 1970: 239-248. D410.I44, v. 26

Sketches the cost of the arms race for the world and for the superpowers and the diplomatic history immediately preceding convocation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Gharekhan ascribes superpower acceptance of negotiations to growing awareness that the arms race preempts revenues needed elsewhere and the apprehension in each country that the other is about to acquire a decisive first-strike capability. Further, the opponents now have fairly accurate ideas about each other's present strategic strength. He describes the deterrence doctrine held by the United States and implicitly recognized by the Soviet Union and the probable present composition of the nuclear-weapon holdings of both powers. Since he thinks the arms race is now largely a technological race, the ABM and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles are discussed. Gharekhan concludes that the issues confronting the SALT negotiators are so complex that prediction of the outcome is difficult. Both sides appear to take the negotiations seriously. If this attitude and the political détente between the two superpowers continue, some understanding may be expected from SALT, "Czechoslovakias and Cambodias notwithstanding."

1888

London. Institute for Strategic Studies. SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: ARMS LIMITA-

TIONS AND POLICY. Feb. 1970. 48 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 65) U162.A3, no. 65

Contents.--The scope for Soviet-American agreement, by Hedley Bull.--The effect of strategic agreements on European-American relations, by Wilhelm Grewe.--Parity, superiority or sufficiency? Some remarks on the nature and future of the Soviet-American strategic relationship, by Johan J. Holst.--Innovation and restraint, by Charles M. Herzfeld.

Probes the issues and ramifications confronting the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Bull finds that these talks will have the best chance of success if the Soviet Union and the United States concentrate on seeking simple and attainable accords, such as a limitation on the overall numbers of deployed launch vehicles. While these talks would probably not create any new problems affecting the Atlantic Alliance, Grewe points out that they might sharpen a number of existing ones. Holst is of the opinion that any limitation agreement would have to be based on some uncomplicated criterion, such as ICBM parity set, perhaps, at 1,000 launchers. The basic question in innovation and restraint in nuclear weapons development and use, Herzfeld feels, is the control of the forces generated by research and development. They can be held in check, he believes, by a clear perception of the natures of these twin concepts and by the design of a policy wherein innovation helps restraint.

1889
Portisch, Hugo. [PEACE THROUGH FEAR. EYEWITNESS IN THE ARSENALS OF ATOMIC WAR] Friede durch Angst. Augenzeuge in den Arsenalen des Atomkrieges. Wien, München, Zürich, Verlag Fritz Molden [1970] 319 p. illus. UA11.P59
Bibliography: p. 317-[319].

Contents.--Attack is self-destruction.--Cavemen and computers.--Spying from space.--"General, can you sleep in peace?"--"I would destroy what I have to destroy."--B-52's--Kennedy deployed them.--Continuously avoiding the enemy.--SS-9 yields its riddle.--How missiles shoot down missiles.--Weapons systems of the future.--New bases for peace.

Foresees that whatever partial agreements may be reached at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) the world will have to live for at least another two decades in the precarious peace dictated by the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers. Portisch describes the complexity of the issues facing the Soviet and American negotiators at SALT and the purposes and peculiarities of the individual weapons systems. The basic question at SALT, as Portisch sees it, is whether an accord can be reached on the basis of an equal number of nuclear weapons for each side. This arrangement would leave the Soviets as the unequal partner and therefore would not be acceptable to them. On the other hand, the Americans are unlikely to give up their advantage and allow the Soviets to catch up. This question of numerical parity is part of the bigger question of mutual distrust born of ideological differences.

1890
Schneider, Mark B. SAFEGUARD, SUFFICIENCY, AND SALT. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, May 1971: 24-33. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

How can the United States protect its vital security interests without undermining the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks? The United States defines its security interests in terms of strategic "sufficiency," but it has neglected so far to procure the weaponry needed to meet that standard. Part of the problem is that growth of the Soviet Union's missile defenses has forced the United States to substitute penetration capability for megatonnage in its strategic weapons, with the result that destructive capability has declined to the point where the U.S. deterrent is in danger. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has not had to contend with this problem, the United States having all but pledged not to deploy much in the way of a missile defense system. The most promising option now open to the United States is to press ahead rapidly with a reorganized Safeguard system. The four sites proposed to protect Minuteman and a new hardpoint defense system that is under development should be rendered operative immediately; deployment of a third stage--some form of national ABM defense--should be delayed. The technical problems of missile defense have been overcome; the decision not to deploy a heavy system would have to rest on political, not technical, grounds. But attacks on the Safeguard system already have led to its modification in ways that reduce its cost effectiveness. By moving the seven sites included in the original Sentinel program (to protect against a Chinese attack) closer to the cities and by reinforcing each of these sites with 100 additional Sprint missiles, the United States, for $700 million, would have a defense system that the Soviet Union could scarcely offset with an expenditure of $5 billion. This modified arrangement would prevent the Soviets from achieving "a disparity of war outcomes in their favor" but would not deprive them of their assured destruction capability. The United States should approve construction of a modified area defense for deployment in the mid-1970's, thereby putting real pressure on the Soviet Union to come to terms in the arms limitation talks.

1891
Sienkiewicz, Stan. GAMBLING WITH THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. Ripon forum, v. 7, June 1971: 17-19, 22. illus. N&CPR

By virtue of its strategic superiority the United States can be flexible, and if need be, can compromise in search of an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. An agreement under present

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circumstances could institutionalize aspects of this superiority, but American negotiators should avoid setting this as a basic goal at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), because the cost of failure, a new round in the arms race resulting from technological breakthroughs, will be far too great. In view of SALT's crucial importance and American superiority, the United States should seriously consider the Soviet Union's desire to include in an agreement American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and a freeze on ABM deployment. Beyond SALT such unilateral actions as pauses in multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle deployment can also be studied. Above all both countries must work to ease the pressures to maintain such a high priority in weapons testing and deployment. The United States and the Soviet Union could find many important alternative uses for the resources currently allocated to defense.

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

1892
Birnbaum, Karl E. PEACE IN EUROPE: EAST-WEST RELATIONS 1966-1968 AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT. London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 159 p. (Oxford paperbacks, 224)
D849.B57 1970
Bibliography: p. 148-151.

Contents.--Introduction.--The West and the European détente, 1966-1968.--The East and the European détente, 1966-1968.--The invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: repercussions in East and West.--Prospects for peace in Europe: the requirements for a better modus vivendi and for an ultimate settlement.--Notes.--Basic documents.--Index.

Assesses the prospects for East-West détente in Europe through an analysis of public statements by policymakers. Birnbaum contends that the chief deficiency of Western policy from 1966 to 1968 was a lack of clarity and consistency sufficient to make it credible to the East. He calls for greater cooperation among West Europeans and a greater awareness and recognition of legitimate Soviet security interests.

1893
Breuer, Wilhelm M. [POSSIBILITIES AND ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM] Möglichkeiten und Vorteile der Kooperation im Rahmen eines europäischen Sicherheitssystems. Marxistische Blätter, v. 9, Mar./Apr. 1971: 18-24. HX6.M32, v. 9

Security and cooperation are inseparable; the one cannot be effective without the other. For that reason the Socialist states of Europe have proposed as the second item on the agenda for a European security conference the broadening of commercial, economic, and technoscientific relations between themselves and the capitalist states of Europe, with the longer range objective of developing political collaboration. This type of cooperation would offer the capitalist states on the continent increased economic activities, fostering greater job security for their workers as a result of new markets and cheaper prices brought on by product specialization, and a real chance to unencumber themselves from economic dependence on the United States. Since capitalist states seek to exploit economic penetration to weaken the Socialist system, they must be forced to accept peaceful coexistence as more than the absence of war. They must accept the political realities on which European security depends: acceptance of the territorial status quo, recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and the renunciation of force as a step toward arms limitation and disarmament. The ratification of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw and the convocation of a European security conference are the most urgent steps to be taken now for the establishment of peace in Europe.

1894
Buschmann, Martha. [ADVOCATES AND OPPONENTS OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE] Befürworter und Widersacher der europäischen Sicherheitskonferenz. Marxistische Blätter, v. 9, Mar./Apr. 1971: 39-45.
HX6.M32, v. 9

Contrasts the views of the Socialist states of Europe and most of the people in the capitalist states of Europe with those of NATO, the Nixon administration, and the ruling circles in the German Federal Republic. The contrast is most evident, the author asserts, in the almost concurrent meetings of NATO and the Warsaw Pact held in Brussels and East Berlin. While the meeting in Brussels sought to forestall a European conference on security and collaboration, holding that only an effective program of deterrence and defense can guarantee the success of such a conference, the meeting in East Berlin regarded the time as ripe for the conference, pointing to the improved environment brought about by the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw. Citing the Nixon policy of dealing from a position of strength, Secretary of State Rogers' admonition to NATO on the perils of agreeing to a security conference, and the attempt by the ruling circles in the Federal Republic to manipulate opinion through the press, the article concludes that it is the task of those West Germans seeking a relaxation of tensions to press the Federal government to support the call for a European security conference.

1895
Dmitriev, Boris. FROM A EUROPE OF CONFLICTS TO A EUROPE OF LASTING PEACE. Current digest of the Soviet press, v. 23, June 8, 1971: 4, 6.
D839.C87, v. 23
Translated from Pravda, May 11, 1971.
Slav Rm

The state of tension engendered in Western Europe by American militarism is so acute that

Brezhnev's proposals for security and cooperation aroused great enthusiasm among the peoples and governments. The Soviet Union has shown that the attainment of détente is within the realm of the possible by the examples of its renunciation-of-force agreement with West Germany and the improvement of its relations with France, Italy, and Austria. In the logic of events the next step should be the convocation of a European security conference, for which all the necessary prerequisites exist. The arguments advanced by Washington against such a conference demonstrate again the fundamental incompatibility of European and American interests. The preliminary conditions stipulated by the North Atlantic bloc will abort the conference. As the last congress of the Soviet Communist Party pointed out, steps toward security must be taken in parallel, without waiting for complete solutions in any one area.

1896
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES--THE PERSPECTIVE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 42, Feb. 1971: 43-49.
JX1162.A33, v. 42

A review of developments affecting the European Communities since the December 1969 meeting at The Hague, prefaced by a brief account of the origin of the communities. The lines of growth projected for the European Communities at The Hague are described in terms of the slogan "completion, deepening, and enlargement." The measures giving the European Economic Community its own fiscal resources, the Barre and Werner proposals for further economic and monetary cooperation, and the Davignon Committee proposal on the possibilities of political integration are discussed. The article concludes that the communities are "evolving slowly but steadily towards increasing supra-nationalism, probably in the form of a confederation," but that the movement toward integration may be more rapid in the economic area than in the political area.

1897
[Galloway, L. Thomas] A MICROCOSMIC VIEW OF THE OAS: THE HONDURAS-EL SALVADOR CONFLICT, by L. T. G. Virginia law review, v. 57, Mar. 1971: 291-314. LL

On July 18, 1969, 4 days after open hostilities began, a cease-fire negotiated by the Organization of American States (OAS) ended the border war between Honduras and El Salvador caused by the alleged mistreatment of the 300,000 Salvadorean immigrants in Honduras. Normal international law affirms the right of a state to intervene militarily in another state to protect its nationals. However, the United Nations Charter has questioned this right, and the matter is still unresolved. The OAS Charter, while denying the right of intervention, can be interpreted as justifying its use to protect the human rights of nationals. The OAS, before and after the crisis, has proven ineffective or incapable of solving two relatively controllable problems--Salvadorean immigration and disputed border areas--let alone their basic underlying social causes, because of the dearth of operative machinery for carrying out this function, and because of traditional Latin American hostility toward intervention, a necessity for effective enforcement. The conflict-management machinery of the OAS proved effective, but this dispute was typical of the situations the OAS has been able to successfully resolve since 1948: "regional conflicts between [small and weak] Central American or Caribbean nations over local issues." Absent were issues over which the organization has stumbled in the past: threats from Communist subversion or to the security of the hemisphere or of the United States. Tension between the two disputants remains, and in general the situation has grown worse. In light of the total failure of regional or OAS efforts to bring about a settlement, another approach is needed. This would involve an OAS resolution, strongly backed by the members, calling for normalization of economic relations, guaranteed by the parties or, if need be, by the OAS. Regional and organizational pressure, not ruling out eventual sanctions, should prompt compliance. Binding arbitration could settle the border dispute. Ideally, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights should be strengthened, but neutral observers could check out offenses against the Salvadoreans in Honduras. A solution to the whole migration issue should be proposed by a special OAS commission. Such short-range measures cannot solve the deeper problems, but without them no start can be made toward basic solutions, and continuing friction and further hostilities will be the only prospects.

1898
Gray, Richard B., comp. LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 1970'S. Itasca, Ill., F. E. Peacock [c1971] 370 p.
F1418.G674
Bibliography: p. [353]-359.

Partial contents.--New wine and old bottles: the changing inter-American system, by John C. Dreier.--The decline of the OAS, by Jerome Slater.--Amended OAS charter goes into effect, by Américas.--The OAS in a period of transition, by Joseph J. Jova.--The "football war" and the Central American Common Market, by Vincent Cable.--U.S. policy regarding military governments in Latin America, by Edwin M. Martin.--U.S. military assistance policy toward Latin America, by Charles A. Meyer.--We should start talking with Castro, by John Plank.--The Rockefeller report on the quality of life in the Americas, by Nelson A. Rockefeller.--Perspectives on Latin America: the need for understanding, by Wayne Morse.--Toward a new policy for Latin America, by Frank Church.

Articles, speeches, and statements, dating from 1963 to 1970, by officials and students of Latin American affairs on developments in the 1960's and

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prospects for the future, with special reference to United States policy. Dreier, Slater, Jova, and the Américas article evaluate the performance of the Organization of American States and its changing role. Cable explores the impact of the 1969 Honduras-El Salvador war on the Central American Common Market; Martin, Meyer, and Plank discuss policies and proposals for hemispheric security; and Governor Rockefeller, former Senator Morse, and Senator Church advocate adoption of new U.S. military policy and other policies toward the region.

1899
Harrison, Selig S. NEHRU'S PLAN FOR PEACE. New republic, v. 164, June 19, 1971: 17-22.
AP2.N624, v. 164

Recalls Prime Minister Nehru's goals for a comprehensive détente in South Asia. As early as 1962 Nehru could visualize a confederation including India, Pakistan, and an autonomous Kashmir. In time the confederation might include some smaller neighbors, such as Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and possibly Ceylon. Blocking such association is West Pakistan's insistence on the "two-nation" theory, the belief that religious groupings, Hindu and Islamic, more than regional, linguistic or cultural similarities, should determine the political structuring of the area. The theory was seemingly violently disproved when Punjabi Muslims from West Pakistan slaughtered Bengali Muslims in East Pakistan, while in India Mrs. Gandhi won a landslide election vote on a clearly secular platform. Harrison believes that India should move to ease tensions by liberalizing its policy toward Kashmir. Any progress towards autonomy for that Islamic-majority area might be interpreted by Pakistan as proof of India's acceptance of the principles of partition. A confederation, difficult though it may be to achieve, still offers the best hope for a stable situation.

1900
Isenberg, Irwin, comp. THE OUTLOOK FOR WESTERN EUROPE. New York, H. W. Wilson Co., 1970. 213 p. illus. (The Reference shelf, v. 42, no. 2)
HC240.I73
Bibliography: p. 203-213.

A series of magazine and newspaper articles dating from 1969 that discuss such issues as European unification, the German problem, U.S. relations with Western Europe, and the future of NATO. Part 1 examines the search for European unity and the numerous obstacles blocking it in the last decade; part 2 notes some of the more important issues connected with the growth of Europe's economic prosperity; part 3 portrays several of the West European countries in terms of their major concerns, such as the political situation in France after De Gaulle and Great Britain's economic crisis; and part 4 looks into East-West relations within a broad political and economic context. The latter part is largely concerned with the impact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on NATO and with U.S. relations with Western Europe and West German relations with Eastern Europe.

1901
Kinsky, Ferdinand. [WITH RESPECT TO "OSTPOLITIK"] A propos de l'"Ostpolitik." L'Europe en formation, v. 12, May 1971: 14-15.
N&CPR

Discusses the favorable and unfavorable aspects of West Germany's Ostpolitik. Kinsky notes that Bonn's East European policy is a step toward détente by virtue of its reconciliatory posture represented by the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, which have affirmed the European territorial status quo. On the other hand, these treaties, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, preclude the creation of a federal European union. He concludes that the Ostpolitik will lead neither to German reunification nor to the dissolution of the two blocs and European unification.

1902
Korbonski, Andrzej. EAST AND WEST EUROPE: A CONTINENT DIVIDED. Current history, v. 60, May 1971: 257-262, 304. D410.C82, v. 60

Despite improved relations between Eastern and Western Europe during the past decade, the chasm between them today remains as wide as ever. In reality the division has been closed only once since World War I--during the Second World War, when Europe was united, at least in the minds and hearts of its people, in a common front against Nazi terror and aggression. After the war the chasm widened again until the 1960's when under De Gaulle's leadership Western Europe began building bridges toward the East. The Moscow-Bonn treaty, West Germany's recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary, and the impending European security conference gave evidence of this. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia shattered hopes of unification, but even if the invasion had not occurred, historical differences and newly shaped attitudes would have made unification almost impossible. Although East Europeans admire Western technology, they are much less impressed with West European political and social systems; few if any want to return to capitalism. Furthermore, East Europeans are aware "that they would once again be forced to take a back seat in the event of a united Europe." On the other hand, internal political and economic problems have led West Europeans to lose interest in any rapprochement with Eastern Europe. Unless it is strongly supported by all the interested parties, unification is likely to take a very long time.

1903
Krosigk, Friedrich von. A RECONSIDERATION OF FEDERALISM IN THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. Journal of Common Market studies, v. 9, Mar. 1971: 197-223.
HC241.J6, v. 9

"Prepared for presentation at the VIII World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich," Sept. 1970.

Examines the "relevance of the federalist approach to integration by tracing some of its most significant theoretical and practical aspects in the present debate over European integration." The introductory review describes the ideological roots of European federalism as found in Kant's philosophy and Jean Monnet's functional approach, as developed by Ernst Haas and Walter Hallstein into the economics-centered version of federal integration. To test the possible existence of a continuous "federalizing process" in which economic integration is the first step, Krosigk analyzes such recent explanations as C. J. Friedrich's concept of federation as a "dynamic process" and Karl W. Deutsch's essential conditions for the "amalgamated security community." Historical examples like the Swiss and German experience in federation are adduced to prove the fallacy of reducing federalism to the category of socioeconomic or organic necessities alone. Krosigk concludes with a criticism of Servan-Schreiber's economic challenge and Friedrich's neo-Kantian culture-formed federation.

1904
Leo, Gerhard. THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. GDR review, v. 16, Apr. 1971: 22-23.
DD261.G2, v. 16

The call of the Socialist states for a European security conference has elicited favorable response from most countries on the continent. Now aware of the indivisible nature of the Socialist states, the Western European countries have come to see the economic benefits that European security would foster. However, the United States is endeavoring, through NATO, to prevent the conference by setting up barriers of preconditions, among them settlement of the West Berlin issue and progress in the talks on arms limitation. The United States then obstructs these talks as a way of precluding the security conference. The German Federal Republic, while professing to favor the conference, has also formulated its own list of preconditions. Not all West European countries support this obstructionism, and backing for the conference is gaining ground in France, Belgium, and Italy. The Socialist call for a European security conference has also taken firm hold throughout the world, for guaranteed security in Europe would be a decisive step for world peace.

1905
Mayne, Richard. THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE: FROM DEVASTATION TO UNITY. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970. 375 p. HC240.M37 1970b
Bibliography: p. 335-358.

Contents.--A generation of change.--The waste land.--The new frontier.--Self-help.--The reluctant St George.--Europe of the states.--The age of anxiety.--Europe and the islands.--The Echternach dance.--Never so good.--The lion and the unicorn.--Remembering the future.--References.--Bibliography.--Index.

Recounts the recovery of Europe from its destruction in World War II against a background of technological and political change that has witnessed the recovered European economy dwarfed by the United States and the Soviet Union and the former power preeminence of Europe likewise reduced by the two superpowers. Mayne pictures the conditions in Europe at war's end and traces Europe's redevelopment from the Marshall Plan, through the Common Market, to current efforts at political integration. He holds out hope for a united Western Europe coexisting with the Communist East and developing into an equal partnership with America. As equals they could exercise a moderating influence on one another, and as partners they could deal more assuredly with the Soviet Union and China.

1906
Medsker, Karen. EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INTEGRATION MOVEMENTS: REPORTS AND ANALYSES. A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF NON-BOOK MATERIALS APPEARING BETWEEN 1965 AND EARLY 1970. Bloomington, Bureau of Public Discussion, Indiana University, 1970. 7 ℓ.
Z2000.M38

A bibliography containing 115 entries on European international organizations and integration. The materials are drawn from journals, newspapers, government, and intergovernmental sources.

1907
Pollard, Vincent K. ASA AND ASEAN, 1961-1967: SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM. Asian survey, v. 10, Mar. 1971: 244-255.
DS1.A492, v. 10

History of the political development of the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) up to the creation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in August 1967. Pollard focuses on the individual and collective self-perception of the member states as revealed through their international relations within the context of contemporary events and their perceptions of Sino-American relations. He points out the difficulties the ASA states encountered in trying to maintain a nonalined organization to attract new members. He contends that the United States became aware of ASA's importance only during the escalation of the politico-military situation in Southeast Asia and that in this period U.S. policies toward ASA merely reinforced the organization's pro-Western ideological alinement. The author concludes that U.S. views on ASA and ASEAN did not represent a significant break from the "containment of China" strategy that had been the basis of U.S. foreign policy objectives over the past two decades.

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1908
[THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAPAN ON THE RETURN OF OKINAWA BY THE UNITED STATES TO JAPAN] Japan socialist review, no. 226, May 1, 1971: 3-22. HX9.J3, 1971

Contents.--We oppose dangerous negotiations on agreement for reversion of Okinawa to Japan; 10 major demands on reversion agreement.--Policy of our party for complete reversion of Okinawa (draft), by the People's Movement Bureau, SPJ.

Outlines the Japanese Socialist Party's proposals for restoring Okinawa to Japanese control. The party demands that the Sato government adopt 10 conditions for this end in the negotiations with the United States. Under existing terms, reversion of the island will lead to the transformation of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty into a de facto "nuclear security treaty covering the whole of Asia" and will become a basic factor in the restoration of Japanese militarism. The party insists on the complete removal of all American military, intelligence, and propaganda installations and all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from Okinawa.

1909
Quilitzsch, Siegmar. ASPECTS OF SOVIET STRUGGLE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. German foreign policy, v. 10, no. 3, 1971: 200-223.
DD261.4.D353, v. 10
Includes bibliographical references.

A consistent proponent of European security as basis for world peace, the Soviet Union is pursuing a four-point foreign policy in regard to Europe: to defend the achievements of the Socialist system; to guarantee the inviolability of the boundaries of allied Socialist states, above all those of the German Federal Republic; to rebuff efforts directed against European security by the imperialist camp, especially by West German revanchists and reactionary circles in the United States and NATO; and to strive for additional measures for the consolidation of security. In formulating its policy the Soviet Union is cognizant of certain changes taking place in the imperialist states; among these are the evaporation of the "myth of a danger from the East," the disenchantment with the United States as a result of its aggression in Vietnam, and a yearning among Western states to liberate themselves from trans-Atlantic dependence. A key issue in European security is the acceptance by all states of the realities of Europe, including unconditional recognition of the permanence of existing boundaries, specifically the Oder-Neisse line and the frontier between the German Democratic Republic and West Germany. Although the peoples of western and northern Europe are looking ever more favorably upon the convocation of a general European security conference, the United States is exerting pressure on NATO states to reject the idea. On the other hand, the Soviet Union regards the conference as a necessary step for bringing about a stabilized peace.

1910
Rumpf, Helmut. [EUROPEAN SECURITY AND ALLIANCE POLITICS] Europäische Sicherheit und Bündnispolitik. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Jan. 1971: 15-27.
D839.A885, v. 22

The proposal for a European security conference raises the question of whether security treaties of any kind (e.g., renunciation of force, demilitarized zones subject to inspection, or collective security pacts) can be reconciled legally and practically with the existing alliance system. A necessary preliminary for understanding is a review of past similar efforts to consider the various types of security pacts and compare their internal logic. The Locarno formula and the Rio pact of 1947 are most relevant. A European security conference would in effect increase the number of states for whose security other nations must act as guarantors. But collective security in Europe must be understood as a supplement, not a replacement, of the alliance system until the very unlikely moment when a U.N. military force is formed and the NATO and Warsaw Pact chiefs of staffs combine their planning. Mutual reduction of armaments and renunciation-of-force agreements do not change the situation in its essentials. Indeed the Moscow-Bonn renunciation-of-force agreement explicitly recognizes the continued existence of the alliances. The effect of the new security conference would be to weaken popular acceptance of the obligations of the alliance system in the West. The best that should be asked of a European security conference is not the dissolution of the alliance system, but its gradual penetration by mutually profitable relationships.

1911
[SECURITY IN EUROPE] Sicherheit in Europa. Moderne Welt, v. 11, no. 4, 1970: 339-388.
D839.M58, v. 11
Article by Wettig also appears as [ON THE SOVIET STRATEGY OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Zur Sowjetischen Strategie der europäischen Sicherheit. Köln [Bundesinstitut für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien] 1970. 29 p. (Berichte des Bundesinstituts für Ostwissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien, 71/1970)
HX15.G648

Partial contents.--Security in Europe, by Peter Coulmas.--European security: the American view, by Anthony Hartley.--Soviet policy in terms of European security, by Gerhard Wettig.--On the road to a European security conference: obstructions, anxieties, and hopes, by Christoph Bertram.

Presents various views on the Soviet call for a European security conference. Although Bonn's détente overtures may have prematurely set in motion Communist initiatives for a security conference, Coulmas holds that the realization of a conference may not be too far off, providing a satisfactory solution to the Berlin problem is found. The United States is reluctant to have the conference take place because, according to Hartley, Soviet

foreign policy is too aggressive, and the Western European states, divided among themselves on many issues, would not be able to match the united front of Eastern states. The best chances for success would come after an accord had been reached at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and a greater communality of Western interests achieved. Although the Soviets have been calling for a security conference since 1954, their motives have not been consistent. Wettig thus thinks that before agreeing to the conference the West should probe the current motive, especially in regard to the implications of the conference for the existing treaty systems; the relationship to Europe of the two superpowers following a security accord; the consequences of a continued military presence of the two superpowers in Europe; and the function that would be assigned to Germany. The chief obstacle to the success of a new security system, Bertram maintains, is the ingrained pattern of thought and procedure that has developed in the two pact systems during the past 20 years. He foresees the possibility that current Western concern over the present military imbalance will be exacerbated by a security conference. Should the conference be held, he feels that its success depends on setting more modest goals.

1912
Soldatos, Panayotis. [GENERAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS] Aspects sociologiques généraux du processus d'intégration européenne. Il Politico, v. 35, Dec. 1970: 719-740. JA18.P65, v. 35

Calls a terminological analysis of the precise meanings of the concept "integration" a necessary preliminary to its "European meanings" studied in this report. This terminological analysis is conducted from the point of view of economics, sociology, and social psychology before going on to the European dimensions of the integration concept. The succeeding analytical and descriptive study of the evolution of European integration is focused on the suppression of violence as a means of settling differences, on types of compromises evolved, and on the development of European solidarity. European integration is studied in terms of two descriptive factors, stage and degree, and two explicatory factors, conditions and actors. Soldatos explains how emphasizing these four factors can enrich the conceptual schemes of the European integration process associated with Deutsch, Haas-Schmitter, and Nye. He concludes that the sociology of European integration can be understood only by the combined efforts of those working in the two areas of internal and international politics.

1913
Spender, Sir Percy C. EXERCISES IN DIPLOMACY; THE ANZUS TREATY AND THE COLOMBO PLAN. [New York] New York University Press [1970, c1969] 303 p. DU29.S647 1970

Describes the negotiations leading to the Pacific Security Treaty of 1951 (the ANZUS Treaty) and the Colombo Plan for Cooperative Development in South and Southeast Asia. Spender contends that after two decades these treaties remain the central pillars of Australia's foreign policy. A speech by the author delivered at the Japanese peace conference in 1951 is appended.

1914
Terfve, Jean. [THE URGENCY OF EUROPEAN SECURITY] Europäische Sicherheit vordringlich. Marxistische Blätter, v. 9, Mar./Apr. 1971: 8-17. HX6.M32, v. 9

Recounts recent events in Europe conducive to holding a European security conference, the preliminary step for achieving an urgently needed collective security system, and flails U.S. imperialists for blocking a conference. The article contends that the bloc system instigated by the United States and the armament race it has caused afford no security and heighten the risk of war. As the myth of any threat to capitalist Europe from the Socialist states is exposed, and as Western Europe's close ties to the United States relax by virtue of the weakened U.S. position in the world, the capitalist states of Europe are beginning to accept the desirability of a European security conference. The recent agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and Poland indicate an improved environment for the conference. On the other hand, the United States, fearful lest its goal of stabilizing its claims to paramountcy in Europe be undermined, is applying the brakes to the movement, as was evident at the December meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. European collective security is possible, the article concludes, but it can be attained in the near future only if the forces of peace and progress throw their weight into the balance.

1915
Tudyka, Kurt P. [ASPECTS OF THE INTEGRATION OF WESTERN EUROPE] Aspekte der westeuropäischen Integration. Neue politische Literatur, v. 16, no. 1, 1971: 89-104. H5.N38, v. 16

A critical review of recent literature on the integration of Western Europe. The review is divided into three sections: history and teaching, economics and associations, and theory of integration.

1916
Watt, Donald C. BRITAIN AND A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. In Royal United Services Institute, London. Journal, v. 116, June 1971: 35-38. illus. U1.R8, v. 116

The British Foreign Office seems to have accepted, reluctantly, that a European security conference will in fact take place and now tries only to

minimize its possible impact. This reaction may lose excellent opportunities for forcing the Soviet Union into making decisions that might embroil it with its minor allies. It also disowns what is historically the Foreign Office's own idea. By offering a conference Moscow wins a psychological victory in the West; by not accepting the offer the West loses a chance to promote the real differences existing in Eastern Europe. Any reduction in the dimensions of Soviet superiority in infantry, armor, and medium missiles would be well worth a conference and might repair the gradual weakening of the military position of the NATO forces now taking place. There is an imperative need to institutionalize "the arms balance in central Europe in the way the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has, for all its faults, come to institutionalise the balance of nuclear power." The negotiators at the conferences should exploit the conflict between military and economic claims in Soviet society and between the Soviets and their allies to diminish Soviet military superiority.

1917
Wild, Dieter. [SOVIET YEARNING FOR THE VIENNA CONGRESS] Sowjet-Sehnsucht nach dem Wiener Kongress. Spiegel, v. 25, May 31, 1971: 82, 84-85.
AP30.S66, v. 25

The Soviets are fervently seeking the convocation of a European security conference as a means of legitimizing the status quo in Europe as the Vienna Congress did in 1815. As part of that same drive for legitimation, the Soviets are most desirous of speedy ratification of the Treaty of Moscow by the West German Government. Ratification, however, is being held up pending satisfactory settlement of the Berlin question. A settlement is difficult for the Soviets because of the unwillingness of the East German Government to make any concessions. One alternative to this impasse, from the Soviet point of view, is a one-sided promise by Moscow to reach such-and-such an agreement with the Americans on Berlin in return for ratification prior to the actual signing of Berlin accords. This ploy would place the onus for failure on the Americans, who are suspected anyway, in some quarters, of sabotaging the Berlin talks to prevent the holding of a European security conference. Once the treaty has been ratified and some arrangement arrived at on the Berlin question, the way will be paved for the security conference. This conference, in turn, will be the means for compensating East Germany for whatever concessions are necessary on Berlin, for the seating of the East German delegation at the conference would be tantamount to de jure recognition by the West, something the East Germans have long sought.

1918
Woronoff, Jon. VIEW POINT: THE CASE FOR AN AFRICAN DEFENSE ORGANIZATION. Africa report, v. 16, June 1971: 23-25. DT1.A217, v. 16

The November 1970 invasion of Guinea (Conakry) raises the question of the possible utilization of the Organization of African Unity as an African defense mechanism. Such a mechanism would have an advantage over U.N. intervention, in that it would not be influenced by cold war considerations. The past activity of the Organization of African Unity in keeping the peace among its members will doubtless be expanded in view of intra- and inter-African problems and the liberation movement being mounted against white hegemony. An African Defense Organization of the kind suggested in the 1965 Freetown meeting of the Defense Commission is now financially and politically feasible.

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS (OCEAN, SEABED, SPACE, ETC.)

1919
Bazell, Robert J. NUCLEAR TESTS: BIG AMCHITKA SHOT TARGET OF MOUNTING OPPOSITION. Science, v. 172, June 18, 1971: 1219-1221. illus.
Q1.S35, v. 172

Wide opposition has been raised against the underground nuclear test the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) plans to conduct this fall on the island of Amchitka in the Aleutians. Test opponents fear the blast might set off an earthquake, with a concurrent destructive seismic sea wave. Hearings held by the Environmental Protection Agency found that the only witnesses favoring the test were from the AEC. Many others testified against the project. Critics expressed concern for the many animals who shelter on the island, while others charged that the missile for which the warhead was being tested was no longer necessary or that it could be evaluated adequately on paper. Some observers feared that the testing might threaten the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or stir up anti-American feeling in Japan or Canada. A Senate fight may develop when the AEC authorizations bill, which includes funds for the test, comes to the floor. Environmental lobbying groups are confident they can block the proposed test.

1920
Feigl, Hubert. [THE CONQUEST OF THE SEABED: TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF THE SEA AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS] Die Eroberung des Meeresbodens: Technische Möglichkeiten der Meeresnutzung und ihre Bedeutung für die internationale Politik. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, May 10, 1971: 303-315.
D839.E86, v. 26

Recommends international agreements to define those oceanic areas reserved for national interests of the coastal states and those for peaceful international exploitation. Agreements to establish an international body to oversee the use of

the seabeds and to guarantee a fair share of their wealth to all states, including landlocked and developing countries, should also be reached. Feigl urges that speedy action be taken, before the more useful areas of the seabed are appropriated by national interests.

1921
Gasteyger, Curt. [SEA POWER TODAY] Seemacht heute. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 50, Feb. 1971: 949-956. AP32.S47, v. 50

The appreciation of seapower as an instrument of international power and security politics is enhanced by the present scientific and technical revolution. Modern technology reveals unbounded possibilities in the extensive exploitation of the oceans for civil and military purposes. The spirit of technological innovation characteristic of modern industrialized nations is augmented by an awareness of the imminent depletion of land resources. The expansion of maritime commerce, particularly the new oil tankers, the introduction of new techniques and mechanisms like hovercraft, and the opening of the northern sea routes are symptoms of an industrial revolution. In the same way, technology can be expected to effect a military revolution for countries with the know-how and means for mastery of the sea. After space and nuclear weapons, the sea has become the third area of superpower competition. Recent British and French official pronouncements indicate that the old naval powers will continue to compete, and Japan and China can be expected to join. Whether superpower domination of the oceans, the so-called "maritime bipolarity," will contribute to increasing world tensions remains to be seen.

1922
Stevenson, John R. THE SEARCH FOR EQUITY ON THE SEABEDS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 64, Apr. 19, 1971: 529-533. JX232.A33, v. 64

Address "made before the Indian Society of International Law at New Delhi on Feb. 9," 1971.

Outlines the U.S. approach to the problem of achieving equity in international control over the seabed and its resources. Stevenson identifies major sources of inequity in present arrangements, chiefly the different geographical circumstances of states and their different levels of economic and technological achievement, and then takes up U.S. proposals for the establishment of an international regime to control the seabed beyond a depth of 200 meters and an International Trusteeship Area comprising the continental margin beyond the 200-meter curve. These U.S. proposals, besides ensuring an equitable sharing of the resources of the seabed, would "make a major contribution to the avoidance of international conflict in the oceans through . . . provision for generally agreed rules and compulsory dispute-settlement procedures and the building of stronger and more effective international institutions."

1923
Stone, Oliver L. THE UNITED STATES DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AREA. Tulane law review, v. 45, Apr. 1971: 527-545. LL

Argues that the draft convention, insofar as it pertains to oil and gas rights, is in need of "substantial revision." Stone, general counsel of the Shell Oil Co., expresses the hope that the draft as it now stands will not form the basic U.S. position.

1924
UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE. In Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. External affairs, v. 23, Apr. 1971: 123-124. JX351.A3, v. 23

Ninth in a series "describing the work of the Legal Divisions of the Department of External Affairs."

Discusses the Canadian role in the Legal Subcommittee and the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the U.N. Outer Space Committee, which are studying a convention on international liability for damages from space objects and the registration and identification of objects launched into outer space. The Direct Broadcast Satellites Working Group and Canada's role in it are also mentioned.

VIOLATION, INSPECTION, VERIFICATION, AND ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS

1925
Evernden, Jack F., and John Filson. REGIONAL DEPENDENCE OF SURFACE-WAVE VERSUS BODY-WAVE MAGNITUDES. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, May 10, 1971: 3303-3308. QC811.J6, v. 76

The observed regional dependence of surface-wave (M_s) versus body-wave (m_b) magnitudes of underground explosions is due to differences in attenuation of body-waves beneath different source and station sites. The yield of an underground explosion is more easily and accurately estimated from M_s than from m_b. (Abstract supplied)

1926
Healy, J. H., Chi-Yu King, and M. E. O'Neill. SOURCE PARAMETERS OF THE SALMON AND STERLING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM SEISMIC MEASUREMENTS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, May 10, 1971: 3344-3355. QC811.J6, v. 76

The source parameters for the Salmon and Sterling nuclear explosions can be approximated by an equivalent source involving a step function of pressure inside an elastic spherical cavity. The

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parameters of this theoretical model were determined for Salmon and Sterling by fitting the spectral ratios of the seismic signals. The elastic radius for Salmon is 169 meters; that for Sterling is 29 meters. The ratio of pressures at these radii is about 4. The values of the parameters determined from seismic data are in good agreement with the values determined from gages in the salt dome near the source. The success of this technique suggests that source parameters for small earthquakes might be determined from their spectral ratios. Estimates of the decoupling factor based on this model are in close agreement with values reported in the literature. (Abstract supplied)

1927
Hosmer, Craig. ON COMPREHENSIVE TEST BANS. Remarks in the House of Representatives, June 30, 1971. Congressional record, 92d Congress, 1st session, v. 117, H6190-H6193.
J11.R5, v. 117

Takes issue with a Washington Post report of Apr. 11, 1971, on the results of a meeting sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency in July 1970 at Woods Hole, Mass., to explore recent advances in seismic detection and discrimination of underground nuclear explosions. The Post article, which contended, among other things, that the United States now has the capacity to detect and identify 1-kiloton nuclear explosions, was based on a meeting summary that had been disapproved for publication by the Department of Defense on the ground that it was not an accurate reflection of the views of those who participated in the discussions. Texts of the disapproved summary and one that was later approved for publication are appended.

1928
Liebermann, Robert C., and P. W. Basham. EXCITATION OF SURFACE WAVES BY THE ALEUTIAN UNDERGROUND EXPLOSION MILROW (OCTOBER 2, 1969). Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, June 10, 1971: 4030-4034. QC811.J6, v. 76

The average surface-wave and body-wave magnitudes of Milrow are determined to be M_s=4.94 and m_b=6.47. Individual station magnitudes scatter by at least one unit about these averages. Milrow generated significantly smaller surface waves than earthquakes of comparable m_b from the same geographical and tectonic region. These observations are consistent with those for the Aleutian underground explosion Longshot (October 29, 1965) and with similar M_s versus m_b studies in other regions of the world that use data from a large number of seismograph stations covering a wide range of azimuth and epicentral distance. (Abstract supplied)

1929
Lukasik, Steven. SEISMIC MONITORING OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. Statement before the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Extension of remarks of the Hon. Craig Hosmer, of California, in the House of Representatives, July 1, 1971. Congressional Record, 92d Congress, 1st session, v. 117: E6989-E6991.
J11.R5, v. 117

Text of a statement made before an informal meeting of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in which the U.S. representative to the conference discusses matters relating to the seismic monitoring of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Lukasik's remarks are based on recent findings of an extensive seismic research program being conducted by the United States expressly for the purpose of determining to what extent seismic monitoring can be depended upon for the enforcement of a comprehensive ban. Great progress has been made in this field in recent years and it now appears that "the problem of discriminating earthquakes from explosions by seismic means is a difficult but not totally insoluble problem." On the other hand, background noises and the various possibilities for intentionally masking an underground test impose inescapable limits on seismic detection and discrimination capability and thus on the seismic monitoring of a treaty.

1930
Perret, William R. JORUM EARLY AFTERSHOCK MEASUREMENTS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, Apr. 10, 1971: 2730-2734.
QC811.J6, v. 76

An instrumentation system devised specifically to aid in differentiating the locus of early aftershocks in the vicinity of a large underground nuclear explosion was tested during the Jorum event in September 1969. This system included six stations located on three radii from Jorum surface zero. Records from these stations included 115 aftershocks during the initial three-hour postshot period. Arrival times from the 40 largest events during the first hour indicated that 12 were in the chimney area and 28 were at distances between 100 meters and 6.3 kilometers from the explosion. Six events appear to be directly associated with faults identified prior to the shock, and two groups near surface zero suggest new faults in that vicinity. Four later aftershocks, identified in Seismological Notes (Seismological Society of America) for September and October 1969, were found to be within the chimney area. (Abstract supplied)

1931
Tsai, Yi-Ben, and Keiiti Aki. AMPLITUDE SPECTRA OF SURFACE WAVES FROM SMALL EARTHQUAKES AND UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, June 10, 1971: 3940-3952.
Q811.J6, v. 76

Theoretical amplitude spectra of surface waves in a layered half-space are compared with the observed spectra for 13 underground nuclear explosions in the Nevada Test Site and for 12 earthquakes in the Gulf of California and in the United

States. The amplitude spectral shape of Rayleigh waves for periods 10-50 sec from explosions does not vary much with the shot medium and the shot yield. Neither the source time function nor the finite source size appears to be the primary cause of the difference in spectral shape between underground nuclear explosions and small earthquakes. Rather, it is due to the small difference in focal depth and the different depth dependence of spectrum for different source mechanisms. Our result gives a theoretical basis for the use of amplitude spectra of Rayleigh waves at long periods as seismic discriminants between underground explosions and earthquakes. (Abstract supplied)

1932

Wilson, Gerald G., and William A. Millard. PERFORMANCE AND FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SANDHAWK FAMILY OF ROCKET SYSTEMS. Journal of spacecraft and rockets, v. 8, July 1971: 783-789. illus.
T1787.A62A2, v. 8

References: p. 788-789.
"Presented as Paper 70-1398 at the AIAA 2nd Sounding Rocket Technology Conference, Williamsburg, Va., December 7-9, 1970 . . . supported by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission."

Sandia Laboratories has been developing sounding or meteorological rocket systems, first for use in support of atmospheric nuclear testing and later, with ratification of the limited nuclear test ban treaty, as part of the Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear-test readiness programs. The Sandhawk rocket motor was developed to handle a sounding rocket with a heavier and larger payload than before. Work is continuing on the systems, with the latest advance, the Terrier-Sandhawk 17 system, designed to facilitate bulkier experiments. Data confirm that the Sandhawk systems are reliable and useful research instruments.

1933

Wyss, Max, Thomas C. Hanks, and Robert C. Liebermann. COMPARISON OF P-WAVE SPECTRA OF UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS AND EARTHQUAKES. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, Apr. 10, 1971: 2716-2729.
QC811.J6, v. 76

The *P*-wave displacement spectra of the underground explosions Milrow and Longshot are compared with those of four shallow earthquakes of similar body-wave magnitude (m_b) in the Aleutian Islands. The spectral data ($0.5 \leq T \leq 33$ sec) have been obtained from three vertical instruments at Pasadena, approximately 50° from the epicentral region common to the six events. A Novaya Zemlya explosion of comparable m_b was also analyzed. The peak spectral amplitude for the earthquakes occurs at periods several times larger than for comparable m_b explosions, indicating that the earthquakes have source dimensions several times larger than the explosions. For $T < 1.5$ sec, the spectra for both types of events are comparable; the absolute level and the rates of decay (ω^{-2}) with increasing frequency are the same. The *Q*-corrected explosion spectra peak sharply in the interval 2 sec $> T \geq 1$ sec and decrease at least as far as ω for longer periods. The earthquake spectra, however, continue to increase to a long-period level. The greatest differences in spectral amplitudes for the events considered occur at periods longer than 3 sec. The observed differences in the *P*-wave spectra provide a promising method for discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions. (Abstract supplied)

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES

1934

ADJUSTMENTS OF THE U.S. ECONOMY TO REDUCTIONS IN MILITARY SPENDING. Edited by Bernard Udis. [Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] 1970. 598 p. (ACDA/E-156)
DLC

Contents.--Overview and summary, by Bernard Udis.--The many dimensions of the military effort, by Bernard Udis and Murray L. Weidenbaum.--The impact of disarmament on aggregate economic activity--an econometric analysis, by Lawrence R. Klein and Kei Mori.--Dimensions of the impact of reduced military expenditures on industries, regions and communities, by John H. Cumberland.--Military expenditures and the economic growth of the Northeast corridor, by Robert T. Crow.--The community impact of military installations, by Darwin W. Daicoff.--The adjustment of DoD civilian and military personnel, by Darwin W. Daicoff.--The individual and the defense mass-layoff, by B. Curtis Eaton.--Balance of payments impact of a Vietnam disengagement, by Emile Benoit.--The impact of the defense industry on the structure of the American economy, by Kenneth E. Boulding.--Intergovernmental resource transfers, by Darwin W. Daicoff.--Industrial adjustments to military expenditures, by Murray L. Weidenbaum.--Organizational and administrative factors affecting shifts in defense expenditures, by Graham T. Allison.--Societal turnability: a theoretical treatment, by Amitai Etzioni.

A study of "the likely impact of reduced military expenditures on the economy of the United States and . . . some of the more pressing problems which may be encountered in the shift of resources from military to non-military uses." The study suggests that "the economy of the United States possesses sufficient vitality and flexibility to absorb such reduced military spending as is assumed in this study without serious dislocations." The impact would be uneven throughout the economy, however, with the result that for some areas the stresses of transition would be noticeably more painful than for others. Furthermore, predictions of a smooth transition assume advance planning and effective cooperation.

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1935
National Planning Association. COMMUNITY INFORMATION SYSTEM: A METHOD FOR EVALUATION OF COMMUNITY DISLOCATION SENSITIVITY AND ADJUSTMENT POTENTIAL. Washington, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1967. 10 v. in 1.
HC110.D4N32

Prepared for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under contract ACDA/E-88.
Bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Summary and recommendations.--Formulation of the information system.--Construction of the information system.--Interpretation and use of the information system.--Appendixes: Information system for nine areas (printed as vol. 2-10).--Bibliographic notes.

Concerned with the economic impact that a reduction or shift in defense spending may have on a community. Provides guidelines for gathering data that a community may employ in assessing its dependence on defense income and its potential ability to adjust to changes or reductions. Tests of such information systems are reported for nine regions. Appendixes and tables are included.

1936
Shearer, Derek. REORGANIZING THE LINES OF POWER. Nation, v. 212, May 17, 1971: 618-623.
AP2.N2, v. 212

Formulation of a workable political program for economic conversion is hampered by varying definitions and analyses of the problem. The spring 1971 conference of the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy on economic conversion brought out this confusion. Some participants felt that the problem would be solved by Government encouragement of market forces to move defense industries into domestic endeavors. Others suggested liberal relief and retraining programs for workers from firms in transition to alleviate political resistance to defense conversion. But Senator Proxmire, citing rising defense expenditures, came closest to the heart of the matter when he questioned the existence of a conversion problem. Present and proposed defense projects and weapons systems in the strategic and conventional areas, along with the military aid costs inherent in the Nixon doctrine, presage large defense budgets for the future. Unfortunately the conference ignored the question of political strategies to reduce the defense budget and thereby begin conversion of some defense industries. Since outlays for World War II ended the Depression, defense expenditures have been the mainstay of continuing economic prosperity. As a solution, defense firms should be nationalized, with those not necessary for defense production converted to production for social priorities. The defense budget should be drastically reduced and savings channeled into a wide range of domestic uses. The problem is basically one of restructuring power in the society. Conversion cannot become a reality until the American people understand this.

OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

1937
[A NEW EPOCH FOR EUROPE?] Eine neue Epoche für Europa? Spiegel, v. 25, June 14, 1971: 84-85. illus.
AP30.S66, v. 25

Western diplomats in Moscow are convinced that the Soviet Union is serious in its initiatives for troop reductions along both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Soviet Union's worldwide commitments are costing billions of rubles that are urgently needed to meet domestic demands for consumer goods. Brezhnev's "signal from Tiflis" announcing Soviet readiness to enter into negotiations for a reduction of forces in Central Europe, Kosygin's more recent statement on the dawn of a "totally new stage of international relations in Europe," and Brezhnev's latest and unambiguous explanation that troop reductions may involve national as well as foreign troops, all point up the seriousness of the Soviet desire. The Soviet Union is also prompted by the conflicts with host countries arising from the stationing of Soviet garrisons in Eastern Europe.

1938
Beglow, Spartak. [TROOP REDUCTION ON THE AGENDA] Truppenreduzierung auf der Tagesordnung. Sowjetunion heute, v. 16, June 1, 1971: 27.
DK266.A25784, v. 16

Commends the Brezhnev initiative for negotiation, without prior conditions, on an agreement to reduce military forces and armaments in Central Europe, and cites the noncommital nature of the Washington response. Pointing to the Soviet concept for lessening the peril of confrontation through regional collective security as the frame of reference for considering the 1970 NATO suggestion for a mutual balanced force reduction, the author holds that the goals of troop reductions should be more than the mere continuation of the balance of power; rather, he contends, it should be a step toward disarmament and general European security.

1939
Berg, Ole. SECURITY POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. Cooperation and conflict, no. 1, 1971: 31-38.
DL55.C66, 1971

The following is an attempt to define more precisely that concept of security which has been customarily utilized in security policy research. After commencing with a definition of security as 'the likelihood of surviving', some of the preconditions for a high national security and the prospects for a national security policy within the future international system are discussed. Among other things an attempt is made to indicate how a rational security policy will imply a gradual relinquishing of national autonomy together with efforts aimed at reducing one-sided dependence situ-

ations among pairs of nations. (Abstract supplied)

1940
Haas, Paul. THE RULISON PROJECT IN RETROSPECT. Nuclear news, v. 14, May 1971: 55-59. illus.
QC770.N75, v. 14

Using the results of an investigation of the Rulison Project, which was a test of the feasibility of using underground nuclear explosions to tap low-permeability gas fields on a commercial basis, seeks to reach conclusions concerning the hazards involved in such a program, the validity of objections raised by opponents of the project, and the adequacy of Government and industry precautions against potential dangers. Haas asserts that much of the controversy surrounding this and similar Government projects has resulted from failure of the Atomic Energy Commission to keep the public informed. Safety precautions taken by the Commission for Rulison do appear to have been quite adequate. Nevertheless, large-scale applications of the techniques used in that shot would involve radiological and seismic dangers to a still-unknown extent, and though gas stimulation with nuclear explosions may yet become a commercial reality, further experiments must be conducted and the risks and benefits carefully and honestly weighed.

1941
May, Donald. TAC NUKES: A MORE PERSONAL DELIVERY. Washington monthly, v. 2, Dec. 1970: 28-33.
E838.W37, v. 2

Interest in tactical nuclear weapons has been increasing. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has recently begun to study them, and there is some indication that the Soviets would like to discuss them at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Thousands of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe and elsewhere have been generally forgotten by the public. These weapons, useful primarily on the battlefield, come in a variety of sizes and styles, and some are almost as large as strategic weapons. Indeed, distinguishing between the two may be difficult. The tactical nukes, mostly in the Hiroshima bomb range, were originally intended to deter Soviet invasion of Europe. Current discussion centers around the development of very small weapons or "mininukes" that could be directed at specific targets with low civilian damage in the surrounding areas. It has been suggested that such weapons might be used to replace some U.S. ground forces in Europe, but objections to their deployment include problems of inspection and verification and the fact that they might render the use of nuclear weapons "socially acceptable."

1942
Mehnert, Klaus. ["RULES OF PLAY" IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE?] "Spielregeln" des ideologischen Kampfes? Osteuropa, v. 21, May 1971: 289-292.
DR1.08, v. 21

Advocates the adoption of rules of play in East-West polemics as a means of reducing tensions. Taking his cue from the changed tone in the press and broadcast media following the signing by Bonn of the accords with Moscow and Warsaw, the author explores ways of moderating the propaganda excesses by both sides. He suggests four rules: renunciation of inflammatory assertions, refusal to print or air material designed to incite political action by the other side, better documentation of unproved or unattributed information, and rebuttal time in cases of attacks against persons or the press.

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AT BEGINNING OF VOLUME.

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